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Abstract
This thesis shows how an emissions trading scheme can help African countries contribute to the goal
of stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This is done through an
assessment of the gaps in Africa’s climate change mitigation policy architecture and the potential
benefits of emissions trading as a policy instrument—including lessons learned from emissions
trading schemes implemented in the US, the EU, New Zealand, and Chile. The thesis concludes that
adopting an emissions trading scheme as a policy instrument in Africa could potentially close the
gaps in its policy architecture.
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Chapter 1

1

Climate Change and the UNFCCC

1.1 Introduction
This thesis argues for the inclusion of emissions trading in Africa’s climate change
mitigation policy architecture. Emission trading is a system of environmental regulation
that allows polluters flexibility in complying with environmental goals. A firm can
comply either by reducing emissions from its own facility or by acquiring emission
reductions from another facility, so long as the total allowable emissions is not exceeded.
This kind of environmental regulation can help African countries meet their individual
obligations to mitigate climate change. It can be a veritable source of carbon finance to
African countries that can be used to achieve a low carbon growth.
The global carbon market has been marginal in Africa’s fight against climate change.
1

Africa’s share in the global carbon market is a meagre 2 percent. The carbon market is
important in the fight against climate change, because by placing a market value on
emission reduction activities, it will incentivize the need for development along a low
emissions pathway. The countries most threatened by climate change are currently on the
sidelines of an important revenue source for combating the challenges of climate change,
even as carbon is steadily becoming the most traded commodity in the world. The value
of the global carbon market grew to 176 billion dollars in 2011 and the market is
2

expected to grow more in the future. An emissions trading scheme can aid in Africa’s
integration in the global carbon market through the linking of the proposed scheme to the

1

World Bank Press Release No: 2012/417/ACF, online:
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:23182183~pagePK:64257043~
piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html?cid=3001_2> Africa currently has 85 registered CDM projects
representing just 2 percent of the 4000 projects registered by the CDM Executive Board.
2

World Bank, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012 (Washington, DC: Carbon Finance, World
Bank May 2012) at 9.

2

global carbon market. Emissions trading can also help Africa reduce its emissions.
Historically, Africa’s contribution to the global greenhouse pool has been small.
The region was estimated to have contributed only 3.57 percent of the world’s total
3

carbon dioxide emissions in 1988. However, there is an upward trend to Africa’s
greenhouse gas emissions even as countries undergo development. Developing countries
in Africa, particularly the least developed countries, are in a phase of massive
infrastructure build-up, and failure to immediately leapfrog to low carbon technologies
could lead to a lock-in in high-emissions systems for decades to come.

4

Emissions trading can also help Africa prepare for a carbon-constrained future. At some
point in the international climate change negotiations, developing countries may be asked
to assume more responsibility in the fight against climate change by assuming quantified
emissions limitation obligations and reduction commitments. Emissions trading can help
Africa prepare for such a time. Implementing an emissions trading scheme would make
African countries cultivate the culture of sustainable development, or climate compatible
growth.
The legal questions to be addressed in this thesis are as follows: “What are the gaps in
Africa’s climate change mitigation policy architecture?” and, “Would adopting emissions
trading as a policy instrument close the gaps in Africa’s climate change policy
architecture?”
The former question will be answered by looking at the mitigation platforms for
developing countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

3

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Action Plan of the Environment Initiative, at 62 online:
<http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Environment%20Action%20Plan.pdf>. NEPAD is the socioeconomic
development framework for Africa adopted by African leaders in July 2001.
4

AMCEN, Addressing Climate Change Challenges in Africa: A Practical Guide Towards Sustainable
Development (AMCEN Secretariat 2011), at 91. AMCEN is the African Ministerial Council on the
Environment.

3
5

Change (UNFCCC), their implementation to date in Africa and the proposed carbon tax
in South Africa.
Africa’s mitigation policy is not yet developed, as African countries have generally
6

placed less emphasis on mitigation of climate change, with the exception of South
Africa.
The latter question will be answered by looking at the nature of emissions trading as a
climate change mitigation policy instrument and the potential benefits of its adoption as a
greenhouse gas mitigation policy in Africa.
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one will be introductory; it provides a
background for the ideas to be discussed in this thesis. This chapter will address the
concept of climate change and its scientific basis. An understanding of the scientific basis
of climate change is important in knowing why climate change is a problem and why the
world must act to tackle this problem. This will then be followed by a discussion of the
legal framework governing climate change. This chapter also highlights the research
methodology to be adopted and the scholarly significance of this research work. Chapter
Two will be an analysis of CDM and REDD+ implementation in Africa; it will also
contain an analysis of the proposed carbon tax in South Africa and NAMA design.
Chapter Three will deal with the evolution of emissions trading as a policy instrument
and its theoretical framework. It will also present the potential benefits of the policy and
its viability in the African context. Chapter Four will present possible downsides of
implementing an emissions trading scheme in Africa. Chapter Five will discuss ETS
success stories, along with lessons from ETS reviews. Chapter Six concludes the
arguments in the thesis.

5

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, 31 ILM 849
(entered into force 21 March 1994).
6

See AMCEN supra note 4 at 84.

4

1.2 Literature Review
Climate Change is now a recognised problem; scholars have been pontificating on the
kind of policy intervention that is needed to solve the challenge. The type of policy
intervention recommended by scholars depends on whether the country is a developing
country or a developed country. This is important for this study because Africa is a
developing region. According to the World Bank, a developing country, “is one in which
the majority lives on far less money—with far fewer basic public services—than the
7

population in highly industrialized countries.” A developing country can be a middleincome country. A middle-income country is a country that has made great strides
entering the world economy and is creating better paying jobs, better and equitable
education and health facilities and is investing in infrastructural development; but still
8

faces substantial development challenges. There are currently 22 middle-income
countries in Africa; they are Botswana, Cape Verde, South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia,
Seychelles, Swaziland, Angola, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana,
Nigeria, Zambia, Sudan, Cameroun, , Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritania, Sao
Tome & Principe, Senegal. They have crossed the $1000 GDP per capita threshold.

9

Within the developing country category, there is a subcategory called the “least
developed country” category. A least developed country is, “a low income country
suffering from the most severe structural impediments to development.”

10

After examining all the policy options available to national governments, Robert Stavins
concluded that tradable permit schemes are more suited to the climate change challenge

7

About Development, online: World Bank
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,contentMDK:20147486~menuPK:
344190~pagePK:98400~piPK:98424~theSitePK:95474,00.html>.
8

Ibid.

9

F. Wolfgang, “Africa`s MICs” (19 November 2012), online: World Bank Blog
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/africas-mics>.
10

LDC Information: Criteria for Identifying Least Developed Countries, online: United Nations
Development Policy and Analysis Division
<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_criteria.shtml>.

5

than any other policy instrument because of their cost effectiveness, since the cost of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions is exceptionally great. He also advocated for an
international tradable permit scheme because of the global nature of climate change.
Involving all countries in this scheme could lead to transfer of wealth for developing
countries.

11

Ackerman and Stewart argued along the same line, positing that emissions

trading programs hold great promise as cost effective methods for achieving
environmental goals and encouraging technological innovation.

12

David Dreisen, however, disagrees. According to him, the “cheap fix” metaphor best
describes emissions trading, rather than the “free lunch” metaphor (a win-win
proposition) ascribed to by its proponents. Also according to him, emissions trading may
facilitate the avoidance of initially expensive investments in innovative technology.

13

Blackman and Harrington shifted the debate to whether market based instruments are
suitable for developing countries; they concluded—using the experience of China and
Poland—that permit trading is not appropriate for developing countries because of weak
institutional capacity to enforce environmental regulation.

14

However, any policy

instrument, be it environmental taxes or command and control, would need strong
enforcement before it can succeed. They argue that technology standards may be
appropriate for developing countries.

15

One limitation of the use of technology standards

11

Robert N. Stavins, “Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a
Global Problem?” (1997) U. CHI. Legal F. 293 at 309.
12

Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, “Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case For Market
Incentives” (1987-1988) 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L 171.
13

David Dreisen, “Free Lunch or Cheap Fix? : The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change
Convention” (1998-1999) 26 B.C Envtl. Aff. L. Rev 1.
14

Blackman and Harrington, Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from
International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution (Resources For the Future May 1999) 1 at 2, online:
<http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-99-39.pdf>.
15

Ibid.

6

alone is its prohibitive cost. They also argue that the United States’ successful
experimentation with emission trading cannot be replicated in a developing country.

16

Still on the point, Bell and Russell posit that technology standards may be more
appropriate for building the initial capacity for emissions reduction because economic
incentive programmes require more specific and greater institutional capacity, have more
stringent monitoring requirements, and may require fully developed market economies to
be effective.

17

Willems and Baumert support this approach, but also note that technology approaches,
policies and measures may have greater applicability to the general capacity needs of
developing countries interested in pursuing sustainable development strategies.

18

Russell and Vaughan suggest that a transitional strategy is the appropriate approach for
developing countries, whereby technology standards are introduced first, followed by
19

performance standards, and finally experimentation with market-based instruments.
Ellerman contends that a performance standard at the facility level and an overall
20

emissions cap could provide a more effective structure.

This type of approach, he

argues, could facilitate a transition to a tradable permits programme as the institutions
and economies develop over time.

16

21

Ibid at 28.
Ruth Greenspan Bell and Clifford Russell, “ Environmental Policy for Developing Countries” (Issues in
Science and Technology Spring 2002), online: <http://www.issues.org/18.3/greenspan.html>.
18
Stephane Willems and Kelvin Baumert, Institutional Capacity and Climate Actions, (OECD
Environment Directorate 2003), online: <http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/21018790.pdf>.
19
Clifford Russell and William Vaughan, “The Choice of Pollution Control Policy Instruments in
Developing Countries: Arguments, Evidence and Suggestions”, (2003) International Yearbook of
Environment and Resource Economics 331-370, online:
<http://www.colby.edu/economics/faculty/thtieten/ec476/Russell.pdf>.
20
Denny Ellerman, “Designing a Tradable Permit System in China: Principles and Practice”, (2002) 23
Energy Journal, online: <http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/publications/reprints/Reprint_161_WC.pdf>.
21
Ibid.

17

7

Chile has successfully used emissions trading to control particulates matter

22

emissions in

the city of Santiago. The Chilean experiment with tradable permit scheme shows that
there is no reason to believe that emissions trading cannot succeed in a developing
country. Though it is not without its challenges, the program is a strong validation that
emissions trading can work in a terrain where the monitoring is not perfect. According to
Coria and Sterner,
The Chilean scheme compares quite favourably with all the early U.S.
programs and to the European ETS scheme, which, (despite being launched
long after the Chilean scheme) has roughly the same number of flaws
23
related to over-allocation and lack of clear rules for penalties.
Despite the fact Chile has used a tradable permit scheme to control industrial pollution,
the question as to what policy instrument is appropriate for developing country remains
open because the Chilean example is not enough to conclude that emissions trading
scheme is suitable for all developing countries. The question would only be settled as
more developing countries develop their climate change mitigation framework. No
African country has yet deployed emissions trading as a domestic policy instrument, as at
the time of writing. However, countries like Nigeria and South Africa have used, and are
still using, environmental tax to mitigate climate change. These two countries’ experience
with environmental tax will be analysed in this work. It will be argued that, in view of the
greenhouse intensity of the two largest economies in Africa, a tradable permit scheme
will best serve their environmental and health needs.

1.3 Climate Change and the UNFCCC
What is Climate Change?
There are different definitions of climate change. According to the UNFCCC,

22

Particulate matter is the term used for solid or liquid particles found in the air. It is a class of aerosols.
Particulate matter is formed when gaseous pollutants such as S02 and N0x react to form fine particles. See
Particulate Matter (PM-10), online: <http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/aqtrnd95/pm10.html>.
23
Jessica Coria and Sterner, Tradable Permits in Developing Countries Evidence From Air Pollution in
Santiago, Chile, (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper December 2008), 1 at 27, online:
<http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-08-51.pdf>.

8

Climate change means a change of climate, which is attributed directly or
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed
24
over comparable time periods.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate
Change is:
A change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using
statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties
and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate
change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings, or to
persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in
25
land use.
A common idea running through all the definitions of climate change is that it is an
increase in the average temperature of the atmosphere at a rate far from normal, caused
by the anthropogenic emission of gases that trap the sun's heat in the atmposhere.

26

While weather is closely intertwined with the climate, climate change does not exactly
equate to weather change.′ It is statistical changes in weather over time that equates to
climate change.

27

There are important differences between weather and the climate. The

chaotic nature of weather makes it unpredictable beyond a few days, but projecting
changes in climate (long term average weather) is much more manageable.

28

Long-term variations brought about by changes in the composition of the atmosphere are
much more predictable than individual weather events. Climate change can be classified
as either natural or anthropogenic; climate change is said to be anthropogenic when the
change in climate is human-induced or emanates from human activities.

24

supra note 5, Article 1.
Field C.B et al., eds, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change
Adaptation Glossary of Terms (Cambridge University Press 2012) at 557.
26
See Crispin Tickell, Climatic Change and World Affairs, 2nd ed (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1986).
25

27

Letreut et al., “Historical Overview of Climate Change Science” in Solomon et al, eds, Climate Change
2007,the Physical Science Basis (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 94 at 104.
28
Ibid. The major reason why weather is not predictable beyond a few days is the property of the everchanging atmosphere. The climate also differs from weather in that it covers or impacts the whole earth
system, including the atmosphere, land surface, oceans, snow, ice, other bodies of water and living things.

9

While many factors influence the climate, scientists have determined that human
activities have become a dominant force, and are responsible for most of the warming
observed over the past 50 years.

29

According to Crispin Tickell,
Climate change is accelerating because the human foot is on the
accelerator. A periodical visitor from outer space would find more change
in the surface of the earth in the last 20 years than he would have found in
the last 200, and in the last 200 more than in the last 2000. Since the
industrial revolution, we have been using the sky as a waste unit. As a
result, carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has now reached its highest level
30
in 400 000 years, and is at a third higher than in pre-industrial times.
Human-caused climate change has resulted not only from changes in the number of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, but also changes in small particles
(aerosols) and changes in land use.

31

Scientists have explained that greenhouse gases trap the sun’s heat by acting like
blankets, which absorb heat radiation that should escape to space, thereby heating the
atmosphere at a rate far higher than normal. Greenhouse gases (GHGs) that contribute to
global warming include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and halocarbons.
According to scientific studies, the primary effect of these gases in the atmosphere is that
they change the equilibrium between incoming radiation from the sun and outgoing
radiation from the earth. By blocking some of the infrared radiation from the earth and
radiating it back to the earth's surface, the gases warm the lower atmosphere and cool the
upper atmosphere. In turn, this increases moisture, which traps more infrared radiation.
The effect of rising temperatures is to reduce the areas covered by snow and ice, thereby

29

Climate Change 2007 the Physical Science Basis supra note 10 at 105.

30

Crispin Tickell, “The Impact of Climate Change on the Economy”, a speech delivered to the Woodhouse
Group, University of Leeds, 10 February 2004, online: <http://www.crispintickell.com/page79.html>.
31

supra note 10 at 105.

10

diminishing the amount of heat reflected back into space and increasing absorption of
solar radiation.

32

These greenhouse gases released by human activities intensify the natural greenhouse
effect. The natural greenhouse effect works this way:
The sun powers Earth’s climate, radiating energy at very short
wavelengths, predominately in the visible or near-visible (e.g., ultraviolet)
part of the spectrum. Roughly one-third of the solar energy that reaches the
top of Earth’s atmosphere is reflected directly back to space. The
remaining two-thirds is absorbed by the surface and, to a lesser extent, by
the atmosphere. To balance the absorbed incoming energy, the Earth must,
on average, radiate the same amount of energy back to space. Because the
Earth is much colder than the Sun, it radiates at much longer wavelengths,
primarily in the infrared part of the spectrum. Much of this thermal
radiation emitted by the land and ocean is absorbed by the atmosphere,
including clouds, and radiated back to Earth. This is called the greenhouse
effect…
Without the natural greenhouse effect, the average temperature of Earth’s
surface would be below the freezing point of water. Thus Earth’s natural
33
greenhouse effect makes life as we know it possible.
Scientific studies show that carbon dioxide (CO2) is produced by the burning of fossil
fuels (coal, oil and gas) as well as by land-use activities such as deforestation; methane is
produced by cattle, rice agriculture, fossil fuel use and landfills; and nitrous oxide is
produced by the chemical industry, cattle feed lots, and agricultural soils.

34

Since 1750, the time of the Industrial Revolution, CO2 has increased by 31 percent,
methane by 151 percent and nitrous oxide by 17 percent.

35

Developed countries have

32

See Crispin Tickell, “The Causes of Climate Change”, supra note 9 at 79. See also Article 1 of the
UNFCCC supra note 5.
33

Climate Change 2007, the Physical Science Basis supra note 10 at 115.

34

P. Forster et al., “ Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and Radioactive Forcing” in Solomon et al, eds,
Climate Change 2007, the Physical Science Basis (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 129
at 135.
35

James E. Hansen, “Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb” (2004) 3 Sci. Amer. 68-77.

11

been identified as the major causative agents of climate change and global warming.

36

Studies show that industrialized countries produce more CO2 per head of population (per
capita emissions) than developing countries.

37

Like greenhouse gases, aerosols also influence the climate.
aerosols are black carbon and sulphates.

39

38

The two major types of

Sulphates come primarily from the burning of

coal and oil, while black carbon comes from biomass burning, cooking with solid fuels,
and diesel exhaust. China and India are the most significant contributors to black carbon
in the atmosphere, contributing 35 and 25 percent of black carbon in the atmosphere,
respectively.

40

Countries in Europe and elsewhere that rely heavily on diesel fuel for

transportation also contribute large amounts of black carbon.
The difference between black carbon particles and greenhouse gases is that black carbon
particles remain airborne for weeks while greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for
years and sometimes even a century, depending on the type of greenhouse gas.

41

Climate change impacts could be cataclysmic if left unaddressed. According to James
Hansen, a renowned United States scientist:
The Earth’s climate is nearing, but has not passed a tipping point beyond
which it will be impossible to avoid climate change, with far ranging,
undesirable consequences. These include not only the loss of the Arctic as
we know it, with all that implies for wildlife and indigenous peoples, but
losses on a much vaster scale due to rising seas. Ocean levels will increase

36

Williams Chandler et al., “Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries”(Pew Center on Global
Climate Change October 2002) at 1online: < http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/dev_mitigation.pdf>
See also Crispin Tickell, “Climate change: Warming, Cooling, Dimming and the Consequences” an address
delivered to the Manchester Luncheon Club, Freemasons' Hall, Manchester, on 7 April 2005, online:
<http://www.crispintickell.com/page79.html>.
37

Each Country`s Share of C02 Emissions, online: Union of Concerned Scientists
<http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html>.
38

Aerosols May Drive a Significant Portion of Artic Warming, online: NASA
<http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/warming_aerosols.html>.
39

Ibid.

40

Ramanathan and Carmachiael, “Global and Regional Climate Changes due to Black Carbon” (2008) 1
Nature GeoScience 221 at 222.
41

Ibid.

12

slowly at first, as losses at the fringes of Greenland and Antarctica due to
accelerating ice streams are nearly balanced by increased snowfall and ice
sheet thickening in the ice sheet interiors. But as Greenland and West
Antarctic ice is softened and lubricated by melt water, and as buttressing
ice shelves disappear because of a warming ocean, the balance will tip
toward the rapid disintegration of ice sheets…
This grim scenario can be halted if the growth of greenhouse gas
42
emissions is slowed in the first quarter of this century.
A respected UK scientist, Professor David King also reinforced the calamitous nature of
climate change when he said:
Antarctica is likely going to be the world’s only habitable continent by the
end of this century, if global warming remains unchecked… the earth is
now entering the first hot period since 60 million years ago when there
may be no ice on the planet and when the rest of the globe may not sustain
43
human life.
According to the IPCC, the world is already experiencing the effects of rising
temperatures and extreme weather.
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42

James E. Hansen, “The Tipping Point?” during a presentation to the American Geophysical Union (6
December 2005), online: <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/jan/12/the-tippingpoint/?pagination=false>.
43

Geoffrey Lean, “Global Warming could soon make Antarctica the only place to live, says Chief British
Scientist” The Independent on Sunday (2 May 2004).
44

“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in
global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average
sea level. Eleven of the last twelve years (1995-2006) rank among the twelve warmest years in the
instrumental record of global surface temperature (since 1850). The 100-year linear trend (1906-2005) of
0.74 [0.56 to 0.92]°C is larger than the corresponding trend of 0.6 [0.4 to 0.8]°C (1901-2000) given in the
TAR (Figure 1.1). The linear warming trend over the 50 years from 1956 to 2005 (0.13[0.10 to 0.16]°C per
decade) is nearly twice that for the 100 years from 1906 to 2005. The temperature increase is widespread
over the globe and is greater at higher northern latitudes (Figure 1.2). Average Arctic temperatures have
increased at almost twice the global average rate in the past 100 years. Land regions have warmed faster
than the oceans(Figures 1.2 and 2.5). Observations since 1961 show that the average temperature of the
global ocean has increased to depths of at least 3000m and that the ocean has been taking up over 80% of
the heat being added to the climate system. New analyses of balloon- borne and satellite measurements of
lower- and mid-tropospheric temperature show warming rates similar to those observed in surface
temperature. Increases in sea level are consistent with warming (Figure 1.1).Global average sea level rose
at an average rate of 1.8 [1.3 to 2.3]mm per year over 1961 to 2003 and at an average rate of about 3.1
[2.4to 3.8]mm per year from 1993 to 2003.” Pachauri R.K and Reseinger A, eds, Climate Change 2007:
Synthesis Report (IPCC Geneva Switzerland) 26 at 30.
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Kovats and Haines confirmed that the world is already feeling the effects of climate
change:
Global climate change caused by the relentless build-up of greenhouse
gases in the earth’s atmosphere is already disrupting ecosystems and is
already causing about 150,000 additional deaths per year. An average
global warming of 2 0C threatens millions of people with an increased risk
45
of hunger, malaria, flooding and water shortages.
According to the IPCC, even though climate change effects will be felt globally, the
impacts will be hardest on poor and developing countries, especially those in Africa.

46

The vulnerability of a region to climate change impacts depends to a great
extent on its wealth, and as such, poverty limits adaptive capabilities.
Socio-economic systems typically are more vulnerable in developing

According to scientists from the United Kingdom Metrological Office, global warming has been on pause
for 15 years. Global average temperatures remain higher than they've ever been since modern records were
kept but after a period of rapid increase in the 1980's and 90's, there's been a dramatic delay. The reason for
the pause is that the oceans absorbed greater amounts of heat, which prevented people from noticing the
difference at surface level. The Earth has been absorbing energy at a rate of 0.6 Watts per square metre that's equivalent to 300 billion 1KW clothing irons being spread around the world. But during the
slowdown, that number fell to 0.48 Watts per square metre. Other factors that could have helped ease the
rise include an increase in volcanic eruptions around the world and a slowdown in solar activity. Despite
the findings, they stressed that 12 of the 14 hottest years on record have been recorded since 2000. Between
1998 and 2012, the average rate of warming was just 0.04 degrees Celsius per decade, compared with
0.17C per decade from 1970-1998. They project a rise of 2 C above pre-industrial temperatures is expected
in the next 50 years, the current slow down will delay that rise by five to ten years. Kevan Karaja, Scientists
believe natural causes briefly paused climate change, online: Weather Network
<http://www.theweathernetwork.com/news/articles/scientists-believe-natural-causes-briefly-pausedclimate-change/9866/>.
45

See: R. Kovats & A. Haines, “Global Climate Change and Health: Recent Findings and Future Steps”
(2005) 172 CMAJ at 4. “Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate variability and change
because of multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity. The extreme poverty of many Africans, frequent
natural disasters such as droughts and floods, and agriculture, which is heavily dependent on rainfall, all
contribute. Cases of remarkable resilience in the face of multiple stressors have, however, been shown
(high confidence). Africa possesses many examples of coping and adaptation strategies that are used to
manage a range of stresses including climate extremes (e.g., droughts and floods). Under possible increases
in such stresses, however, these strategies are likely to be insufficient to adapt to climate variability and
change, given the problems of endemic poverty, poor institutional arrangements, poor access to data and
information, and growing health burdens”
46

Parry, Canziani, Pautikof, “Technical Summary” in Climate Change 2007 Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press 2007), 23 at 48-49. Adaptation is the act of
building resilience in the ecosystems to cope with the unavoidable impacts of climate change, while
mitigation involves cutting down of human activities that release greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.
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countries where economic and institutional circumstances are less
favorable; therefore developing countries, which have lesser capacity to
adapt, are more vulnerable to climate change damages, just as they are to
other stresses. This condition will be most extreme among the poorest
47
people.

International response to climate change dates back to 1979 when the first World Climate
Conference was held and highlighted concerns about the increasing concentration of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
In 1988, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution, proposed by Malta, in favour of
the protection of the climate for present and future generations.

48

The evidence of climate change emerging from the scientific community led the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) to establish the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988.
The mandate of the IPCC was to provide the world with clear scientific view on the
current state of knowledge on climate change and its environmental and socio-economic
impacts.

49

The IPCC began issuing comprehensive assessment reports in 1990.

The United Nations General Assembly also established an International Negotiating
Committee in 1990; its task was to negotiate a framework convention. The first
assessment report by the IPCC and the negotiated Framework Convention were
deliberated upon at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992. The negotiated
Framework Convention known as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change opened for signature at the Earth Summit in 1992.

47

Q.K. Ahmad et al., “Summary for Policy Makers” in Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press), 1 at 8.
48

See: United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/43/53, online:
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r053.htm>.
49

The IPCC only reviews and assesses the most recent scientific, technical and socio-economic
information produced worldwide relevant to the understanding of climate change. It does not conduct any
research nor does it monitor climate related data or parameters. See: IPCC, online:
<http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UQIxpW9QSjQ>.
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The UNFCCC entered into force in March 1994 and as of today, 195 countries have
ratified the Convention.

50

The Convention has as its objective: “the stabilization of

greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.

51

The Convention seeks to achieve this objective through three major principles: the
Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility, the Precautionary Principle and
the Cost Effectiveness Principle.
Common but Differentiated Responsibility Principle
Article 3(1) of the Convention provides as follows:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.
The Convention places the responsibility of protecting the climate system on all the
parties but expects the developed countries to take the lead in the fight for two reasons:
countries have limited resources to address the enormity of the risk that climate change
poses. Developed countries, however, are more technologically advanced and have more
financial resources available to them; so developed countries are better equipped to
address the problem than developing countries. They are more technologically advanced
and have more financial resources available to them. Since developed countries are in a
more advantaged position to address the problem, they are able to assist developing
countries with technology and finances to combat climate change.
The second reason is that developed countries have been the major cause of the rising
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, particularly during the time of the
Industrial Revolution. On the other hand, developing countries have contributed little to
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See: UNFCCC, online: <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php>.
art 2 supra note 5.
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the climate change problem, so it would amount to a disproportionate burden if the
responsibilities were even.
Through this Principle, the Convention was intended to devise a fair solution to the
matter. Since the participation of developing countries is needed in the fight, these
countries would only come on board if it represented their interests. Developing countries
are still battling with the mundane issues of food security and water supply. In fact, it was
when the issue of climate change was framed in the context of the daily needs of food
and water that developing countries got on board. The climate change problem was
framed at first “as an abstract, global, technological dilemma that could be solved using
market-based mechanisms and appropriate technologies; this alienated many developing
countries in the climate change discussion”.

52

Developing countries believe that

developed countries owe an ecological debt because of their historic emissions. There can
only be a level playing field if this responsibility is first acknowledged before anything
else.

53

It is said that the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the
Convention was patterned after the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Chemicals,
after seeing the success of the Protocol.

54

At the time the international community agreed to phase out several chemicals under the
Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Chemicals, the industrialized world used large
amounts of these substances as refrigerants and industrial solvents. Developing countries
were not prepared to give up domestic industries that use solvents or the future benefit of
refrigeration—advantages long enjoyed by developed countries; so the developed
countries agreed to lead the effort to solve the environmental problem they had caused by
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Harro Van Asselt & Joyeeta Gupta, “Stretching Too Far: Developing Countries and the Role of
Flexibility Mechanisms Beyond Kyoto” (2009) 28 Stan Envtl. L.J 311 at 318.
53

See also Karin Mickelson “ Leading Towards a Level Playing Field, Repaying Ecological Debt, or
Making Environmental Space: Three Stories About International Environmental Cooperation” 43 Osgoode
Hall Journal 138-168.
54

David Dreisen, “Free Lunch or Cheap Fix? The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change
Convention” supra note 9 at 11.
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phasing out several ozone-depleting substances during the Montreal Protocol’s first
decade.
They also agreed to a program of developing and transferring new technology to make it
possible for less developed countries to enjoy refrigeration and increased manufacturing
capability without relying on ozone-depleting chemicals. The Montreal Protocol
authorized some initial increases in developing countries' use of ozone-depleting
chemicals but required these countries to reduce consumption of such chemicals; a
decade after the developed countries phased them out. Developing countries agreed to a
late phase-out because they believed that developed countries would manufacture
adequate substitutes as they eliminated their own consumption of ozone-depleting
chemicals.
Accordingly, developing countries could help solve the environmental problem without
foregoing benefits formerly associated with use of ozone-depleting chemicals. The
developed countries did, in fact, develop adequate substitutes for many of these ozonedepleting chemicals.

55

The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility is operationalized in the form
of different legal obligations under the Convention. For example, Article 12 of the
Convention allows for different reporting obligations. Parties report their obligations
through what is called national communications. Developed Countries, known as Annex
1 Parties under the Convention, are to issue their national communications to the Climate
Change Secretariat biennially. They are also expected to update their national inventory
of greenhouse gases regularly.
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Barrat-Brown, “Building a Monitoring Regime under the Montreal Protocol” (1991) 16 Yale J. Int'l L. at
519-31, cited in Dreisen’s article, ibid.
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Annex 1 Parties are Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.
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Apart from publishing a national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals, and impacts of proposed mitigation measures, developed countries must
indicate in their national communication their proposed efforts to assist developing
countries, as well as their contribution towards data collection and systemic observation
of the climate in such countries.
Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle is contained in Article 3(3) of the Convention. The
Convention expects parties to take cautionary measures to anticipate and mitigate the
adverse effects of climate change. When there is a doubt as to the effect of a proposed
action on the climate system, parties should refrain from taking the step. Lack of
scientific evidence establishing the detrimental nature of the proposed action is not a
tenable excuse under the Convention.
Dreisen argues that the Precautionary Principle provision is rooted in the science of
climate change: scientists fear that climate change may occur quickly and unpredictably,
hence, waiting for scientific certainty before taking action may involve suffering through
decades or centuries of hurricanes, droughts, ecological destruction, etc.

57

The value of this principle in the Convention is that it takes into cognizance possible
changes in scientific knowledge. It also reflects the reality that decision makers never
have all the information they would like to have before making a decision that is likely to
affect the environment.
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The provision also emphasises the role of environmental impact

assessment in climate change mitigation.
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Dreisen supra note 9 at 16.

UNEP, Training Manual on International Environmental Law: Principles and Concepts of International
Environmental Law, 23 at 32 online: <http://www.iucnael.org/en/online-resources/unep-trainingmanual.html>.
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Cost Effectiveness Principle
The cost effectiveness principle is also contained in Article 3(3) of the Convention. It
states that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost effective so
as to ensure global benefits. Policies and measures that are expensive are generally not
attractive to decision makers, especially in a world of scarce resources. What is more,
expensive measures are generally prohibitive and will preclude the poor countries that are
signatories to the Convention from enjoying the benefits of such measures.
In Article 7, The Convention named the Conference of Parties as the supreme organ of
the Convention. The Conference of Parties (COP) is to see to the implementation of the
objectives of the Convention. In line with Article 7, the Conference of Parties has been
meeting and deliberating on how best to achieve the objectives of the Convention.
At the first Conference of the Parties in Berlin in April 1995, a proposal was made for an
ancillary instrument to the Convention containing specific and legally binding targets.

59

This proposal led to a subsequent protocol known as the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The
Protocol came into effect on 16 February 2005 with the receipt of the Russian
Federation’s instrument of ratification by the United Nations on 18 November 2004.
Following the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility entrenched in the
Convention, the Kyoto Protocol introduced a legally binding set of obligations for 38
industrialized countries and 11 countries in Central and Eastern Europe mandating them
to return their GHG emissions to an average of approximately 5.2 percent below their
1990 levels over the commitment period of 2008-2012.
However, the Protocol allows for some amount of flexibility in the meeting of these
obligations. It introduced three flexible (market) mechanisms by which the industrialized
countries can meet their obligations. The three flexible mechanisms created under the
Protocol were to supplement home grown mitigation efforts by Annex 1 countries. The
three market instruments are in line with the Cost Effectiveness Principle contained in the

59

Harro Van Asselt & Joyeeta Gupta, “Stretching Too Far: Developing Countries and the Role of
Flexibility Mechanisms” supra note 35 at 323.
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Convention. The idea of the flexibility mechanisms is that Annex 1 countries can meet
their obligations in a cost effective way. These market instruments are: International
Emissions Trading provided for under Article 6, the Clean Development Mechanism
60

provided for under Article 12 and the Joint Implementation under Article 4.

These three

mechanisms enable countries to pay for emission reductions anywhere on the planet,
based on the idea that climate change is a global problem, and that its reductions are
equally good for the climate no matter where they occur.

61

The Clean Development Mechanism allows the developed countries (Annex 1 countries)
to invest in emissions reduction projects in developing countries, which they can use to
meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. Under the mechanism, developing
countries are to learn sustainable development from their developed counterparts while
the developing countries can use the emission reductions units garnered from the CDM
projects to meet their obligations under the Protocol.
Joint Implementation gives the latitude to two or more developed countries to collaborate
in meeting their emissions limitation obligation under the Protocol. In determining
whether the countries involved in such an agreement have met their obligations under the
Protocol, recourse will only be had to the their total aggregate emissions so long it does
not exceed their individual allowable emissions under the Protocol.
Annex 1 countries are given Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) that limit the tonnes of
greenhouse gases they are allowed to emit. Under the International Emissions Trading
scheme of the Protocol, a particular Annex 1 country can purchase Emission Reduction
Units (ERUs) from another developed country. The idea of this policy is to prevent a
particular Annex1 country from exceeding its Assigned Amount Units under the
Protocol.
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Kyoto Protocol, online: <http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/items/2830.php>.

Jonathan Wiener, “Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context” (1999) 108
Yale L.J. 677 at 691-692.
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The detailed rules for operation of the three market mechanisms were not contained in the
Protocol. The detailed rules for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at COP
7 in Marrakesh, Morocco in 2001, and are referred to as the “Marrakesh Accords”. The
UN Climate Change Secretariat based in Bonn, Germany keeps an international
transaction log to ensure that transactions are in accordance with the Protocol.
The Convention expects parties to remove greenhouse gases by source and by sink.

62

Forests are believed to be sinks of greenhouse gases in that they capture carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere and consume it through the process of photosynthesis. In December
2007, at the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held in Bali, Indonesia,
signatories to the Convention decided that national and international efforts to mitigate
climate change should include the enhancement of forest carbon stock in developing
countries.
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This led to the creation of a mitigation platform known as REDD+ (Reducing

Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries). Parties
in Bali noted that deforestation and forest degradation are both major sources of
emissions and that, in some cases, forest degradation (e.g. of peat land soils) can generate
high emission rates.

64

REDD+ is particularly important for Africa because Africa has a

lot of forest carbon potential and its forest reserves have been undergoing degradation.
REDD+ is one of the mitigation areas of work identified by the African Union in the
Conceptual Framework of African Climate Change Programmes.
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The goal of stabilizing the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is a
66

long-term vision, thereby requiring the broad participation of all parties. At COP 16,
signatories observed that the pace of mitigation efforts has been slow.
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See Article 4(1)(a) of the UNFCCC supra note 5.
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United Nations, Bali Action Plan, online:
<http://unfccc.int/key_documents/bali_road_map/items/6447.php>.
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See: the Draft Declaration on the African Process for Combating Climate Change, at 10, online:
<http://www.unep.org/roa/Amcen/Amcen_Events/3rd_ss/Docs/nairobi-Decration-2009.pdf. >
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Ibid.
The Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico (December 2010).
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Parties noted that:
…deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required according to
science, and as documented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, with a view to reducing
global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global
average temperature below 2 °C above preindustrial levels, and that
Parties should take urgent action to meet this long-term goal, consistent
with science and on the basis of equity; also recognizes the need to
consider, in the context of the first review, as referred to in paragraph 138
below, strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the best
available scientific knowledge, including in relation to a global average
67
temperature rise of 1.5 °C.
Parties stressed the need for enhanced action on mitigation by both developed country
and developing country parties. Developing country parties were encouraged to formulate
nationally appropriate mitigation plans of action in the context of sustainable
development supported by technology, finance and capacity building. This gave rise to
what is known as NAMA.
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The Cancun Agreements created a registry for nationally

appropriate mitigation plans of action for developing countries. Eighteen African
countries have submitted mitigation projects that require financial and technological
assistance; they are Benin, Botswana, Ghana, South Africa, Tunisia, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Gabon, Madagascar,
Mauritania, Morocco, Sierra Leone and Togo.
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Cancun Agreements, online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2>.
Keeping global rise in temperature below 2 °C above preindustrial levels is the only way the world can
avoid the cataclysmic effects of climate change. At the Cancun Climate Change Conference, parties agreed
that all mitigation efforts should be geared towards keeping global rise in temperature below this range;
they made provision for possible changes in scientific knowledge by agreeing that the climate target could
be changed to below 1.5°C if scientific knowledge so dictates.
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Ibid, Decision 53. A Registry was created for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions of developing
country parties.
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See: UNFCCC Appendix II, online:
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/items/5265.php>.
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Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ended in 2012.

In Doha, Qatar, on 8

December 2012 the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. The
amendment would only come into force if it were accepted by three fourths of the parties
71

to the Protocol.

The amendment was negotiated at a price; the European Union agreed

to a second commitment period for the Protocol on the condition that there will be
another treaty that will be all inclusive of all the contributing countries to the global
72

greenhouse gas pool, or an agreed outcome with legal force for the post-2020 period65.

An all-inclusive treaty that covers all the contributing sources to the global greenhouse
gas pool has implications for a country like South Africa. Despite being a developing
country, it is one of the top emitters of greenhouse gases. South Africa has been under
increased international pressure along with China, Brazil and India to assume some form
of binding targets; this means its mitigation efforts have to be scaled up. An all-inclusive
treaty also has implications for the other 52 countries in the African continent. A timeline
in which the emissions of developing countries would peak could be specified in an allinclusive treaty, meaning that African countries should be prepared for a carbonconstrained future.

70

Not much progress was made during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol because the
largest per capita emitter of greenhouse gases, the United States of America, decided to pull out of the
Protocol, citing the fact that commitments under the Protocol could hurt its economy, and lack of binding
targets for key developing countries like China and India. See: the United States Senate Resolution 98 105th
Congress 1997 (enacted), cited in Harro Van Asselt and Joyeeta Gupta’s article “Stretching too Far” supra
note 35 at 325. The Protocol was negotiated during the Bill Clinton administration, but in 2001, the Bush
administration described the Protocol as fundamentally flawed. Canada, Japan and the Russian Federation
have also communicated their decision not to assume quantified emission limitation and reduction
commitment (QELRC) during the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. See: the Doha
Amendment, online:
<http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kp_doha_amendment_english.pdf>. It is expected,
however, that the second commitment period of the Kyoto will witness more ambition in the fight against
climate change, even as greenhouse gases reached a record high in the atmosphere in 2011. See: WMO
press release No 965, online: <http://www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/press_releases/pr_965_en.html>.
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See: Article 20 of the Kyoto Protocol.

Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the EU Position at the 17th Session of the
Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC, 3118th Environment Council meeting (Oct. 2011), online:
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/ docs/pressdata/en/envir/125026.pdf>.

24

The new treaty could specify a time when developing countries will assume quantified
limitation and reduction commitments.

1.4 Research Methodology
Given the legal and practical nature of the research topic, the methodology to be adopted
in this thesis will be analytical and expository. The thesis will utilize orthodox legal
methods of research, including the doctrinal, analytical and the case study approaches in
providing answers to the research questions.
First, I will expose the possible gaps in Africa’s climate change mitigation policy
architecture. I will look at the structure of the aforementioned policies with a view to
pointing out their limitations. There will a doctrinal analysis of the literature on the nature
and possible benefits of emissions trading. This will be followed by a case study
approach on how to design a successful emissions trading scheme. This approach will
show how emissions trading can cover the gaps in the policy architecture.

1.5 Justification of Choice of ETS Case Studies
In this thesis, there are four ETS schemes to be outlined as models for the proposed
scheme. The schemes to be examined include: the U.S. Acid Rain Program, the EU ETS,
the New Zealand ETS and the Santiago Particulate Program. The idea behind studying
the four ETS schemes is to see what can be transferred or borrowed from these three ETS
schemes to enhance the proposed scheme.
The United States of America was the first to experiment with emissions trading as a
means of pollution control. After some initial misses, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency finally succeeded with the Acid Rain Program. The Acid Rain
Program was used to reduce the overall atmospheric levels of sulphur
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dioxide and nitrogen oxides, which cause acid rain.

The program was the most

successful and largest cap and trade program until the EU ETS came into existence.
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The cap and trade part of the program is significant for the proposed scheme because one
of the problems that bedevilled CDM implementation in general is the problem of
“additionality”.
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Baseline trading systems (the form of trading under the CDM) involve

making a determination as to whether emissions reductions would have occurred anyway
without the project. If the emissions reductions are not additional, it dilutes the
environmental integrity of the scheme.
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Obtaining data for baseline development is difficult, coupled with the fact that it is
impossible to verify baseline data with the necessary degree of certainty.
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This is

exacerbated in a continent where data management is still at its infancy.
The EU ETS is the first multinational cap and trade program for greenhouse gases. It is a
scheme involving sovereign nations with diverse historical, institutional, and economic
circumstances. It is the largest cap and trade program in operation. Thus, it is a useful
model from which to learn. Though the EU ETS was primarily designed to help
European nations meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol,
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it also holds

important lessons on how to manage a scheme involving countries without QELRCs
under the Kyoto Protocol. This will be shown in the course of this work.
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United States Environmental Protection Agency, What Causes Acid Rain?, online:
<http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/>.
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Tom Tietenberg et al., International Rules for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading, Defining the
Principles, Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for Verification, Reporting and Accountability, United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development Secretariat, 1 at 27, online:
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/pogdsgfsbm6.en.pdf>. The program was a success, both environmentally
and economically.
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Harro Van Asselt and Joyeeta Gupta, “Stretching Too Far” supra note 35 at 345.
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US EPA, Tools of the Trade: A Guide to Designing and Operating a Cap and Trade Program for
Pollution Control (2003), 1-1 at 2-7.
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Harro Van Asselt and Joyeeta Gupta, “Stretching Too Far” supra note 35 at 345.
European Commission, The EU Action Against Climate Change 2009 Edition, (2009), 1 at 5.
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The New Zealand ETS is the first cap and trade program that covers all the Kyoto
gases.

79

80

New Zealand is a small country with modest emissions;

it has a lot of carbon

potential in the agriculture and forestry industries. Forestry is currently covered in the
trading program, with plans to include the agricultural sector in 2015. Africa also has
significant carbon potential in the agriculture and forestry industries.
Chile is a developing country. Its experience with tradable permit scheme is apt for the
countries in Africa.

1.6 Scholarly Significance
African countries like all other developing countries are inexperienced in greenhouse gas
mitigation. It is important African countries build capacity in carbon trading since the
global carbon market is at the heart of the world’s fight against climate change.
The Stern Review have advocated for creation of a global price on carbon through the
linking of emissions trading schemes as a way of fighting climate change in a cost
effective manner.
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Thus, there is a strong probability that emissions trading will

continue to play a major role in the fight against climate change.
This work will also aid in the development of Africa’s climate policy.
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See: Tom E. Moyes, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in New Zealand, Trailblazing Comprehensive
Cap and Trade” (2008) 35 Ecology L.Q. 911 at 913.
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Chris Bougen, “Emissions Trading in New Zealand”, Market Trends (December 2009) 49.

Nicholas Stern, Economics of Climate Change the Stern Review, (Cambridge University Press 2007)
480.

27

Chapter 2

2

Analysis of Africa’s Climate Change Mitigation Policy
Architecture

2.1 Introduction
The strength of any policy architecture can only be measured against its overriding
objectives. The African Union does not yet have a specific climate change mitigation
objective.

82

However, we have seen in the preceding chapter that the Conference of

Parties (COP) has set a stabilization target of keeping the total global average warming to
83

no more than 2ºC/3.5ºF relative to pre-industrial levels.

This is the standard that will be

used to analyse Africa’s climate change policy architecture.
According to the Stern review,

84

even if the developed world takes on responsibilities for

absolute cuts in emissions of 60-80 percent by 2050, developing countries must take
significant action too, in order to avoid temperature increases above 2.0 °C. This chapter
seeks to answer the question, “What are the gaps in Africa’s climate change mitigation
policy architecture?”
First for discussion is the proposed carbon tax in South Africa. This will be followed by
the implementation of REDD+ so far in Africa. Thereafter, the discussion will move to
CDM implementation in Africa. The chapter ends with a discussion of NAMA.
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The African Union has only identified mitigation areas of need or work and it is contingent on
technology transfer, capacity building and finance. See the Conceptual Framework for African Climate
Change Programmes contained in the African Process for Combating Climate Change, 1 at 10, online: <
http://www.unep.org/roa/Amcen/Amcen_Events/3rd_ss/Docs/nairobi-Decration-2009.pdf> The areas of
work are in energy efficiency, renewable energy development investments REDD, land use change and
forestry. The areas of work are contingent on capacity building, finance that must be additional to
developmental aid and technological transfer.
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To avoid temperatures above those levels, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide would need to
peak below about 400 to 450 parts per million and stabilize in the long-term at around today’s levels.
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See the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change supra note 73 at vii.
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2.2 Carbon Tax in South Africa
A few background facts about the country, South Africa, are apposite here. South Africa
is a middle-income developing country whose economy is built on the wealth of its
mineral resources and its primary sectors;
86

million in 2010.

85

its population was estimated to be roughly 50

South Africa is the most industrialised country in Africa with well-

developed mining, transport, energy, manufacturing, tourism, agriculture, and services
sectors. The South African economy is powered by coal
global pool of greenhouse gases is 1.8 percent.

88

87

and its contribution to the

Its total emissions in 2000 were

estimated to be 461 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e).

89

Eighty-three

percent of emissions are derived from energy supply and consumption, 7 percent from
industrial processes, 8 percent from agriculture, and 2 percent from the waste sector.

90

In 2011, South Africa formally published its National Climate Change Response Policy.
The Policy has two objectives:



Effectively manage inevitable climate change impacts through
interventions that build and sustain South Africa’s social, economic and
environmental resilience and emergency response capacity.
Make a fair contribution to the global effort to stabilise greenhouse gas
(GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that avoids dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system within a timeframe that
enables economic, social and environmental development to proceed in a
91
sustainable manner.
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South Africa’s Second National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (Department of Environmental Affairs 2011) at 8 online:
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/zafnc02.pdf>.
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Statistics SA cited in South Africa’s Second National Communication supra note 77 at 3.
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Khan” (2007) 18 CNS 4 at 19.
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Ibid. South Africa is the 17th largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world. See Climate Analysis
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South Africa’s Second National Communication supra note 77 at ix.
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South Africa, National Climate Change Response White Paper (2011) at 5, online:
<http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=152834>.
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South Africa has also developed what is called Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS).
The idea behind the LTMS was to develop broad and sound mitigation scenarios that will
form the basis of a long-term climate policy.

92

LTMS is a detailed study of South

Africa’s mitigation potential. Acting on the LTMS, South Africa announced at COP15
(the 2009 climate change conference in Copenhagen Denmark) that its emissions should
peak in the period from 2020 to 2025, remain stable for around a decade, and decline
93

thereafter in absolute terms.

As part of its international commitment to fight climate change, South Africa is
considering the use of a carbon tax to reduce its emissions; South Africa National
Treasury started experimenting with environmental taxes in 2006. In 2010, it published a
Discussion Paper on various designs of a carbon tax.
The proposed tax would cover all direct, stationary sources, and process emissions. The
94

tax would apply to methane, carbon dioxide, and nitrous oxide.

The implementation

was meant to start in October 2014 in two phases: the first running to 2019, and the
second to 2025; but it has now been shifted to 2015. The initial proposed rate is ZAR 120
per tCO2e, applying above a certain threshold of a firm’s emissions, and would increase
10 percent annually until 2019-20.

95

In the first phase, the tax would only apply to 40 percent of total emissions (basic
threshold at 60 percent). Trade-exposed sectors with competitiveness concerns and
process emissions would receive an additional exemption of 10 percent each. An offset
mechanism is also envisaged to offset carbon tax liability up to a maximum of 5 or 10
percent. Revenue would not be earmarked, but consideration given to environmental
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Harold Winker, Long Term Mitigation Scenario Project Report at 1,online:
<http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Research/LTMS/LTMS_project_report.pdf>.
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National Climate Change Response supra note 83 at 27.

94
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Ibid.
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issues when determining revenue use, particularly to energy efficiency and assistance to
low-income households.

96

The proposed tax is not the first tax targeted at greenhouse gas emissions in South Africa.
There is already in place a levy of ZAR 3.5c/ kWh on electricity generated from fossil
fuel.
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There is also a tax on new vehicles in place;

98

new passenger cars are taxed on

carbon dioxide emissions above 120 g/km at a fixed rate of ZAR 75 per g/km. For
example, if a new passenger car emits 200 g/km of carbon dioxide, it will be taxed on the
80 g/km emitted above the 120 g/km threshold. At the suggested flat rate of ZAR 75 per
99

g/km, such a vehicle will attract a carbon tax of ZAR 6,000.

This particular tax seeks to

reduce emissions from the transport sector; it is targeted at the manufacturers as well as
buyers of vehicles that are not environmentally friendly. The proposed tax differs from
the already implemented taxes because it is a universal carbon tax.
Ideally, for a tax to be environmentally effective, the tax rate should equal the social
marginal damages from producing an additional unit of emissions or, more or less
100

equivalently, the social marginal benefit from abating a unit of emissions.

Thus, the optimal tax rate would be where the marginal benefit of abatement equals the
101

marginal cost of abatement.

To arrive at the optimal rate, the government would need

to estimate both the marginal abatement cost curve and the marginal abatement benefit
curve. Estimating the marginal abatement cost curve and the marginal benefit curve is an
uncertain science. Climate change as a global problem means that damage costs have to
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be assessed globally.

102

Asking local polluters to pay the global damage costs seems

unfair. Such a system would probably succeed if there were an international carbon tax.
The National Treasury of South Africa seems to appreciate this fact when it said:
The tax rate should, over time, be equivalent to the marginal external
damage costs of GHGs to affect appropriate incentives. However, in the
absence of an international climate change agreement and therefore a
global emissions pricing system, a partial, rather than full, internalisation
103
of the externality will be considered as an interim measure.
Even if a uniform tax is adopted, the end result is that polluters would undertake to
implement those emission reductions that are cheaper than paying the tax, because each
emitter weighs the cost of emissions control against the cost of emitting and paying the
104

tax.

It does not offer an incentive to polluters that want to make aggressive cuts in

emissions.
Another thing that emerges from the literature on environmental taxes is that
environmental taxes cannot guarantee environmental certainty. This is due to the fact
that, at the time of setting the tax, policy makers do not have all the required information
105

regarding technological progress and price sensitivities;

so, setting the tax at the

required level to meet the emission target becomes difficult. New entrants into the
polluting industry can also upset the whole arrangement, in that their activities could lead
to increased emissions.

106

To ensure that the environmental goal is not diluted by reason

of new polluting sources, the tax level has to be adjusted.
Environmental certainty is important when considering South Africa’s LTMS target,
which anticipates a peak, a plateau, and a decline. A peak by 2020 or 2025 and a decline

102
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National Climate Change Response supra note 83 at 41.
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thereafter mean that the environmental outcome must be certain as of 2015, when tax is
meant to be introduced until 2020 or 2025. The policy makers in South Africa are well
aware of this point. In the National Climate Response White Paper, the government said:
Although a carbon tax does not set a fixed quantitative limit on GHG
emissions over the short-term, such a tax—at an appropriate level and
phased in over a period to the “correct” level—will provide a strong price
signal to both producers and consumers to change their behaviour over the
medium- to long-term. The National Treasury’s carbon tax policy will seek
to primarily stimulate behaviour change through the price mechanism, and
as a secondary benefit, generate a revenue stream that may allow fiscal
decisions over time that support climate change policy and broader
107
sustainable development objectives.
The government’s view that the tax will generate revenue and that this revenue will be
used to stimulate other sustainable development goals is sound, but claims about the tax
instilling a behavioural change may be an overestimation. This claim can only be
satisfactorily investigated ex post, but if Nigeria’s experience with the use of pollution
charges reveals anything, it is that taxes or pollution charges by themselves are not
enough to instil behavioural change.
Environmental taxation has, from the onset, been an integral part of the gas flaring legal
regime in Nigeria, and has been one of their government’s frontline policies in seeking to
eliminate flaring. In principle, Section 3 of the Associated Gas Reinjection Act outlaws
gas flaring, but allows polluters to continue to flare on payment of a fine. The Section
provides as follows:
3. Flaring of gas to cease
Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no company engaged in the
production of oil or gas shall after 1 January, 1984 flare gas produced in
association with oil without the permission in writing of the Minister
[1985 No.7.]
(2) Where the Minister is satisfied after 1 January 1984 that utilisation or
re-injection of the produced gas is not appropriate or feasible in a

107

National Climate Change Response supra note 83 at 41.
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particular field or fields, he may issue a certificate in that respect to a
company engaged in the production of oil or gas(a) Specifying such terms and conditions, as he may at his discretion
choose to impose, for the continued flaring of gas in the particular field or
fields; or
(b) Permitting the company to continue to flare gas in the particular field
or fields if the company pays such sum as the Minister may from time to
time prescribe for every 28.317 Standard cubic metre (SCM) of gas flared:
Provided that, any payment due under this paragraph shall be made in the
same manner and be subject to the same procedure as for the payment of
royalties to the Federal Government by companies engaged in the
108
production of oil.
The penalty was initially fixed at 2 kobo (equivalent to US$0.0009 in 1985) against the
oil companies for each 1,000 standard cubic feet (scf) of gas flared. In 1990, the penalty
was increased to 50 kobo/10,000 scf. This was further raised to 10 naira/1000 scf in 1998.
In 2008, the penalty was raised to US$3.50 (equivalent to 560 naira today) for every
1,000 scf of gas flared. Nigeria is also planning to raise the penalty to the international
market value of the tax flared.
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In 2012, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

(NNPC) confirmed that flare is only down by 15 percent, which means 85 percent of
Nigerian gas is still being flared.

110

The Nigerian situation is relevant to the South African situation because the enactment of
the tax in Nigeria followed the “slow ramp-up” approach, which is what the National
111

Treasury of South Africa wants to use as well. In a “slow ramp-up” approach,
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the tax

Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1985 (Nig), Section 3.
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Petroleum Industry Bill, An Act to Provide For the Establishment of a Legal, Fiscal and Regulatory
Framework For the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria and Other Related Matters , 7th National Assembly,
2012, Section 277(3).
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Adeola Yusuf, “FG Confirms 85 percent flaring by IOCs” Daily Independent Newspaper online:
<dailyindependentnig.com/2012/12/fg-confirms-85-gas-flaring-by-iocs/ daily independent newspaper>.
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The other approaches for the introduction of an environmental tax are the grandfathering approach and
the cold- turkey approach. Grandfathering would exempt from taxation a baseline level of emissions, such
as an amount equal to emissions in a reference year. A cold-turkey approach would simply introduce the
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is introduced gradually over time, starting with a low initial rate or a narrow initial base
and then increasing the rate or base at a pre-announced schedule in order to reach the
desired system.
Setting the tax at the desired rate is complicated; this is evident in the proposed plan by
Nigeria to set the flare penalty to the international market value of the gas flared. The
market value of gas varies across continents.

112

Competitiveness concerns could also weaken the effectiveness of the proposed tax in that
trade exposed sectors will seek to be exempted from the tax. There is no danger of this in
a cap and trade program because of the opportunity offered by linking. Joining the ETS
with the EU ETS and other ETS’ in other jurisdictions will ensure that companies that
would have sought exemption from the tax will participate in cutting their emissions as
the argument of being unduly exposed will no longer be tenable.
What is more, a universal carbon tax is likely going to be regressive. This could
aggravate the social inequality in South Africa. As stated in its national communication to
the UNFCCC,
There is high social inequality in a population of about 50 million people, revealed
by a Gini coefficient of between 0.66 and 0.69, several poverty and human
113
development indices emphasise this.
Thus, the revenue to be generated from the carbon tax has to go towards addressing the
social inequality in South Africa, and not only to carbon mitigation measures.
Ultimately, the effect of the proposed tax in South Africa can only be satisfactorily
assessed after its implementation, which will start in 2015. This is meant to give

tax without any special provision for transition. For further reading see Gilbert Metcalf & David Weisback,
“The Design of a Carbon Tax” supra note 92 at 516.
112
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‘‘Natural gas glut seeps into high price market ‘‘, Globe and Mail (April 12 2012) online:
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companies time to adjust to the new fiscal regime on climate change.

114

Carbon tax and a

tradable permit scheme are not mutually exclusive. They can complement each other.
Carbon tax can be used for certain sectors of the economy, while a tradable permit
scheme can cover the rest. This way the country will profit from the unique benefits of
both policies.

2.3 REDD+ in Africa
REDD+ discussions within the UNFCCC negotiations had been on for a while, but it
gathered momentum in 2005 when the Coalition for Rainforest Nations

115

–led by Costa

Rica and Papua New Guinea—presented a formal proposal for reducing GHG emissions
from deforestation to the 11th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC and first
Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol (COP 11/CMP 1). At the same
meeting, several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and scientists, led by
Environmental Defense, reiterated earlier calls for inclusion of forests under Kyoto’s
trading instruments.

116

COP 11 requested that its Subsidiary Body for Scientific and

Technological Advice (SBSTA) evaluate the issue of reducing emissions from
117

deforestation and report back to UNFCCC COP 13/MOP 3 in December 2007.
REDD+ is meant to address the perceived gaps in the operation of the Clean

Development Mechanism. The list of eligible activities under the CDM includes
afforestation and reforestation,

118

but expressly excluded measures to reduce
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Mike Cohen, ‘‘South Africa Delays Implementation of Carbon Tax Until 2015 ‘‘, Bloomberg (27
February 2013).
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Griffiths & Martone, Seeing ‘REDD’? Forests, climate change mitigation and the rights of indigenous
peoples and local communities (Forest Peoples Programme May 2009) at 4.
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Ibid.

“Afforestation” is the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for a period
of at least 50 years to forested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of
natural seed sources while Reforestation” is the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to
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deforestation, and hence did not provide a means for CDM funding to help developing
119

countries tackle deforestation.

REDD+ discussions further gained momentum with the publication of the Stern Review
on the Economics of Climate Change.

120

The Stern Review recommended thus:

Curbing deforestation is a highly cost-effective way of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and has the potential to offer significant
reductions fairly quickly. It also helps preserve biodiversity and protect
soil and water quality. Encouraging new forests, and enhancing the
potential of soils to store carbon, offers further opportunities to reverse
121
emissions from land use change.
At the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held in Bali in December 2007,
discussions on the inclusion of forests in climate change mitigation continued. In the Bali
Action Plan, parties decided that national and international actions to mitigate climate
change should include:
Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing
countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests
122
and enhancement of forest carbon stock in developing countries.
Parties were urged to:
…explore a range of actions, identify options and undertake efforts,
including demonstration activities, to address the drivers of deforestation
relevant to their national circumstances, with a view to reducing emissions

forested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, on
land that was forested but that has been converted to non-forested land. Definitions taken from Decision
11/CP7, online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf#page=54 >.
119

Dave Pritchard, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing
Countries-the Link with Wet Lands (Foundation for International Environmental Law 2009).
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Bali Action Plan supra note 45 at 3.
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from deforestation and forest degradation and thus enhancing forest carbon
123
stocks due to sustainable management of forests.
The need to reduce emissions from deforestation was again reemphasised at COP 16 in
Cancun, Mexico. Parties were urged to “collectively aim to slow, halt, and reverse forest
cover and carbon loss, in accordance with national circumstances, consistent with the
ultimate objective of the Convention, as stated in Article 2”.

124

What is REDD+?
As stated in the Cancun Agreements, REDD+ includes:
(a) Reducing emissions from deforestation;
(b) Reducing emissions from forest degradation;
(c) Conservation of forest carbon stocks;
(d) Sustainable management of forests;
(e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks.

125

It refers to a suite of interventions that aim to enhance the removal of GHG emissions
through forest conservation, sustainable management of forests, and the enhancement of
forest carbon stocks in developing countries.

126

REDD+ is important because deforestation is the second largest anthropogenic source of
carbon dioxide after fossil fuels.

127

Plants and trees remove carbon from the atmosphere

through photosynthesis as they grow. However, when forest is cleared and soils are
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Carbon Initiatives in Tanzania, Kenya and Democratic Republic of Congo (2011) online:
<http://www.awf.org/documents/climatechange/AWF_Mitigation_Final_11242011.pdf >.
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Van Der Wherf et al., “CO2 emissions from forest loss” (2009) Nature Geo Science 2 737-738 cited in
Cheik Mbow et al., Challenges and Prospects for REDD+ in Africa Desk Review of REDD+
implementation in Africa (Global Land Report No. 5 2012), online:
<http://www.start.org/Publications/REDD_Report.pdf>.
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disturbed through ploughing, the stored carbon is released back into the atmosphere.
Deforestation is the major singular source of greenhouse gases emissions in Africa.
Africa accounts for 20 percent of the global net CO2 emissions from land-use change.

128

Forest degradation of peat soils can generate emissions; peat soils generate emissions
when they switch from anaerobic conditions to aerobic conditions through human
interference. The switch occurs through the deposition of decaying matter in their
waterlogged soils. The carbon and methane they sequester is released back to the
atmosphere when decaying matter is deposited in them.

129

Forest degradation is very rampant in Africa and has been most severe in Nigeria, where
more than 410,000 hectares of forest are lost to desertification annually.
percent of the country’s land is forested.

131

130

Less than 12.2

Ghana also lost an average of 115,000

hectares of forest per year between 2000 and 2005. Over the last 15 years, West Africa
132

has lost almost 12 million hectares of tropical forest.

Even though African forests

constitute only 16 percent of the world’s total, the deforestation rate in Africa is more
than six times the world’s average.
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African forests play a crucial role in the global carbon cycle, since tropical forests store
more carbon than other types of forests.
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African forests account for 17 percent of the

world’s forest cover with over 582 million hectares of forested land. These include the
world’s second largest rainforest, covering 180 million hectares across the Congo
Basin.
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NASA Map reveals tropical Carbon Storage, online:
<http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/earth20110531.html>.
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REDD+ is not only a mitigation measure; it has adaptation as a co-benefit. Tropical
forests influence precipitation and can have a cooling effect on a region through
increased evaporation and cloud cover.

136

Urban forests and trees provide green

infrastructure – shade, evaporative cooling, and rainwater interception, storage and
infiltration – in cities.
They can play a significant role in urban adaptation to climate variability and change by
reducing temperatures during heat waves.

137

Forests contribute to regulating river flows

(base flows during dry seasons and peak flows during rainfall events), thereby
minimising risks related to water scarcity and floods.

138

Research in Africa shows that

leguminous trees can make agriculture more drought-resilient by improving water
139

infiltration and increasing productivity through nitrogen fixation.

REDD+ also has other benefits, such as protection of biodiversity and economic
empowerment for forest dependent communities, in that it offers incentives to protect
forest stock.
To participate in REDD+, developing countries are to develop:
(a) A national strategy or action plan;
(b) A national forest reference emission level and/or forest reference level
or, if appropriate, as an interim measure, subnational forest reference
emission levels and/or forest reference levels, in accordance with national
circumstances;
(c) A robust and transparent national forest monitoring system for the
140
monitoring and reporting of the activities.
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CIFOR, Forest and Climate Change Adaptation: What Policymakers Should Know (Factsheet No 1
November 2012), online: <http://www.cifor.org/fileadmin/factsheet/RIO+20_Factsheet percent20percent20Adaptation.pdf>.
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Developed country parties are to support developing country parties’ action in this regard
through capacity building, technology transfer, and finance and general support for
results-based demonstration activities.

141

The final form of REDD+ is yet to be known, as parties failed to agree on how to
measure emissions reductions from REDD+, i.e. monitoring, reporting and verification of
carbon emissions from REDD+ at COP 18.
demonstration projects to get underway.
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This is important for REDD+

143

The early implementation of REDD+ in Africa, i.e. REDD+ readiness projects, presents a
worrying sign. In the fall of 2009, the Ogiek people of Kenya, a forest-dependent
community, were forcibly displaced due to the introduction of REDD+ in the Mau
Forest.

144

Over 22,000 people were violently evicted from the Mubende and Kiboga

districts in Uganda to make way for the UK-based New Forests Company to plant
trees.

145

Evicted successful farmers were reduced to becoming poorly paid plantation

peons on the land from which they were evicted.

146

Natural forests are also being

converted to monoculture plantations in the name of REDD+.
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This has led some

scholars to advocate for the rights-based approach to REDD+, i.e. the recognition of the
148

rights of forest-dependent communities.
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Cifor Blog (11 December 2012), online: < http://blog.cifor.org/13152/disappointing-outcome-for-forestsin-doha-but-redd-can-still-move-forward/#.UUAXWhysiSo>.
143

Ibid. Credits for REDD+ projects are only available currently through the voluntary carbon markets.

144

Ten of the Worst REDD- projects affecting Indigenous People and Local Communities (No REDD
papers one, Carbon Trade Watch, November 2011) at 46 online: <http://www.reddmonitor.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/noreddpapers_download.pdf>.
145
146

Ibid.
Ibid.

147

Plantations store less carbon than natural forests. See: Rita Osarogiagbon, “REDD and its implication
on community people” (Presentation made at Cross River State stakeholders forum on Climate change, 1
March 2011).
148

Griffiths and Martone Seeing REDD supra note 107 at 9.

41

The Cancun Agreements sought to remedy this defect by providing that the rights of
indigenous peoples must be respected by developing country parties in REDD+
activities;

149

these parties must show how they are going to safeguard the rights of

indigenous people in REDD+ implementation.
Another challenge facing REDD+ implementation in Africa is the underlying drivers of
deforestation. It is already recognised at the UNFCCC level that a good REDD+ must
address these drivers,

150

which are economic and difficult to reverse.

Logging is one of the drivers of deforestation in Africa. Forestry is an important source of
livelihood in Africa, as it is a source of employment for approximately 500,000
people.
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The contribution of forestry to the African economy is still marginal, but the

fact that people depend on it for daily survival cannot be discountenanced.
Another driver of deforestation in Africa is fuel wood extraction. Almost two thirds of
global fuel wood use is in Africa,

152

where it is a significant source of energy. Current

levels of extraction largely exceed the regenerative capacity of the forests. Fuel wood
extraction is even greater than industrial wood extraction.
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A third driver of deforestation and loss of forest cover is agriculture. Conversion of
forested land to cropland by farmers is one of the ways agriculture contributes to
deforestation in Africa. Shifting cultivation and use of fire in farming is another way
154

agriculture contributes to deforestation on the continent.
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Another driver of forest degradation in Africa is artisan mining. There is a noticeable
155

trend towards “de-agrarianization”

in rural households; up to 50 percent of rural

incomes in Africa are derived from off-farm sources.
a preferred non-farm occupation.

157

156

Artisan mining is fast becoming

In Ghana, the desire to earn foreign exchange from

the mining sector conflicts with the objectives of REDD+.

158

Attempts to address these drivers appear to be failing. The Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Policy in Nigeria was designed to address reliance on a fuel wood extraction as a source
of energy but it is not producing the desired results. This has been attributed to
institutional and policy inefficiencies.

159

The reason why a thriving domestic gas market

is yet to develop in Nigeria goes beyond institutional failures. Fuel wood extraction is
cheap compared to all other sources; even if gas supply penetrates the hinterlands in
Nigeria, people will still resort to fuel wood extraction for their energy needs because it is
less costly. In fact, there is no cost involved with fuel wood extraction for energy needs.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the drivers of deforestation are economic; this infers
that part of the solution must also be economic. Creating a value for maintaining forest
cover can help in changing behaviour. Forest-dependent communities and farmers are
key actors in a successful REDD+. They must be actively engaged in the battle to
maintain forest cover, and the only way they can be engaged is if they see the practical
benefits of REDD+.
160

Farmers will be better able to internalise concepts such as agro-forestry

and better

farming practices when they see the monetary incentives for maintaining forest cover.
Monetary incentive has proven to be successful in maintaining forest cover in Costa Rica,
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The term “ de-agrarianization” connotes the movement of rural dwellers away from agricultural based
modes of livelihood.
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nitrogen-fixing crop, to improve the fertility of the soil.
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where land owners were promised 45 dollars for maintaining it. Forest cover increased
from 21 percent in 1977 to 51 percent in 2005 as a result of this monetary incentive
coupled with other measures.

161

The monetary incentive should be equal to or greater than the returns from alternative
uses of land. This will create enthusiasm among the farmers and cause less friction.
Creating economic incentives is the only way REDD+ can attain its objectives of curbing
emissions and reducing poverty.

162

If REDD+ results in enhancement of livelihood rather

than loss of livelihood, it will face less opposition from rights activists.

2.4 CDM in Africa
The purpose of CDM is as contained in Article 12 (2) of the Kyoto Protocol, which
provides as follows:
The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties
not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in
contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist
Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3.
CDM allows developing countries to participate in stabilizing the concentration of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere despite not having QELRCs (Quantified
Emission Limitation and Reduction Commitments) under the Protocol. It allows
developed countries (known as Annex 1 countries under the Protocol) to identify and
invest in emission-reducing projects in developing countries, and to claim credits for
the reductions achieved. Conceptually, this investment is meant to reduce compliance
costs for developed country parties, and result in transfer of funds and new
technology to developing countries. The range of sector and source categories that
could be addressed via CDM project activities is indicated in the table found in
Appendix A.
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A developing country is at liberty to implement CDM projects without the support of a
developed country. All it needs to do is identify a project that will result in emissions
reduction and seek registration for the project before the CDM Executive Board; then it
will need to source for potential buyers for the certified emissions reduction units (CER).
This is called unilateral CDM; project activities that do not have an Annex I party letter
163

of approval at the time of registration are known as "unilateral CDM" projects.

164

Ratification of the protocol is a condition precedent to participation in CDM.

Most

African countries have ratified the Protocol. A developing country must also have a
165

Designated National Authority for CDM.

According to Manso, the functions of the

DNA include: serving as the focal point between investors and the host country
government; providing potential projects for investors; processing framework agreements
with investors; ensuring that an environmental impact assessment is carried out before
approving projects and considering the assessment reports carefully; providing legal
advice for project investors; coordinating with other relevant official entities and
authorities within the host country; drawing up standardized baselines; monitoring
ongoing CDM projects; granting export of emissions rights (CERs); conducting public
relations and providing information on CDM implementation in the host country through
advertisements in the media and through the web. It is also to design and establish an
evaluation procedure that adopts international eligibility criteria to assess the contribution
of the prospective CDM projects to sustainable development in the host country.

166

One of the most important criteria for CDM projects is that it should contribute to
sustainable development in a developing country.

167

The CDM Rules and the Kyoto

Protocol do not offer any common guidelines or indicators for assessing the sustainable
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development benefits of a CDM project. It is left for the host country to formulate its own
definition of sustainable development.
Another criterion a CDM project has to meet is “additionality”. A CDM project activity
is additional if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced
below those that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project
activity.

168

The baseline for a CDM project activity is the scenario that reasonably

represents the anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases that would occur
in the absence of the proposed project activity.

169

The alternative scenario may be the

“business as usual” scenario (the continuation of current emission levels in the absence of
the CDM project), or some other scenario that involves a gradual reduction in emissions
intensity.
The CDM project process has been summarised as follows:
• Obtaining formal written approval from the DNA of the Host Country for
the proposed project and an affirmation that the project will assist the Host
Country to achieve sustainable development;
• Obtaining formal written authorization from the Party to the Kyoto
Protocol of the voluntary participation of the proposed Project
Participants;
• Creation of a Project Design Document containing details of the project
activity, the proposed monitoring methodology and baseline, the crediting
period of the project, the Project Participants and the method by which the
participants will communicate with the CDM Executive Board;
• Review and Validation of the Project Design Document by a DOE;
• Registration of the project as a CDM Project with the CDM Executive
Board; operating the project in a manner which reduces, abates or
sequesters Greenhouse Gases;
• Monitoring the emission reductions achieved by the project in
accordance with the monitoring plan;
• Periodic review and Verification of the achieved emission reductions by
another DOE; certification to the CDM Executive Board by the second
DOE that the project has achieved the number of emission reductions
verified and a request to the CDM Executive Board to issue CERs for the

168
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Ibid at 16.

The baseline covers emissions from all gases, sectors and source categories shown in Appendix A.
Ibid.
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amount of Greenhouse Gas abatement, which occurred during the
Verification period;
• Issuance of CERs by the CDM Executive Board for the Verification
170
period.
The participants in the CDM project process include the following: project developer
(who might also be the CER purchaser), the CDM Executive Board,
National Authority, Designated Operational Entity,

172

171

Designated

and the CER purchaser (when they

are not also the project developer).
There are two CDM project types: the traditional CDM and the programmatic CDM. The
traditional CDM involves a single big project that leads to greenhouse gas cuts, while the
programmatic CDM involves a series of small scale projects lumped together that lead to
greenhouse gas emissions. A programmatic CDM (also called POA) is a voluntary
coordinated action by a private or public entity that coordinates and implements any
policy/measure or stated goal (e.g., incentive schemes and voluntary programmes) that
leads to anthropogenic GHG emission reductions, or to net anthropogenic greenhouse gas
removals by sinks that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the POA,
via an unlimited number of CDM program activities (CPAs).
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UNEP Legal Issues Guidebook to the Clean Development Mechanism (UNEP Resource Centre:
Roskilde, Denmark, 2004) at 31-32.
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The role of CDM Executive Board is to develop procedures for the CDM; approve new methodologies
related to baselines and monitoring plans; accredit DOEs; register projects (in accordance with specific
procedures); issue CERs (in accordance with specific procedures); make publicly available information on
proposed CDM Project activities in need of funding and investors seeking opportunities; maintain a public
database of CDM Project activities containing information on registered Project Design Documents,
comments received, Verification Reports, CDM Executive Board decisions and information on all CERs
issued; and develop and maintain the CDM registry. Ibid at 23.
172

Designated operational entities (DOEs) are independent auditors that assess whether a potential project
meets all the eligibility requirements of the CDM (validation) and whether the project has achieved
greenhouse gas emission reductions (verification and certification). They are accredited by the CDM
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State and Trends of the World Carbon market supra note 2 at 56.
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Africa is more involved in the programmatic CDM than the traditional CDM. Four out of
every fifth multi-country CDM “program of activity” is hosted in Africa.

174

This is due to

the fact that a lot of African countries do not have large-scale single projects that can
generate a lot of CERs. Thus, the majority of CDM projects in Africa are programmatic
in nature.
One of the limitations of the CDM as a mitigation platform is that it is investment based.
The trend is for project developers and financiers to invest in relatively low risk projects.
Consequently, if a project can lead to greenhouse gas emissions but has not been tested or
proven, investors will be reluctant to invest in such projects. So, CDM projects are in the
main low hanging fruit projects. According to the World Bank State and Trends of the
Carbon Market 2012,
Carbon revenues continue to leverage relatively low-risk investments in
proven technologies by improving the marginal rates of return and
enhance the chances of the projects being developed and remaining
operational. As a result, after almost completely exhausting the market for
HFCs and N2O, most primary CERs in recent years have been generated
175
from wind, hydro, and other renewable energy projects.
The shift towards renewable energy investment is very good for the African continent in
that it can help solve their energy deficit

176

and can aid in the transition away from fossil

fuels. Renewable energy projects generate less carbon credits per output, so it remains to
be seen how long investors’ appetite in renewable energy projects will be maintained.
Renewable energy projects account for 70 percent of the current CDM projects, but the
CERs from them remain small compared to their number. See Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below.
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Carbon Markets and Africa: a Quick Factsheet for Journalists (UNEP Resource Centre, Roskilde,
Denmark, 2011) at 6.
175
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The majority of villages in Africa rely on kerosene lamps and candles for their lighting. These cost the
average household US$40–80 each year and they emit pollutants that pose serious health risks and can
cause house fires. – Carbon Markets and Africa: a Quick Factsheet for Journalists supra note 165 at 9.
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Total
tal Number of Projects in the CDM Categories
Figure 2.1 Percentage Share of To
Source: UNEP CDM Pipeline Analysis and Database (1 August 2013), online:
<http://www.cdmpipeline.org>
>.

Figure 2.2 Growth of Total Expected Accumulated 2012 CERs
Source: UNEP CDM Pipeline Analysis and Database (1 August 2013), online:
<http://www.cdmpipeline.org>.
>.
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Figure 2.2 shows the total number of CERs that were expected before the end of 2012 for
the major project categories, according to the PDDs in all the CDM projects that are
alive.
As noted in the World Bank report quoted above, the shift towards renewable energy
projects was not deliberate; it was necessitated by the dwindling availability of hydro
fluorocarbon and nitrous oxide projects—natural investors’ preference.
CDM has not contributed much to greenhouse gas mitigation in Africa, where landfill gas
projects top the list of CDM projects. Thirty-six of the currently registered CDM projects
in Africa are landfill gas and methane avoidance projects (see Appendix B). Landfill gas
projects convert methane from decomposing garbage into power, while methane
avoidance projects seek to utilize waste sawdust for pellet/briquette production and are
small-scale in nature. Contribution of waste to greenhouse gas emissions in Africa is
negligible compared to the emissions from land use change and fossil fuel use. Emissions
from the waste sector accounted for just 2 percent of South Africa’s total emissions for
the year 2000.

177

South Africa has more landfill gas projects and hosts more CDM

projects that any other country in Africa.
The project-by-project mitigation under the CDM does not account for the expected
growth rate in Africa’s emissions. Africa has only hosted 27 biomass cook stove projects
thus far (as shown in Appendix B), which are meant reduce black carbon emissions. The
projects are meant to replace open fire cooking, which is common in the rural areas in
Africa. This is small in view of the fact that Africa is the second highest contributor of
black carbon emissions. See Figure 2.3.
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South Africa’s Second National Communication under UNFCCC supra note 78 at ix. Emissions from
the waste sector in Nigeria for the year 2000 was 2,377 CO2e, less than 2 percent of its emissions for the
year 2000. National Environmental Economic and Development Study (Needs for Climate Change in
Nigeria) (Federal Ministry of Environment Special Climate Change Unit, September 2010), online:
<http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/nigerianeeds.pdf>. Emissions from the waste sector in
Egypt for the year 2000 were 19.5 MtCO2e, 10 percent of the country’s total emissions for the year 2000.
Egypt’s Second National Communication under the UNFCCC (Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency,
May 2010), online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/egync2.pdf>.

50

Figure 2.3 Global BC Emissions Based on Year 2000 Estimates
Source: US EPA Report to Congress on Black Carbon: Department of the Interior, Environment, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (March 2012) at 97.

Currently, South Africa has 16 wind CDM projects and 6 solar CDM projects, which are
178

meant to supply 2,756 megawatts to the national grid.

However, the Department of

Energy anticipates the introduction of 41,346 MW in the next 17 years to enable South
Africa to diversify its electricity generation mix to sources other than coal.

179

To address this shortcoming, there have been suggestions to reform CDM from its project
nature to cover sectors of the economy in developing countries. Conceptually, sectorial
CDM can help developing countries participate more in the goal of stabilizing
greenhouse gas emissions, but it will be difficult to set a baseline for a sector of the

178
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UNEP CDM Pipeline Analysis and Database (1 August 2013), online: <http://www.cdmpipeline.org>.

Solving South Africa’s Energy Crisis: Renewable Energy Projects Offer New Hope (15 January 2013)
online: Aurecon <http://www.aurecongroup.com/en/about/latest-news/2013/january/solving-south-africasenergy-crisis-renewable-energy-projects-offer-new-hope.aspx>.
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economy.

180

It has been suggested that additionality is not needed for sectorial CDM;

181

the effect of this is that certainty of emissions reductions is not guaranteed.
Generally, CDM does not guarantee environmental certainty, as it is very difficult to
define with certainty what would have happened in the absence of a project.

182

CDM

baselines for some projects do not relate to existing practices but to projections of future
use. The Bujugali Dam project in Uganda is one example of this. In this project, CER
was calculated on the assumption that Uganda would be afflicted with load shedding
(power shortage), which would lead to increased use of diesel generators and automotive
oil. While it is true that there was load shedding in Uganda (12 hours per day)

183

before

the project, the load shedding scenario was projected to continue indefinitely in the
Project Design Document,

184

because the crediting period goes from 8 April 2012 to 8

April 2019. The project is meant to reduce 6,328,000 tCO2e for the 7-year period. The
increased use of diesel generators should ordinarily decline during the first year of the
185

project. As a matter of fact, there is currently no load shedding in Uganda now.

The EU ETS, the biggest buyer of CDM credits, has expressed concerns over the
environmental integrity of CDM projects being supplied to it, and has decided to ban
credits from industrial gas projects such as hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs) and adipic acid
N2O projects for use in its ETS after April 2013.

186

180

UNFCCC Compilation of inputs considered by the CDM Executive Board in its review of the CDM
modalities and procedures (8 March 2013), online:
<http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/l/q/F02QOJZ359UME6WARCBYX7GI1NPTSL.pdf/eb72_repan01.pdf?
t=aGR8bWtpbDF1fDBlUi2QdX7v09frcjIQjSMb>.
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CDM does not allow companies in host countries to internalise the cost of greenhouse gas
externality. This is important given the role of multinational corporations in the fight
against climate change. Apart from the foreign multinational corporations in Africa, the
list of homegrown multinational companies is also increasing.

187

According to the Stern

Review:
Project-based carbon finance does not internalise the cost of the
greenhouse gas externality for firms and consumers in the host country or
for goods exported from the country. Project-based carbon finance acts as
a form of subsidy; it reduces the emissions from a particular project, but it
does not affect the demand for high carbon goods and services across the
economy as a whole, so the overall level of emissions can remain high or
increase. It also creates issues of moral hazard and gaming, where there
are incentives to manipulate the system to increase the rewards
188
received.
The case of Sasol is apt in this regard; Sasol is a beneficiary of CDM finance for a nitrous
oxide abatement project at its Secunda and Sasolburg plants.
While this project will reduce Sasol’s emissions by one million tonnes of CO2e a year, its
new plant in South Africa will emit about 30 times that amount per year.

189

CDM is

indirectly encouraging multinationals to pollute even more. The CDM Executive Board
rejected the application for failing to pass an additionality test. Peter Geek, the supply
manager, was reported to have addressed the failed CDM pipeline project at a public
meeting:
Yes, we are indeed trying to get some carbon finance for this pipeline …
(But) we have this problem of additionality; we think there’s a case to be

187

Homegrown multinational corporations like Oando, African Petroleum, Kenya Airways, Conoil,
International Trading Oil and Commodities Corporation all in carbon emitting sectors of the economy in
Africa experienced 30 percent growth from 2006 to 2009 despite the global economic downturn during the
period. See: Dalberg Pioneers on the Frontier Sub Sahara African Multinational Corporations (2011).
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Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change supra note 74 at 16.

Rehana Dada, “South Africa Country Context” in Trusha Reddy ,ed, Carbon Trading in Africa a
Critical Review (Pretoria, South Africa Institute of Security Studies 2011) 47 at 50.
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made for that … The biggest issue is additionality; we would have done
190
this project anyway.
Sasol also sought CDM finance for a 645-kilometre natural gas pipeline from
191

Mozambique to its Secunda plant.

The Secunda plant project had been conceived since

1999 before the Kyoto Protocol came into effect. The company had already costed the
project and did not find it prohibitively expensive. This perverse incentive created by the
CDM is also one of the reasons EU ETS placed a ban on CDM industrial gas projects.

192

More importantly, the European Union wants the CDM to be progressively phased out
for advanced developing countries.

193

As a statement of this intention, credits from new

CDM projects registered after 2012 can only be used in the EU ETS if they are located in
a Least Developed Country (LDC). Credits from CDM projects registered after 2012 in a
developing country will only be allowed if the developing country has a bilateral
agreement with the EU.

194

This decision is both good and bad for Africa. The majority of

the LDCs are in Africa, where there are currently 31;

195

this will encourage CDM

investment in LDCs. However, the remaining 23 developed countries (DCs) in Africa—
with the exception of South Africa who have not really benefited much from CDM—can
no longer rely on CDM as a mitigation platform, as this decision will discourage
investors from investing in carbon offset projects in the DCs, in view of the fact the EU
ETS is the biggest buyer of offset credits.
Beyond this, as part of reforms of its ETS, the EU has reduced the volume of
international credits that are eligible for compliance purposes in the third phase of the
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Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 O J L 140
5.6.2009 art 11a(4).
195

List of Least Developed Countries, online: <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/devplan/profile/ldc_list.pdf>.
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scheme.

196

A total of 1,400 million tonnes of CERs and ERUs were eligible for

compliance by installations during Phase II of the scheme, representing approximately 13
percent of the average allocation in the period 2008-2012 (about 280 MtCO2e per
year).

197

198

The import cap for Phase III is 1,700 MtCO2e.

This reform, coupled with the

fact that the EU ETS is currently oversupplied with CDM credits and declining market
prices for CERs,

199

could discourage further investments in CDM.

2.5 National Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)
The concept of NAMAs emerged in 2007 at the Bali Climate Change conference. As part
of its long term global goal for emissions, the Bali Action Plan reductions called for “[the
implementation of] Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions by developing country
parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology,
financing, and capacity building, in a measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner”.

200

The Cancun Agreement moved the NAMA process forward by creating a NAMA
registry.

201

Nationally appropriate mitigation actions are voluntary commitments that non-Annex I
parties have set up for proposal to the UNFCCC to limit the growth of greenhouse gas
emissions by 2020. NAMA is an opportunity for developing countries to green their
respective economies while trying to develop themselves; it is meant to help developing
country parties avoid the carbon intensive pathways on which developed economies are
founded. NAMAs provide guidance for future mitigation policies in developing
countries.

202

Due to the intricate link between mitigation and development, NAMAs are

explicitly framed in the context of national appropriateness and sustainable

196
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199
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State and Trends of the World Carbon Market 2012 supra note 2 at 21.
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The price of CERs is almost completely driven by the EU ETS. Ibid at 37.
Bali Action Plan supra 57 at 3.
Cancun Agreements supra note 48 at 10.
AMCEN Addressing Climate Challenges supra note 4 at 184.
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development.

203

As part of commitment to NAMA, developing countries are expected to

improve the content and frequency of national communications—including inventories—
204

and to create comprehensive, low-carbon sustainable development strategies.

There are two types of NAMAs: unilateral NAMAs, which are financed and supported
entirely by the host country, and supported NAMAs, which will be implemented if
provided with the necessary international support.

205

To date, nineteen African countries have identified with the NAMA concept. They are
Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco, Sierra Leone,
South Africa, Togo, Tunisia, and Mali. In September 2012, Mali and Ethiopia sought
support by submitting NAMAs to the prototype NAMA Registry.

206

Mali is planning

NAMAs in the renewable energy and forestry sectors, while Ethiopia is seeking support
for the development of an inter-urban electric rail powered by renewable electricity.

207

Tunisia is seeking support for electricity generation from concentrated solar power
208

(CSP), solar photovoltaic.

Other areas that Tunisia’s NAMA seeks to address include

reducing N2O emissions in the phosphate industry, reuse of treated waste water to aid
agriculture, increasing forest cover through afforestation and reforestation, development
of multimodal transport and transport of trucks by railways, and gas utilization plans in

203
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Tunisia’s NAMA (17 May 2010) at 9, online:
<http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/application/pdf/tunisiacphaccord_app2.pdf>.
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the industrial and residential sectors.
MtCO2e per year.

Tunisia’s solar project is projected to avoid 1.5

210

Sierra Leone’s NAMA includes development of alternative energy sources such as
biofuels, waste incineration programmes for energy production, sustainable agriculture,
clean energy utilization, and improving forest governance to maintain the proportion of
land area covered by forests to at least 3.4 million ha by 2015.

211

South Africa’s NAMA is also on renewable energy development; the initiative is meant
to avoid 60 MtCO2 per year.

212

Energy efficiency, renewable energy development, conservation farming, and improving
forest cover are common threads that run through the submitted African NAMAs.
However, there are still significant knowledge gaps on how the submitted NAMAs will
contribute to the accelerated cuts in emissions by 2020. To this end, COP 18 has
established a work programme to further the understanding of the submitted NAMAs.

213

The work programme starts in 2013 and ends in 2014. The global warming outcome of
the submitted NAMAs will be evaluated through the work programme, which is a
capacity building exercise for the implementation of the submitted NAMAs.

214

A key challenge facing the NAMA initiative is that the currently submitted NAMAs of
developing country parties are not adequate to reduce emissions to a level consistent with
the 2 °C target.

209

215

To bridge this significant emissions gap, developing countries that are

Ibid.

210

Kelly Levin et al. “MRV of NAMAS” in Gesine Hansel et al. (eds). Annual Status Report on
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (ECN, 2012) 28 at 30.
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Sierra Leone NAMA (2010) at 4, online:
<http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/application/pdf/sierraleonecphaccord_app2.pd
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Ibid at 4.
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yet to identify with the NAMA concept were urged to formulate and submit their
216

respective NAMAs at COP 18.

Another challenge facing NAMA is finance. There are presently no dedicated funds for
the implementation of NAMAs. A financial commitment made by developed countries to
support the NAMA concept is yet to be delivered.

217

COP 18 also did not resolve the

issue; this is important since the majority of NAMAs are supported NAMAs. It is being
speculated that the newly created Green Climate Fund will be the channel of support for
218

NAMA, but the fund is yet to come into operation.

The goal of NAMA is for

aggressive cuts in emissions by 2020, but as of 2013, funding is yet to be delivered for it,
with just 7 years to go until the set date.
Leveraging private finance by removing barriers to investment could help in financing
NAMA, but the fact that some NAMAs are non-market in nature could prove to be an
obstacle in attracting private finance. As stated in the NAMA Report 2012,
The link between NAMAs and the private sector is much less obvious to
entrepreneurs than it was when the CDM and JI mechanisms were
introduced. Two reasons are mentioned: First, private sector actors are
direct beneficiaries of CDM revenues, while NAMAs support is delivered
to governments who decide how to disburse it. This may create uncertainty
about how support will be used or accessed. Second, the CDM developed
against the background of firm reduction targets that gave an indication of
the future market size. For NAMAs, it is not yet clear how efficient the
219
mechanism will be in achieving GHG emission reductions.

2.6 Summary Conclusions
The gaps in Africa`s climate change mitigation architecture identified in this Chapter are
as follows:
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•

•
•
•

A carbon tax does not guarantee environmental certainty unless complemented by
a tradable permit scheme; certainty is important if African countries are to
effectively contribute to global climate change mitigation.
The economic drivers of deforestation threaten the successful implementation of
REDD+ in Africa.
CDM does not guarantee environmental certainty and it does not encourage
polluting companies in Africa to make cuts in their emissions.
NAMA implementation is threatened by lack of funds.

The next question to determine is whether the proposed emissions trading scheme can
close the gaps in Africa’s mitigation policy architecture, as discussed in this chapter. This
will be examined in the succeeding chapters.
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Chapter 3

3

Emissions Trading as a Climate Change Policy Option
in Africa

3.1 Introduction
This chapter will show how the proposed emissions trading scheme can cover the gaps in
Africa’s mitigation policy architecture. To do this, I will analyse some of the existing
literature on the nature of emissions trading as a policy instrument, including its types to
its evolution and theoretical framework. I will then show the justification for the policy in
Africa.
The justification part of this chapter will demonstrate the environmental need for such a
policy within the UNFCCC context and other gains that could be made from
implementing the policy. This will be followed by a discussion of the viability of the
proposed scheme in Africa, which will answer the question of whether the potential to
trade carbon exists in Africa; meaning whether there are enough sources for trading and
institutions to support trading of carbon in Africa.

3.2 Evolution of Emissions Trading
An emissions trading scheme, in principle, seeks to fight pollution by setting a price on it.
The reasoning behind this concept being that the more costly the government makes
pollution, the more likely it is that companies would want to prevent it from happening. It
is anchored on the Polluter Pays principle. The Polluter Pays principle states:
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of
pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting
220
international trade and investment.
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It allows for flexibility in meeting environmental goals by allowing the market to dictate
how to comply with environmental targets, as opposed to traditional regulation, which
does not give room for flexibility, in that it specifies only one route to compliance.

221

Under an emissions trading scheme, each firm or nation has a binding reduction
obligation, but each could meet this obligation either by making reductions itself, or by
purchasing them from another firm or nation. Emissions trading equalises the marginal
cost of compliance between firms by transferring more of the pollution control burden to
222

firms with low costs of control.

Economists also argue that emissions trading will foster technological innovation,
because it creates incentives for firms to develop new technology in order to make more
emissions reductions than the regulator requires; this is a result of the opportunity
available to over-complying firms to sell the credits to other pollution sources. Stavins
argues that emissions trading, “would promote dynamic efficiency", meaning that it
would provide continuous incentives for developing better emissions control
technologies.
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Pigou is the father of pollution economics; he theorised that pollution is an externality, in
the sense that those responsible for pollution do not really bear the damage costs
associated with their actions. He argued that, in the face of a negative externality such as
pollution, the appropriate remedy involves imposing a per-unit tax on the emissions from
a polluting activity.
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The tax rate would be equal to the marginal external social damage caused by the last unit
of pollution, at the efficient allocation. Faced with this tax on emissions, firms would
“internalize” the externality. By minimizing their private costs, firms would
simultaneously minimize the costs to society as a whole. Rational pollution control policy
225

involved putting a price on pollution.

In 1960, Ronald Coase took a divergent opinion from Pigou; he argued that the market
should be left to determine how to internalize the externality that is pollution; he asserted:
If factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes easier to
understand that the right to do something which has an harmful effect
(such as creation of smoke, noise, smell, etc.) is also a factor of
production…. The cost of exercising such a right (of using a factor of
production) is always the loss that is suffered elsewhere in consequence of
that right-the inability to cross land, park car, to build a house, enjoy a
226
view, to have peace and quiet or to breathe clean air.
He argued that, by making property rights—the right to emit—transferable, the market
could pay a substantial role in allowing firms to internalize the externality. He pointed
out that traditional pollution control regimes based purely on emissions limits provided
no means for these property rights to flow to their highest valued use.
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Dales took the insight further by arguing that legal regimes imposed by the government
for pollution control had, in fact, already established a property right in the right to emit.
This property right was not efficient because it was not transferable.
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According to

Dales, the virtues of the market mechanism are that no person or agency has to set the
price; it is set by the competition among buyers and sellers of rights.

225
226
227

229

Ibid at 3.
Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) JL & Econ 1-44 cited in supra note 221 at 3.
Ibid.

228

J.H Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1968) cited in supra
note 221 at 4.
229

Ibid at 4.

62

Crocker added a further insight by noting that this property approach fundamentally
changes the information requirements on the bureaucracy, i.e. the pollution control
authority’s responsibilities will not include the guesswork involved in attempting to
estimate individual emitter and receptor preference functions.
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The authority does not

have to know anything about the damage nor cost functions of each individual emitter
while setting the level of allowable emissions.
In 1971, Baumol and Oates applied the emissions trading theory to uniformly mixed
pollutants, for which only the level, not the location, of the emissions mattered.
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In

1972, Montgomery extended the theory to non-uniformly mixed pollutants, for which
both the level and the location mattered.
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It was not long before these insights had practical applications. The United States of
America was the first to use emissions trading as an environmental policy instrument.
According to Tietenberg, American scholars who were familiar with the literature on
property rights actively canvassed for its use in the United States.
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They suggested that

it might be possible to improve on the traditional approach of promulgating ambient air
quality standards that specify the permissible legal threshold for concentrations of
pollutants in the ambient air, and selection of desirable technologies by allowing firms to
trade pollution control responsibility among themselves.
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They did this by providing

empirical analyses showing Command and Control policy was not cost effective.
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The opportunity to explore emissions trading as a pollution control instrument came in
1976. By this time, it had become clear that a number of regions designated as “nonattainment areas” by the Clean Air Act would fail to achieve the ambient air quality
standards by the deadlines mandated in the Act.
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The statute had mandated

improvements in air quality in these regions; further economy growth would only make
the air quality worse, contrary to the statute. The only recourse was to prohibit new
businesses (those that would emit any of the pollutants responsible for the non-attainment
in that region) from entering these regions until the air quality came within the ambient
standards.
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This solution was politically unpopular among governors, mayors, and

members of congress.
It was at this point that the US Environmental Protection Agency warmed to the idea of
emissions trading. Existing sources in the non-attainment areas were encouraged to
voluntarily reduce their emissions levels below their current legal requirements. The EPA
then certified these excess reductions as emission reduction credits. These credits became
transferable to new sources that wished to enter the area. New sources were allowed to
enter the non-attainment regions, provided they acquired emission reduction credits from
other facilities in the region, and that total regional emissions would be lower (not just the
same) after entry than they were before. This was accomplished by asking new sources to
secure credits for 120 percent of the emissions they would add; the extra 20 percent of
credits secured by new sources were retired as an improvement in air quality.
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This offset program later became known as the Emissions Trading Program (ETP) when
it was combined with three new policies: Bubble, Banking, and Netting.
The Bubble policy allowed existing sources to buy credits from each other, as opposed to
the offset program, which only allowed new sources to buy from existing sources.
Banking allowed created credits to be saved for subsequent use or sale in the future.
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Netting allowed sources undergoing expansion or modifications to escape the strict new
source technology requirement, or the need to secure offsets for their remaining
emissions, so long as any net increase in emissions fell below an established threshold.
The government’s role in the emissions trading program was to certify each reduction
before it qualified as credit. The control authority also approved credit trades on a caseby-case basis.

239

As part of the solution to phase out lead from refined gasoline, the EPA also used
emissions trading; this was in 1985 when a fixed amount of lead rights was allocated to
refiners.
Refiners who did not need their full share of authorized rights (due to early compliance)
could sell their rights to other refiners.
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Since then, emissions trading has been used

more widely by the United States. It was used to phase out ozone-depleting substances
under the Montreal Protocol, and also used to combat acid rain through the Sulphur
Allowance Program. Emissions trading is now a very popular concept and this is partly
because it was included as part of the Kyoto Protocol. The European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme is the backbone of the EU’s fight against climate change, and likewise,
the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme is at the heart of New Zealand’s fight
against climate change. A nationwide emissions trading scheme will start in Australia in
2015. The scheme is expected to cover 60 percent of the country’s 600 million tonnes of
CO2 per year. Mexico and Republic of Korea have also introduced emissions trading
schemes with their recently passed climate bills.

241

3.3 Conceptual Framework
In principle, emissions trading seeks to achieve cost effective allocation of the pollution
control responsibility. Emissions trading can result in cost effective allocation of the
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pollution control burden because plants typically have very different costs of controlling
emissions. Emily Richman has best illustrated this concept with the following example:
Suppose Power Plant A, which emits 1,000 tonnes of carbon, is required to
reduce its emissions by 500 tonnes. Plant A already uses high quality
pollution reduction technology; to reduce its emissions further, it would
have to cut its output or invest in the latest, state-of-the-art technology,
which limits emissions even further, but is very expensive. Thus,
reductions would cost Plant A $1,000 per tonne. Plant B is also required to
reduce its emissions by 500 tonnes. Plant B uses old, out-dated pollution
reduction technology and could implement the technology that Plant A
already uses at fairly low cost. Thus, Plant B could reduce emissions for
$500 per tonne. If Plant A and B each meet their emissions reductions
obligations themselves, without any trading, Plant A would spend
$500,000 and B would spend $250,000. Overall, 1,000 tonnes of
emissions reductions would cost the economy $750,000. On the other
hand, under a trading program, Plant A could purchase emissions credits
from Plant B at the lower price. Thus, Plant B would make 1000 tonnes of
reduction for a total price of $500,000. Plant B could even charge Plant A
a premium (anywhere between $501 and $999) and the reductions would
still cost less than if Plants A and B each had to make reductions
242
independently.
Price differentials can arise from disparate technology, as here, but can also stem from
the development of efficient production processes in Plant B, Plant B's agreement to
produce less, or a variety of other situations.
To achieve cost effective allocation of the pollution control burden through traditional
regulation, the control authority will need detailed information about the marginal cost of
control of each polluting source. This will be used to set the appropriate standard for each
source.

243

This information is difficult to obtain and if obtained, it will be at great cost to

the control authority. What is more, the information obtained will not be accurate because
plant managers (who are familiar with the possible array of pollution control technologies
and their associated costs) will not want to disclose their exact control cost to the control
authority or to the legislature because the information about cost is part of what the plants
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are using to maintain their competitive edge. What will usually happen is that plant
managers will overstate their control costs to the control authority, which in the end will
defeat the motive of cost effective allocation.
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To get out of this impasse, a market

permit system seems to be a plausible solution. The market permit system will act as an
incentive to the plant managers to act on the information they know, and it will save the
control authority or the legislature the stress of information gathering.
Thus, emission trading solves the problems of information and incentive that are inherent
in a command and control approach because there is an existing market for the sale of
excess permits.
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However, the cost effective allocation of pollution control burden that emissions trading
seeks to achieve could be undermined by high administrative costs as well as transaction
costs. The ability of an emissions trading system to achieve full cost effectiveness
depends on how smoothly the market operates. This is a function of administrative and
transaction costs. Administrative costs include the costs of implementing and setting up
an emissions trading scheme. Thus, an emissions trading scheme will not be cost
effective if the administrative costs are higher than the cost of command and control, i.e.
if the increase in administrative costs from moving to emissions trading to command and
246

control policy dwarfs the savings in abatement costs.

Administrative costs could be in the form of setting up new institutions, such as setting
up the registry system to keep track of permits or designing a compliance system. They
could also come in the form of training for staff, designing rules for trading, monitoring
emissions and enforcement of penalties for non-compliance.
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According to Tietenberg, transaction costs, “are costs other than price, incurred in the
process of exchanging goods and services”.
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Transaction costs in an emissions trading
249

scheme could arise from search and information, bargaining and decision.

Search and

information connotes costs of researching the market and finding buyers or sellers.
Information about sellers and buyers is not readily available, so brokers step in to fill the
gap. In the process, brokers absorb some fees. Costs arising from bargaining and decision
connote negotiation costs; they come in form of time and fees for brokerage, legal and
insurance services.
The presence of high transaction costs in a market permit system will reduce the volume
of permit trading and ultimately lead to high abatement costs. According to Stavins, the
problem of transaction costs in an emissions trading system can be ameliorated in a
market with a relatively large number of sources.
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As the pool of trading partners

increases, it will be easier for sources to locate potential trading partners, thereby
lowering transaction costs.
The manner of initial allocation of permits can also play a role in tempering the potential
effects of transaction costs. Allowances are generally distributed either through
auctioning or for free, on the basis of historical or current emissions. Grandfathering, or
endowment, is the distribution of permits for free on the basis of historical or current
emissions. The argument for grandfathering is a political one; it is felt that the best way
to build a constituency of support for a new ETS is through free allocation, because
existing sources in the market can block the success of the program. The argument for
auctioning is an economic one; auctioning allowance—apart from raising revenue for the
government—will reduce transaction costs because there will be no need to search for
potential sellers. The middlemen will be eliminated. There will be no legal fees incurred
as a result of negotiation and drawing up contracts.

248
249
250
251

251

Ibid at 41.
Robert Stavins, “Transaction Costs and Tradable Permits” (1995) 29 JEEM 133-148.
Ibid at 144.
Ibid at 146.

68

The model of emissions trading chosen can also determine the level of cost effectiveness
of a tradable permit scheme.
There are three types of emissions trading: cap and trade, project-based trading and ratebased trading. The most popular emissions trading type is cap and trade. In a cap and
trade program, an aggregate emissions cap is set specifying the amount of emissions
permitted for sources participating in the program. The regulating authority of a cap and
trade program creates rights to emit a specific quantity (e.g., 1 tonne) of a pollutant,
called an allowance. The total number of allowances equals the level of the cap. To be in
compliance, each emission source must surrender allowances equal to its actual
252

emissions.

It may buy or sell (trade) them with other emissions sources or market

participants.
The cap and trade model is attractive because it guarantees environmental certainty. The
cap represents the maximum allowable emissions from sources participating in the
scheme; it is the cap that does the work of reducing pollution. The integrity of the cap is
very important and must be maintained; it is maintained through penalties and consistent,
effective enforcement. Command and control policy does not rely on a cap, but rather on
emission rates, which may lead to increased emissions as utilization rises. With a cap and
trade program, there is no danger that new entrants into the polluting activity will dilute
the emissions goal, as they would receive allowances from the cap set or purchase
allowances from existing sources.
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The cap and trade model is believed to also guarantee improved accountability because
participating sources must account for every tonne of emissions by following protocols to
ensure completeness, accuracy, and consistency of emission measurement; unlike other
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environmental regimes that base compliance on periodic inspections and assume that the
254

equipment is functioning.

Accurate measurement of emissions and timely reporting are integral to a successful cap
and trade program. Participants in a cap and trade program must have the ability to
measure emissions with sufficient accuracy and consistency. If one source uses a less
accurate emission measurement method than another, and consequently underestimates
its actual emissions, it could surrender fewer allowances than necessary to offset its
emissions. If this scenario occurred, the emission goal (or cap) would not be met and by
extension there will no active market for allowances.
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Cap and trade programs make the most sense when emission sources have different costs
for reducing emissions. This difference in costs makes room for a deal as sources with
high marginal abatement costs have incentive to buy from sources with low marginal
abatement costs. If sources are homogenous, their marginal abatement cost will most
likely be the same and there will be little incentive to trade.
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If the sources are few, there will be few opportunities for trading. This will create
continued liquidity in the market. There must also be enough sources to create an active
market before a cap and trade program can achieve the aim of meeting environmental
goals cheaply.
There are a number of different types of trading that must be considered. For example,
CDM relies upon project-based trading. Project-based trading (also known as credit
trading or offset trading) is generally not used as a standalone program. In a project based
trading, emission offsets, or credits, are typically calculated by comparing actual
257

emissions against a baseline.
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This is the type of trading that occurs in the CDM. The
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baseline is an estimate of what emissions would be in a hypothetical situation (e.g., if the
project had not been created).
Baseline setting is the greatest challenge with project-based trading. Additionality is the
gauge used to measure emission reductions in a project-based trading. Before credits are
issued for emission reductions in a project based trading, it must be shown that the
emissions reductions would not have occurred without the project. The emissions
reductions must not be such that would have happened anyway. Project-based trading
does not guarantee environmental certainty, as it is difficult to determine what would
have happened in the absence of a project.
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For project-based trading to be environmentally effective, the issue of non-additional
projects must be tackled. This is usually done through increased regulatory oversight.
Since each credit trade is unique, project participants are often required to develop a
project-specific emission baseline for review by the regulating authority or other
authorized experts. Even after the emission baseline is approved, credit trades will still
have to be approved by the regulatory authority to ensure that the project does not dilute
the emission goal coupled with continued monitoring of the project. As a result,
transaction costs and uncertainty are high (the fear that the credit trade might not be
approved is always there). The United States’ credit trading systems have generally
performed poorly. The programs did not achieve significant economic or environmental
benefits, nor did they introduce flexibility into the fairly rigid regulatory system
governing criteria pollutants. The disappointing results of these programs have been
attributed to their high transaction costs and the uncertainty and risk involved in
obtaining the needed government approvals for credit trades.
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To reduce administrative and transaction costs and to address additionality concerns,
multi- project baselines are set. The multi-project baseline uses performance standards or
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benchmarks for different types of projects. If the project results in emission rates lower
than the standard, the project automatically receives credit equal to the difference
between the baseline and the actual emissions. Standardizing baseline methodologies in
advance can also help reduce transaction costs in project-based trading and limit the
subjectivity inherent in a review of a project baseline.
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However, standardizing does not guarantee that the emissions reductions are additional.
Multi-project baselines may be difficult for some projects. Generally, project-based
trading is ideal for sectors in which it is easier to measure an emission reduction than
261

total mass emissions.

A second example to consider is a rate-based trading approach. Under this approach, the
regulating authority determines a performance standard.
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It sets an emissions limit per

unit of production, for example, 1,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide per kilowatt of electricity
generated. Trading occurs when sources with emissions rates below the performance
standard sell to sources whose emissions exceed the performance standard set. One
drawback of rate-based trading is that if the activity level increases at a rate faster than
the emission rate declines, sources can earn credits while total emissions increase. New
263

entrants into the polluting activity can increase the pollution load.
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Rate-based trading is similar to environmental tax in that the regulating authority must
periodically impose new rate standards to achieve and maintain an emission target and
prevent additional emissions that may result from increased production. The data
requirement in a rate-based trading tends to be more because the regulating authority has
to collect activity level data. Activity level data gathering is essential in a rate based
trading in order to revise the rate standard and to ensure that the emission goal is not
264

diluted.

3.4 Economic Gains of the Policy
A well-designed emissions trading policy can ensure the transfer of wealth from
developed countries to Africa to the rural poor, to the government, as well as to private
companies. Implementing REDD+ as an emissions trading scheme will not only address
the economic drivers of deforestation in Africa, it will also help address rural poverty in
Africa. REDD+ has been described earlier as performance-based financial incentive
system for developing countries to reduce the rate of emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation. It has also been shown earlier (in Chapter Two) that the drivers of
deforestation threatens REDD + implementation in Africa. Putting a value on forest cover
through an emissions trading policy that engages small holder farmers and forest
dependent communities in Africa will not only manage the tension that REDD+ would
ordinarily generate but help ensure the flow of wealth to the rural areas in Africa.
Emissions trading policy can ensure a proper benefit sharing between the government and
forest dependent communities from the gains of REDD+. This benefit sharing can be
accomplished through an emissions trading policy when avoided deforestation achieved
by farmers are denoted as carbon credits or units and these credits are then sold on behalf
of the farmers by the government.
Governments retain a percentage from the money realised from the sale and a percentage
is given to the farmers. If farmers know also they can make money through avoided
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deforestation, they will better internalize concepts such as agro forestry. They will also
put an end to shifting cultivation, otherwise known as slash-and-burn agriculture.
This will raise the profile of farming as a profession and stop the trend towards deagrarianisation. Erstwhile farmers who are now artisan miners would want to go back
into farming, thereby addressing the driver of deforestation known as artisanal mining.
Emissions trading schemes can also ensure that forest-dependent communities play their
role in monitoring the progress of REDD+. While satellite analysis is important in MRV
of REDD+, community involvement in the MRV of REDD+ must not be
discountenanced, as forest degradation is very difficult to monitor remotely.
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Thus,

forest owning families have to be involved in the process. Emissions trading can help
ensure that they report to the government the forest degradation noticed in their
communities.
A regional emissions trading scheme involving polluting companies in Africa can lead to
the transfer of wealth from developed countries to African companies. Carbon is steadily
becoming the most traded commodity in the world. The value of the global carbon
market grew to 176 billion dollars in 2011. The global carbon market is divided into two
market segments: the compliance market and the voluntary market. The compliance
market is regulated by mandatory national, regional, or international reduction regimes.
The voluntary carbon market includes any sectors and geographies not covered by
mandatory cap-and-trade schemes or other regulation of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. Individuals, companies and governments purchase carbon offsets to mitigate
their own greenhouse gas emissions, to cover some or their entire carbon footprint for
particular activities or businesses, or just to display their concern for the environment.
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The voluntary carbon market value increased to 576 million dollars in 2011.

The

market value of EU ETS, the backbone of the global carbon market, increased to 148
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billion dollars in 2011.

The market is expected to grow all the more with new players

entering the market. Though the EU ETS is currently oversupplied, there will be demand
for international credits in the third phase of the scheme. This demand will come from
government buyers as well as private buyers because EU member countries committed to
the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The fact that the coverage of the
scheme has been expanded to include all the major greenhouse gases will fuel the
demand for international credits in the third phase. Other players are also coming in:
Australia will start a nationwide cap and trade program in 2015. In November 2011, the
Australian Parliament passed the Clean Energy Legislative Package as part of an effort to
comply with Australia’s unconditional target of reducing net emissions by 5 percent
below 2000 levels by 2020. The legislative package, known as the Clean Energy Future
Package, includes a Carbon Price Mechanism (CPM) that was to take effect July 2012
and link with international offset markets from July 2015.
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The scheme will cover

approximately 500 businesses representing 60 percent of Australia greenhouse gas
emissions from electricity generation.
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Under the scheme, participants can meet 50

percent of their emissions obligation with international credits. Africa can take advantage
of the scheme’s liberal linking provisions.
China has also decided to launch a nationwide emissions trading scheme by 2015. As a
form of testing the waters, it has launched seven pilot carbon-trading schemes in
preparation for the take off of the nationwide emissions trading scheme in 2015.
In November 2011, the National Development and Reform Commission ordered seven
Chinese cities and provinces to set up pilot carbon trading systems during the 12th FiveYear Plan, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing, Chongqin, Shenzhen (the five cities)
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and Guangdong and Hubei provinces.
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Given China’s emissions intensity, there will

most likely be a provision for linking when the nationwide emissions trading scheme is
launched in 2015.
Japan is also planning to introduce a domestic emissions trading scheme, where there is
currently a Basic Law on Climate Change Countermeasures, which contains a provision
for the adoption of a domestic emissions trading scheme.
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Though it has not been

approved yet, it will be approved once the highly political issues of tax reform and
pension reform are settled. There will most likely be a provision for linking once the law
is passed.
It is also believed that if the new California cap and trade program succeeds, the US will
have a national cap and trade program by 2016.
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The New Zealand ETS also allows for

linking with international credits.
Linking the proposed scheme to several ETS in other jurisdictions in a non-reciprocal
manner can be a source of massive financial flows to Africa companies who cut their
273

emissions beyond and above the allowances given to them.

A regional ETS can also fetch revenue for African countries through the auctioning of
allowances to the highest bidder. This revenue can be used to fight the overwhelming
challenges of climate change in Africa.

270

IETA, Greenhouse Gas Market 2012 New Market, New Mechanism, New Opportunities (IETA 2012)
at 27, online: <http://www.ieta.org/assets/reports/ieta%20greenhouse%20gas%20market%202012.pdf>.
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Ibid at 25.
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The challenges posed to Africa by climate change are considerable and there are no
matching funds available. The Human Development Report 2007-2008 confirms that
adaptation aid to Africa is flat. To date, the Least Developed Country Fund—one of the
sources of adaptation funding under the UNFCCC—has received pledges from 17 donors
amounting to just under US$157 million. Less than one-half of this has been delivered to
Global Environment Facility accounts. Actual spending in terms of delivery through
274

projects amounts to US$9.8 million.

In total, $350 million has been pledged to Africa

to support adaptation plan of actions. Out of the pledged sum, only $130 million has been
delivered.
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Yet, World Bank adaptation cost studies suggest that Africa will need close

to $30 billion between now and 2030 to effectively adapt to climate change.
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As evident in Chapter One, the poorest countries of the world will be the hardest hit by
the impact of climate change. According to the Stern Review, to stabilise the level of
greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at even 500 ppm CO2, a level that would still
carry a significant risk of dangerous climate change, would cost around two percent of
277

global GDP annually—close to US$1 trillion.

The African Group of Negotiators has

also argued that Africa will need at least US$267 billion a year for mitigation and
adaptation.
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The African Union has rightly identified finance as a major constraint, both to adaptation
and mitigation actions in Africa. The approach of the African Union to the half-hearted
commitment to climate change aid by developed countries is to demand compensation for
Africa in the interest of climate justice at UNFCCC negotiations; that the North must pay
the climate debt owed to the South.

279

This approach is commendable, as developed
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countries can do more than they are currently doing (as they are obligated under the
principles of international environmental law).

280

The need is acute, but total reliance on foreign aid cannot solve the problem, especially in
view of the economic downturn in developed economies. Other sources of funding
should be explored. A regional ETS can help African countries attract additional funding
to implement climate change programmes.
CDM cannot ensure the transfer of wealth from developed countries to Africa in the
manner a national and regional ETS with linkage to other ETS would achieve. Less than
30 per cent of the revenue from CDM goes to developing countries. The rest goes to
brokers, bankers, investors, and consultants in rich countries, as well as to fees and
281

taxes.

Most CDM finances are absorbed by project developers as transaction costs.

A graphic example of this is the Trees Farm project in the Bukaleba Forestry Reserve in
Uganda. The project is meant to offset the GHG emissions of a coal-fired power plant to
be built in Norway. The Ugandan government received a meagre one-off fee of US$410
and an annual rent of about US$410 for each hectare of plantation, which is an
incongruously low lease price compared to the huge carbon credits the Norwegian
company (Tree Farms) was aiming to sell.
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What is more, Certified Emission

Reduction units (CERs) are sold at a discounted rate in the carbon market compared to
the EUAs (European Union Emission Allowances). The designated carbon unit of the
scheme will attract more value than CERs.
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3.5 Contribution to the Stabilisation of Greenhouse Gases
in the Atmosphere
An understanding of the contributions and trends of greenhouse gas emissions in Africa
is important in knowing what mitigation strategy or policy to adopt.
Africa’s contribution to the global pool of greenhouse gases is currently modest but like
all other developing regions, its emissions are expected to increase in the future. There is
an upward trend to Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions. Canadell et al. show that
emissions from Africa have grown at a faster pace than the global average for the period
283

2000-2005.

In its Energy Outlook 2011, the US Energy Information Administration

projects that Africa’s carbon dioxide related emissions will grow by 1.8 percent per year
between 2008 and 2035.
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According to US EPA,
Non-CO2 emissions from Africa grew 17 percent between 1990 and 2005.
GDP in Africa grew 57 percent over the same period. The pattern of
emissions is quite different in Africa than other regions. Sources with
significant emissions and growth over this period include savannah
burning (included in other agricultural sources), biomass burning, natural
gas and oil, stationary and mobile combustion, landfills and wastewater.
Emissions from Africa are projected to increase 34 percent from 2005 to
285
2030, while GDP is expected to triple over this time.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the global total non-CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2030,
according to the US EPA.
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supra note 120 at 468.
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International Energy Outlook, (US Energy Information Administration, 2011), online:
<http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/pdf/0484(2011).pdf>.
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US EPA, Summary Report: Global Anthropogenic Non CO2 Emissions 1990-2030 (Office of
Atmospheric Programs, Climate Change Division, Washington, DC, 2012).
The non-C02 gases evaluated in the report are nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), methane (CH4), sulphur
hexafluoride (SF6), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). The
sectors covered are agriculture, industrial processes, waste and energy.
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Three variables influence emissions growth: population; income, measured as per capita
gross domestic product; and intensity of emissions, (tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions
286

per million dollars of GDP).

Population x per capita GDP x Intensityghg = Emissionsghg.

Figure 3.1 Total Global Non-CO2 Emissions by Country Grouping
Source: US EPA, Summary Report: Global Anthropogenic Non CO2 Emissions 1990-2030 (Office of
Atmospheric Programs, Climate Change Division, Washington, DC, 2012).

Figure 3.2 Percent Change in Total Global CO2 Emissions by Decade and Region
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John Blodget & Larry Parker, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Drivers: Population, Economic
Development, and Growth and Energy Use. (Congressional Research Service Report for US Congress,
2010).
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Source: US EPA, Summary Report: Global Anthropogenic Non CO2 Emissions 1990-2030 (Office of
Atmospheric Programs, Climate Change Division, Washington, DC, 2012).

The World Energy Council estimated that in the period 1980 to 2001, Africa’s energy
intensity increased slightly between 1980 and 2001, from 5,953 Btu per $1995-PPP to
287

6,555 Btu per $1995-PPP.

Nigeria and South Africa accounted for the bulk of this

increase, as they consume the bulk of the region’s energy and constitute the largest
economies. African carbon dioxide intensity grew slightly; from 0.49 metric tonnes per
thousand $1995-PPP to 0.51 metric tonnes per thousand $1995-PPP. Africa is the only
world region where carbon dioxide intensity increased during this period.
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Africa has the fastest population growth rate in the world. Most of the high fertility
countries are in Africa. Africa’s population was estimated to be 943 million in 2006.
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According to the Population Reference Bureau, developed countries will experience little
or no population growth in this century. The population growth expected in this century
will come from the world’s poorest countries. By 2050, the population of the world’s
LDCs will number over 8 billion, 86 percent of the world’s population.
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Appendix C

shows the most populous countries in 2012 and 2050, and the countries with the highest
fertility rates in 2012.
According to the report, Nigeria will be the fourth largest country in the world by 2050.
With only 10 percent landmass, this would mean increased pressure on the environment.
The environment cannot keep up with the pace of this population growth.
Africa also has the highest rate of urbanization in the world, ranging between 3-5 percent
per year. In 2000, one in three Africans lived in cities; by 2030 one in two will live in
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cities.

291

Almost two thirds of all vehicle fleet growth will be in non-OECD countries.

292

This translates to increased emissions from the transport sector.
Africa’s economic growth rate is expected be to 4.5 percent in 2013 and rising to 5
percent by 2014.

293

The economic prospects for the future look bright as well. This is due

to increasing trade and investment ties with developing economies. The new oil
discoveries in Africa mean that Africa’s GDP will increase. The new oil discoveries are
in Kenya, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Uganda. These discoveries add to the ten existing
major oil-exporting countries (Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Egypt,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria) in Africa.
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Ghana’s Jubilee field has an

estimated total reserve of 490 million barrels of high quality oil and is expected to yield
government revenues of $1 billion on average per year between 2011 and 2029, based on
a long-run price assumption of $75 per barrel. Oil production had already started in
Ghana in 2010.
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The above statistics suggest that Africa is set to have a major influence on the global pool
of greenhouse gases. Consequently, increased action on mitigation is needed. A
piecemeal approach to mitigation will not suffice in the circumstance. A cap on emissions
will do more environmentally than the current project-by-project nature mitigation under
the CDM. A cap and trade program conceptually guarantees environmental certainty
more than project-based trading.
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Jane Akumu, “Reducing Emissions from Transport” (delivered at SUSTRAN National Workshop,
2012), online:
<http://www.unep.org/transport/pcfv/pdf/icct_2012/reducingemissionsfromtransports_jane%20akumu_une
p.pdf>.
292
293

Ibid.
United Nations, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013 (New York, NY, 2013) at 120.

294

Ibid at 121.
The ten existing major oil-exporting countries are among the top flarers of associated gas, a major
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Global Gas Flaring Volumes Estimated Using Satellite Data (World Bank, 30 May 2007), online:
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The greenhouse gas emissions intensity of some countries in Africa is already significant.
Africa’s environmental impact intensity in relation to the level of industrialisation is
among the highest in the world.
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Algeria emitted a total of 117.3 million tonnes of

greenhouse gases in the year 2000.
The energy sector was responsible for about 75 percent of these emissions, with 20
percent of that figure coming from the production, processing and transport of
hydrocarbons, and 47 percent down to the electricity generation. Of total emissions,
agriculture accounted for 11 percent, waste emitted 10 percent and industrial processes 5
percent.
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In Egypt, total emissions for 2000 amounted to about 193 MtCO2. Fifty-five

percent of the emissions came from fuel combustion, 6 percent from fugitive fuel
emissions, 16 percent from agriculture, 14 percent from industrial processes and 9
298

percent from the waste sector.

In 2000, the total greenhouse gas emissions from the five main sectors (energy, industry,
agriculture, land use change and forestry, waste) in Nigeria were about 330,946 Gg
299

CO2.

South Africa’s total emissions in 2000 were estimated to be 461 million tonnes of carbon
300

dioxide equivalents (CO2e) .

Eighty-three percent of emissions are derived from

energy supply and consumption, 7 percent from industrial processes, 8 percent from
agriculture, and 2 percent from the waste sector.
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An emissions trading scheme can help reduce Africa’s emissions. African fuels are
known to be of poor quality and high in sulphur levels,

301

a major contributor to global

warming. A regional cap and trade scheme covering the downstream sector in Africa, for
instance, will not only reduce emissions from the sector but also reduce emissions from
the transport sector. Cleaner fuels will mean fewer emissions from the transport sector.
This will also translate to better air quality in African cities.

3.6 Preparing Africa for a Carbon Constrained Future
The future of the world is likely going to be carbon constrained. The principle of
Common but Differentiated Responsibility (the main pillar of the UNFCCC) envisages a
time when developing countries will also assume quantified emissions limitation
obligation and reduction commitments (QELRCs). Not much progress has been made in
the fight against climate change, even as greenhouse gases continue to rise in the
atmosphere.
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A reason for this failure is because of the problem of burden sharing; how

to allocate climate change control responsibility between developed country parties and
developing country parties.

303

Since broad partnership is needed in the goal of stabilizing the concentration of
greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, a process has begun to devise fair solutions to all
parties concerned. At the 2012 UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, parties
agreed to speedily work toward a universal climate change agreement covering all
countries from 2020, to be adopted by 2015.
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According to the WMO, the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere reached 390.9 parts per million in 2011.
The amount of methane reached 1813 parts per billion in the atmosphere in 2011. Nitrous oxide reached
324.2 parts per billion in the atmosphere in 2011. See: WMO Press Release No. 965, online:
<http://wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/press_releases/pr_965_en.html>.
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United States insisted it would only accept binding emissions cuts under the Kyoto Protocol if they
apply to developing countries as well. Developing countries like China and India refused to accept binding
emissions targets, asking rather that developed countries like US show leadership in curbing its emissions.
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The international negotiation to build a new global climate agreement and to drive greater
immediate climate action has started. The negotiating team is looking at:
an innovative set of ways for all countries to commit to climate actions
that are compatible with their national circumstances; that the contours of
the new agreement must integrate action across all levels (international,
national, sub-national and private sector); and that a mechanism must be
created to regularly ratchet up ambition to stay below a 2 degrees Celsius
304
temperature rise.
An agreement that is compatible with national circumstance could mean quantified
emissions limitation obligations based on per capita emissions. Implementing emissions
trading as a policy before the agreement is reached can help institutions adjust early to
new obligations of the UNFCCC, so that when African countries assume additional
responsibility under the UNFCCC, meeting the obligations will not be so burdensome.
Naturally, increased obligations for African countries would be demanding on the
government as well as industries in Africa. Implementing emissions trading as a policy
could make the transition to a carbon constrained environment less painful because, in
principle, it seeks to reduce greenhouse gases emissions at the lowest cost to the society.
The fact that emissions trading allows for trans boundary cost sharing will make the
transition to a carbon constrained environment less difficult.

3.7 Viability of the Policy in Africa
The next issue to be considered is the issue of institutional feasibility. It is argued that the
fundamental criterion for a policy to exist in the real world is that it must demonstrate or
gain institutional feasibility.
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Feasibility consists of being publicly acceptable (political

feasibility) and having administrative capacity available to implement it. Institutional
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UNFCCC Press Release (3 May 2013), online:
<http://unfccc.int/files/press/releases/application/pdf/20130305_adpclose.pdf>.
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S. Gupta et al. Policies, Instruments and Cooperative Arrangements supra note 97 at 752.
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feasibility also includes factors such as plausibility and time requirements to develop or
enable institutions to implement a policy.
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The presence of multinationals with experience in emissions trading favours the
implementation of an emissions trading scheme in Africa. Multinationals like Shell,
ExxonMobil and Lafarge Cement have substantial experience in emissions trading.
These multinationals are active participants in the emissions trading scheme in Europe.
Before the introduction of the trading scheme in Europe, Royal Dutch/Shell launched its
own internal emissions trading to learn the intricacies of emissions trading schemes. The
Royal Dutch/Shell Group developed and used a pilot internal emissions trading system
(STEPS) to gain experience and understanding in the use of, and structure for, emissions
trading. The system, which ran from 2000 to 2002, allowed trading between Shell Group
entities located in Annex 1 countries. The system covered over 33 million metric tonnes
of CO2e from over 22 separate sites, accounting for almost two-thirds of its global
307

emissions.

The presence of these multinationals will ensure the policy’s smooth

takeoff. Their experience will also rub off on the local African companies in the carbon
intensive sectors of the economy who have no experience in emissions trading.
For an active emissions market to emerge in Africa there must be enough pollution
sources. There are enough polluting industries in Africa to make trading of permits
possible. The polluting industries cut across various sectors of the economy with different
marginal abatement cost to act as an incentive to trade. Appendix D shows some of the
polluting sources in Africa.
The fact that the polluting sources are not homogenous means there is room for a market
to develop. The Moroccan industry alone burns 1 million tonnes of fossil fuels each year,
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Shell launches its own emissions trading scheme (28 January 2000), online: Edie Newsroom
<http://www.edie.net/news/0/Shell-launches-its-own-emissions-trading-scheme/2271/>.
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generating 2 million tonnes of CO2.

The cement industries and fertilizer industries in

Egypt are very energy intensive. They contribute about 28 Mt of CO2e per year,
representing more than 99 percent of the total emissions of Egypt’s industrial sector.
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The institutions in Africa have also been building capacity in carbon trading. Kenya
opened the first carbon exchange in Africa in 2011.

310

The goal of the exchange is to

facilitate the trading of carbon credits generated through the Clean Development
Mechanism. The exchange is called the African Carbon Exchange (ACX). It is based in
Nairobi, Kenya. The ACX is an electronic trading platform for the trading of carbon
credits and environmental derivatives. Since 2008, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange

311

has been using its platform to sell carbon credit notes. Carbon credit notes are listed
tradable securities designed to provide holders with the opportunity to gain exposure to
carbon credits that will be generated from greenhouse gas mitigation projects. There is
another carbon trading platform in Zambia, called the African Carbon Credit
Exchange.
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The South African government is also considering introducing an emissions

trading scheme.

313

While an active homegrown carbon market can develop in Africa, some institutional
barriers will have to be addressed. This will be the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4

4

Institutional Barriers Against a Homegrown Emissions
Trading Scheme in Africa

Conditions are hardly ever perfect for the introduction of a new policy. In this chapter, I
will look at the institutional barriers that must be addressed before there can be a
homegrown emissions trading scheme in Africa. Some of the barriers that will be
discussed are challenges facing mitigation of climate change in Africa. This chapter will
also proffer solutions to these institutional barriers.

4.1 Greenhouse Gas Inventory Constraint
An inventory of greenhouse gases is important in mitigation of climate change.
Developing a national inventory of greenhouse gases is part of the obligations of African
314

countries to the UNFCCC.

A national GHG inventory is a comprehensive listing, by
315

source of annual GHG emissions.

National inventories include greenhouse gas

emissions and removals, taking place within national territory and offshore areas over
which the country has jurisdiction. A GHG inventory report should cover all the relevant
gases and source categories of the gases. National GHG inventories provide a baseline of
data and, if regularly updated, a tracking mechanism for assessing how domestic policies
316

impact emissions.

The guideline to follow in the emissions development process by

parties to the Convention is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change guidelines.
The basic approach for calculating emissions under the IPCC guidelines is summed in the
equation: Emissions = Activity Data x Emissions Factor.
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Ibid.

316

Thomas Damassa, National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Can Help Countries Curb Climate Change,
online: <http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/05/national-greenhouse-gas-inventories-can-help-countries-curbclimate-change>.
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Kristin Rypdal and Newton Paciornik, “Introduction to the 2006 Guidelines” in Eggleston et al, eds
IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Volume 1 General Guidance and Reporting
(Hayama, Kanagawa: Japan Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, 2006) 1.1 at 1.6.
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Activity Level Data is the extent to which an activity that leads to emissions of GHG
takes place, while Emissions Factor refers to the ratio between the emissions generated
and the outputs of production processes. Fuel consumption would, for instance, constitute
activity level data in the energy sector, while the mass of carbon dioxide emitted per unit
of fuel consumed would constitute an emission factor.
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One of the qualities of a good inventory is consistency. Estimates for different inventory
years, gases and categories are made in such a way that differences in the results between
years and categories reflect real differences in emissions.
be accurate, must not contain underestimates,

320

319

A good inventory must also

and must be complete. Estimates are

reported for all relevant categories of sources and sinks, and gases.

321

Inventory preparation has proven to be a challenge for African countries, as there is so
much uncertainty in the process. The authors and compilers of South Africa’s GHG
Inventory (1990 to 2000) said:
The GHG inventory process continues to face a number of challenges, the
most significant of which is the availability of activity data for
computation of the emissions. The most challenging sectors for data
collection were AFOLU (Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use) and
IPPU (Industrial Processes and other Product Use). For the AFOLU sector,
spatial data, in-depth research and modelling studies are required in order
to create a robust database for land use and land use changes. Data for the
agriculture sector had to be obtained from international sources (FAO) for
this 2000 inventory. For the IPPU sector, one reason given for the
difficulty in collecting data was lack of cooperation by some industrial
companies connected to the protection of confidentiality. There is an
urgent need for government assistance here. Government can consolidate
the agreements it has entered into with industry so that industry provides

318
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321

Ibid.
Ibid at 1.8.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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the required data, and in a format that is commensurate with the data
322
requirements for preparations of national GHG inventories.
Challenges facing African countries in inventory preparation include incomplete or nonexistent activity data, lack of country specific emission factors, and difficulty in retaining
experts. The west African countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Chad, and Togo have identified
several difficulties in inventory preparation; including inconsistencies and lack of
coherence in data provided by sources, lack of forest surveys, limited national coverage
in some data items, and predominance of informal (unregulated) sectors.
In east African Ethiopia,
Even though Ethiopian environmental policy states that there should be a
policy to ‘promote a climate monitoring program as a country is highly
sensitive to climate vulnerability’, there are two problems with this law:
first, it doesn’t give the responsibility to any single agency but the
National Metrological Agency is doing it. Second, it only refers to
vulnerability data and looks at how Ethiopia is affected by the world with
GHG emissions rather than looking at domestic GHG emissions.
Industries, sectors and government agencies don’t have any mandate to
collect data or have ownership of data. Government agencies and subnational administration also don’t have any government mandate to
monitor GHG by industries. As these agencies don’t have any
governmental mandate or authority, they face challenges in collecting data
from industries. Furthermore, without any mandate, allocation of resources
including financial and personnel by the government agency to monitor
GHG emission won’t be possible. There is an absence of locally applicable
data collection tools and methodology. Even though IPCC guideline
should be used to collect data, some of the tools and methodologies need
to be locally adapted so that it can properly reflect the local environment.
National, sub-national and government agencies, which should be
monitoring GHG emissions, don’t have the necessary technological
infrastructure collect and store data. Financial constraint is also one of the
challenges that agencies have in creating data collection mechanisms and
maintaining the system. As the government currently doesn’t have the

322

Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Republic of South Africa, Greenhouse Gas
Inventory South Africa 1990 to 2000 (2009) at v- vi, online:
<http://rava.qsens.net/themes/theme_emissions/government-publications/SA%20GHG%202000.pdf>.
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policy to monitor GHG emission, it doesn’t allocate any budget to set up
323
and maintain the necessary system.
The lack of activity data is because priority is not given to environmental accounting in
African countries, and also due to poor data management. Low quality inventory is not
peculiar to African countries alone; it is a general phenomenon common to all developing
country parties’ inventory under the UNFCCC.
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A good inventory is very important to an emissions trading scheme because it is from the
inventory that a decision will be made about which sectors to include, and where to apply
the obligation to hold allowances (e.g., at the fuel distributor or the emission source). It
is also from the inventory that a decision will be made about the aggregate cap. In
addition, emissions inventory is sometimes used to project future emissions.
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The minimum data requirements for the emission inventory necessary for a tradable
permit scheme include individual emission source characteristics (e.g., size, location,
name-plate capacity, process type, boiler type, fuel type) and emission levels for
individual sources based on output, fuel use, and/or emission data.
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A Guide to Designing and Operating a Cap and Trade supra note 69 at 3-3 to 3-4.
Ibid at 3-4.
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Some polluting companies in Africa voluntarily report their emissions. For instance, in its
327

annual sustainability report, Shell publishes its greenhouse gas emissions.

Some
328

polluting companies in Africa are involved in the Carbon Disclosure Project.

Companies like Eskom, Transnet, Sasol, Anglo American PLC, Barloworld, FirstRand
Ltd., Gold Fields Ltd., Mondi PLC, and Woolworths are active participants in the Carbon
Disclosure Project.

329

However, the problem with voluntary reporting by companies is

the risk of underreporting. For instance, in its Sustainability Report 2012, Shell did not
provide emission data on specific locations and facilities. The level of reporting of gas
330

flaring of other oil companies in Nigeria is also not up to the standard required.

To solve this challenge, there should be a legislative framework for greenhouse gas
reporting in African countries. Regulation should require reporting of GHG emissions at
the facility level and then roll up to the corporate level. Companies should state GHG
emission source categories such as from stationary combustion mobile construction,
process emission, and fugitive emissions. African countries whose emissions primarily
emanate from the forestry sector should mandate farmers and other forest-dependent
professions to report their activity-based emissions. This would involve training in the
reporting guidelines of the IPCC.
To this end, the Department of Environmental Affairs in South Africa is contemplating
making emissions reporting mandatory for all entities (companies and installations) that

327

In its Sustainability Report of 2012, it reported that emissions from its facilities were 72 million tonnes
equivalent on a CO2 equivalent basis in 2012. Nigeria accounted for around 65 percent of flaring from its
facilities during the period under review. Shell Sustainability Report (2012), online:
<http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-report/2012/servicepages/downloads/files/entire_shell_sr12.pdf>.
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Sipho Kings, SA Companies come out tops in Carbon Disclosure Project, (22 November 2012), online:
Mail and Guardian http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-22-carbon-disclosure-project-south-african-companiesdoing-well.
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A survey of oil companies conducted by Ayoola Tajudeen reveals that very few companies provided
data on global GHG emissions. None provided data on specific locations, facilities and impact of emissions
on the environment. Ayoola Tajudeen, “Gas Flaring and Its Implication for Environmental Accounting in
Nigeria” (2011) 4 JSD 244 at 246.
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emit more than 0.1 Mt of GHGs annually, or that consume electricity that results in more
than 0.1 Mt of emissions from the electricity sector. Qualifying entities will be obliged to
report energy use by energy carrier and other data, as may be prescribed. The emissions
inventory will be a web-based GHG Emission Reporting System.

331

The fact that it is a

web-based system will make for more transparent reporting.
Through its Consultative Group of Experts on National Communication, the Conference
of Parties has also been organising training workshops to improve the inventory
preparation process in Africa, one of which was recently organised in Namibia for
African experts involved in the inventory preparation process.

332

This is important because, even if there is a legislative framework for emissions reporting
in Africa, there is need for well-trained experts who would be able to evaluate and ensure
that the reporting format followed the IPCC standards for GHG reporting.

4.2 Monitoring and Enforcement Constraint
This constraint is closely intertwined with the earlier constraint discussed in this chapter.
The goal of any tradable permit scheme is to control pollution, albeit through cost
effective means. This goal can only be achieved if the environmental goals of the
program are strictly adhered to. This can only be done through an effective enforcement
regime, but African countries have weak environmental enforcement capacity.
For instance, in Nigeria, it was recently reported that, in 2012, none of the oil firms in
Nigeria paid the new gas flare penalty of $3.50 per standard cubic foot because they
disagreed with the penalty. The Department of Petroleum Resources, charged with the
task of enforcing the flare penalty, failed to enforce the penalty on oil companies.

331
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National Climate Change Response White Paper supra note 83 at 29.

Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Progress Report on the work of Consultative Group of Experts on
National Communications from Parties not included in Annex 1 to the Convention: report on hands-on
training workshop for the African region on national greenhouse gas inventories, UNFCCCSBIOR, 37th
Session, FCCCSBI/2012/25.
333
Soni Daniel, Oil firms shun gas flare penalty payment for 2012, (7 November 2012), online: Vanguard
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weak enforcement capacity is partly due to the fact that environmental protection is yet to
assume the importance it deserves in the public space.
Enforcement of emissions trading generally involves four steps: detecting violation,
notifying the source, negotiating a compliance schedule, and applying sanctions for noncompliance when appropriate.

334

Detecting violation involves determining that a plant is
335

in compliance when it commences operation, and during continuous normal operation.

Normally, a single set of tests, conducted at installation, will suffice to determine that a
source is initially in compliance, but it is inherently harder to verify continuous
compliance. Several means are used to detect violations, including self-certification by
sources,

336

on-site inspections, and direct monitoring of pollutant flows. Thus, the ability

to measure emissions by participating facilities is very important in an ETS.
Measuring compliance can be difficult for GHGs. Carbon dioxide is easier to monitor
because of the close link between the carbon content of fuel and the amount of carbon
dioxide emissions. Thus, monitoring the flow of fuels could substitute for monitoring
emissions.337
However, monitoring methane is difficult. Agricultural sources of methane, such as
ruminant animals and animal wastes, sources of nitrous oxide and carbon sinks, are also
difficult to monitor accurately.338
One way of dealing with unreliable emissions monitoring would be to limit trading to
GHG sources that can be readily and accurately monitored.339 For gases that are difficult
to monitor, such as methane, emission factors may be developed.340
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Determining compliance in emissions trading involves comparing actual emissions with
authorized emissions. If actual emissions are estimated imperfectly, the environmental
goal of the ETS is diminished. The two known options for showing compliance are
through modeling and monitoring. However, modeling does not guarantee continuous
compliance because it is an estimate accomplished before the fact.341 Technology could
help solve this monitoring concern; for instance, asking facilities to install and pay for a
Continuous Emissions Monitor (CEM). A CEM would make it easier to verify
continuous compliance.342 A CEM would also transfer the monitoring burden to
polluters, especially in a terrain where the environmental enforcement capacity is weak.
Another way of dealing with monitoring concerns is to use permits in some markets and
to combine permits and standards in others.343 As part of compliance, facilities or firms
must show that monitored emissions match allowances.
The allowance monitoring system should be sufficiently harmonized with the emissions
monitoring system to allow matches between the two to be easily obtained. A registry is
needed to ensure this. The registry is an automated database that keeps track of all
permits and changes to the permits either through transfer or use.344

4.3 Corruption
Another institutional constraint is corruption. For an emissions trading scheme to
succeed, the regulator must be corruption-free; the participants in an emissions trading

341 Emissions Trading Principles and Practice supra note 249 at 178. When a facility makes an application
for a certificate of approval to install, operate, or modify any device that emits contaminants into the air, it
has to prepare what is called an Emission Summary Dispersing Modelling Report (ESDM) summarizing all
air emissions from a facility and assessing their impacts against the regulator standards and guidelines.
Though this report is regularly updated, it does not guarantee accurate monitoring. See also: Emission
Summary and Dispersion Modelling Reports, online:
<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/environment/en/industry/standards/industrial_air_emissions/air_pollution/STD
PROD_078056>
342

The CEM is the gold standard for source monitoring. It is attached to a smoke stack and records all the
emissions from the stack. See: “Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries” supra note 10 at 78.
343
Pablo Montero, “Pollution Markets with Imperfectly Observed Emissions” (2005) 36 Rand 645 at 657.
344
Ibid at 179-180. The Acid Rain Program, discussed in the next chapter, had an Allowance Tracking
System. The ATS records the holdings of all allowance holders, including regulated entities and brokers.
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scheme must have confidence in the regulator. Emissions trading will thrive in an
environment where rule of law is respected and enforcement is consistent, impartial,
transparent, and independent of political considerations. Participating firms or facilities
should clearly understand from the onset how the program works, and how regulating
authorities will measure and enforce compliance. Interest in a trading program will
diminish significantly if firms believe that rules are unfair, arbitrary, or unpredictable.

345

The role of the ministry of environment, or agencies charged with environmental
protection, is crucial because it is the ministry or agency that will monitor and enforce the
scheme locally. While corruption is a global vice, it appears more predominant in Africa.
Ninety percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa scored below 50 (the average score) in
the Corruption Perception Index 2012 of Transparency International.

346

This perception is capable of eroding the confidence of participants in the process, but it
can, however, be remedied if public participation in environmental governance is
allowed. Public inputs on what the emissions cap should be and public access to data on
trades, violations and actual emissions will enhance the credibility of the program.
Evaluation of compliance by rights groups should be factored into the implementation
design. Rights groups can exert a lot of pressure on companies that want to dilute the
emissions goal and on impartial regulators.

4.4 Summary Conclusions
Despite the aforementioned institutional barriers, emissions trading can thrive in Africa.
The literature on emissions trading schemes reveals that conditions must not necessarily
be ripe for trading before the policy is deployed. Chile has already experimented with
tradable permits for total suspended particulates. Montero et al. found that the allocation
process associated with a tradable permit scheme created, “economic incentives for
incumbent sources to more readily declare their emissions and claim the corresponding
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A Guide to Designing and Operating a Cap and Trade supra note 69 at 2-4.

70 percent of all the countries in the world scored below 50. Corruption Perception Index 2012, online:
<http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/cpi_2012_report?e=2496456/2010281>.

96

emissions rights (i.e., capture scarcity rents), helping the authority complete its inventory
of sources and emissions more quickly”.347
Setting up an emissions trading scheme is always challenging; it proved challenging for
the developed countries as well. According to Ellerman,
The problems that are likely to be encountered in setting up a cap-andtrade system should not be minimized. Institutionally, the Member States
of the European Union must be considered more prepared and capable of
implementing such a system than many of the prospective participants in a
global system. Yet, there was no end of difficulties in setting up the
system in Europe. The biggest problem was data at the installation level
which was needed both for the allocation of allowances to covered
installations and more importantly for setting an appropriate cap. The data
deficiencies in Eastern Europe were greater than they were for the EU15
and most of the East European governments required more time to set up
the requisite infrastructure for trading and enforcement. Poland’s registry
did not go on line until eighteen months after the start of the EU ETS; and
Romania and Bulgaria, who became participants in the trial period in its
last year, did not have everything in place in time to participate effectively
in trading in 2007.348
Another challenge that the EU ETS faced is corruption. So, how did EU overcome all the
challenges associated with setting up a tradable permit scheme? What lessons can Africa
learn from existing successful tradable permit schemes? This will be the focus of the next
chapter.
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CEEPR 1 at 23.
348
Denny Ellerman, “The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: A Prototype Global System?” 1 at 5-6, online:
<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Ellerman11.pdf>.
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Chapter 5

5

Emissions Trading Scheme Success Stories

There have been several experiments with tradable permit schemes, both in developed
and in developing countries. Tradable permit schemes have been deployed to address
climate change and conventional pollution control. This chapter will examine the United
States Acid Rain Program, the EU ETS, the New Zealand ETS, and the tradable permit
scheme in Chile.

5.1 The United States Acid Rain Program
The Acid Rain emissions allowance trading program was enacted through Title IV of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA).

349

In 1980, prior to the enactment of the

Amendment and due to public concern about acid rain, the US Congress commissioned a
ten year study of the causes and effects of acid rain. The result of the study led to the
introduction of emissions trading under the Clean Air Act.

350

The goal of the program

was to achieve a 10 million-tonne annual reduction in sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions
from 1980 levels by the year 2010, and a 2 million tonne annual reduction in nitrogen
oxide (N2O) emissions, also below 1980 levels.

351

Phase 1 of the program, which began

in 1995, included mostly coal-burning electric utility plants located in 21 eastern and
midwestern states. Phase II of the program, which began in 2000, tightened the annual
emissions limits imposed on large, higher-emitting plants and also set restrictions on
smaller, cleaner plants fired by coal, oil, and gas.

352

Utilities have the freedom in meeting their compliance obligations. They could decide to
employ energy conservation measures (i.e. increasing reliance on renewable energy and

349

Clean Air Act (1990) § 401-416.
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Timo Behr et al., Towards a Global Carbon Market? Potential and Limits of Carbon Integration
(Global Public Policy Institute) 1 at 22, online: <http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/GPPiPP7Carbon_Markets.pdf>.
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Ibid.
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reducing usage), or adopt pollution control technologies like switching to lower sulphur
fuels.

353

Utilities that reduce their emissions below the number of allowances they hold

may trade with other utilities or bank them to cover emissions in future years.

354

Each allowance is defined for a specific calendar year. They are transferable among the
affected sources; any plants reducing emissions more than required by the allowances
could transfer the unused allowances to other plants.
A source must hold enough allowances to equal its emissions in a calendar year. If a
source emits 8,000 tonnes of sulphur dioxide in a year, it must hold 8,000 allowances in
that same year. Emissions cannot exceed the levels permitted by the allowances, whether
acquired or allocated. Utilities are required to pay a penalty per tonne if they emit more
than their authorized holdings. This penalty was $2,000 per tonne in 1990 and is indexed
355

to inflation.

Secondly, excess tonnes in one year are subtracted from the allocation the

following year. The penalty of $2,000 per excess tonne was effective in ensuring
compliance because it was greater than the cost of buying an allowance.

356

If the penalty

is not greater than the cost of an allowance, there will be a lot of violations by firms.
The US Environmental Protection Agency allocated allowances at an emission rate of 2.5
pounds of SO2/mmBtu (million British thermal units) of heat input, multiplied by the
unit's baseline mmBtu (the average fossil fuel consumed from 1985 through 1987).

357

These allowance allocations are listed in Table A of the Clean Air Act and codified in the
Allowance System Regulations (Part 73, Table 1). Alternative or additional allowance
allocations were made for various units, including affected units in Illinois, Indiana, and
Ohio, which were allocated a pro rata share of 200,000 additional allowances each year
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EPA Clean Air Markets, online: <http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/s02.html>.
Ibid.
Emissions Trading Principles and Practice supra note 215 at 11.
Ibid at 181.
EPA Clean Air Markets, online: <http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/factsheet.html#whatis>.
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between 1995 and 1999.

358

In the second phase, allowance calculations were made for

various types of units, such as coal- and gas-fired units with low and high emissions rates
or low fuel consumption. The EPA allocated allowances to each unit at an emission rate
of 1.2 pounds of SO2/mmBtu of heat input, multiplied by the unit's baseline.

359

Beginning in 2010, the Act places a cap at 8.95 million on the number of allowances
issued to units each year. This caps emissions at 8.95 million tonnes annually and ensures
that the mandated emissions reductions are maintained over time.

360

In addition to annual allocations, allowances could also be obtained by application to the
US EPA reserves. Utilities were allowed to obtain additional allowances in Phase 1 by
installing qualifying Phase I technology (a technology that can be demonstrated to
remove at least 90 percent of the unit's SO2 emissions) or by reassigning their reduction
requirements among other units employing such technology.

361

A second reserve

provides allowances as incentives for units achieving SO2 emissions reductions through
customer-oriented conservation measures or renewable energy generation. Sources were
required to submit information regarding their energy savings and renewable generation
to the EPA. In turn, the EPA awarded allowances at a pre-determined rate of one
allowance per 500 megawatt hours of energy saved or renewable energy generated.

362

The third reserve contains allowances set aside for auction, which are sponsored yearly
by EPA. Utilities that began operating in 1996 or later were not allocated allowances.
They are meant to purchase allowances from the market.

363

To ensure compliance with the cap set, utilities must install Continuous Emissions
Monitors (CEMs) to accurately monitor their actual emissions. Each utility must show
that it holds at least as many allowances for its emissions that year as measured by its
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installed CEM. Sources must finalise allowance transactions and submit them to the EPA
by March 1st (or by February 29th if it is a leap year) so that they can be recorded in their
compliance account.

364

The EPA also has an auditing team; the audit is meant to verify

that the testing is completed according to standard procedures and accurately represented
in the reports to EPA.

365

The auditing team performs both random and targeted field

audits. They visit facilities to inspect the CEM and the on-site records to verify that data
366

reported to the EPA are actually a reflection of what is going on at the facilities.

One of the innovations of this program was the creation of an auction market. The
auction market helped in achieving the low cost compliance objective of the program.
Previous emissions trading markets did not work well because of high transaction costs.
This was due to the fact that allowances could only be purchased through private sale.
Prices of allowances were confidential because the sale was private and there was scarce
367

information about potential buyers and sellers of emissions.

Though the auction

market was meant to reduce transaction costs, it could ostensibly raise the cost of
compliance significantly.
The US EPA established a zero revenue auction to solve this problem. Each year, the
EPA withholds from its allocation to utilities less than 3 percent of the allocated
allowances and auctions them off. These allowances are allocated to the highest bidders,
with the successful buyers paying the actual bid price. Proceeds are refunded on a
proportional basis to the utilities from which the allowances were withheld.
369

allowance holders other than utilities can also sell at the auction market.
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Private
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Another innovation of this program is that it allows anyone to purchase allowances. Thus,
environmental groups and private citizens can purchase allowances for the purpose of
retiring them.

370

Any retired allowance can no longer be used to emit pollution.

Environmental and student groups acquired up to 934 allowances between 1994-1997.

371

Any person or group—including brokers and investors—wishing to purchase allowances
may open a general Allowance Management System (AMS) account. AMS accounts
track issuance of all allowances, how many allowances an account holds, how many
allowances are held in various allowance reserves such as the EPA Auction Reserve and
the Conservation and Renewable Energy Reserve, deduction of allowances for
compliance purposes, and transfer of allowances between accounts. Information on
372

emissions allowances and transactions is available to the public.

The Program is regarded to be a success. It is said to have reduced emissions by thirtyfive percent more than the pre-existing command-and-control emissions cap, with a cost
savings of twenty-five to thirty-five percent (about $225-375 million) each year.
from 1988 show that ambient SO2 concentrations in the air are declining.

374

373

Data

Field data

collected by the National Atmospheric Deposition Program/National Trends Network
(NADP/NTN) also reveal that sulphate levels in precipitation have dropped sharply since
the SO2 Emissions Trading Program began in 1995.

375

According to the Clean Air and

Status and Trends Network (CASTNET), dry deposition sulphur concentration levels
have also declined by approximately 30 percent in the northeast and Mid-Atlantic
States.

376

A study examining surface water quality in the acid sensitive regions of the

370

Ibid at 12. The opt- in provision is also an innovation of the program. It allows sources not required to
participate in the program to enter on a voluntary basis. Clean Air Act 1990 § 410.
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United States found that sulphur concentrations in lakes and streams have declined
significantly in all monitored regions of the Eastern United States, except Virginia.
Nitrate concentrations have decreased significantly in the Catskill and Adirondack
377

Mountains, and in Vermont since 1990.

According to the EPA, the program has led to 67 percent annual SO2 emissions compared
to 1980 levels, and 64 percent compared to 1990 levels.

378

In 2009, sources involved in

the program emitted 5.7 million tonnes of SO2, well below the 9.5 million tonne cap for
the year.

379

The 3,572 electricity-generating units involved in the program in 2009

complied with the requirement to hold enough allowances to cover their SO2
380

emissions.

N2O emissions were 2.0 million tonnes in 2009, well below the projected number of 8.1
million tonnes. Though other factors such as low demand for electricity contributed to
381

reduction in N2O emissions, the program was largely responsible for the reduction.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the reduction in SO2 and N2O emissions.
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Ibid at 5-7.
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United States Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain and Other Programs: 2009 Highlights
(Clean Air Market Division: Washington, DC, 2010) at 3.
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Figure 5.1 SO2 Emissions from Acid Rain Program Sources, 1980-2009
Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain and Other Programs: 2009 Highlights
(Clean Air Market Division: Washington, DC, 2010) at 3.

Figure 5.2 N2O Emission Trends for All Acid Rain Program Units, 1990-2009
Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain and Other Programs: 2009 Highlights
(Clean Air Market Division: Washington, DC, 2010) at 3.

The EPA posits that the program has also fostered innovation, because sulphur removal
technology has become radically more effective and less expensive during the life of the
program.382

382

Emissions Trading and the Development Critique supra note 232 at 146.
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5.2 Lessons and Transferable Ideas from the US Acid Rain
Program
Emissions trading does not work in vacuum; it must be complemented by other policy
initiatives. The success of the Acid Rain Program was due to the sulphur dioxide
regulation, which specified National Ambient Air Quality Standards.

383

Thus, there must

be a strong regulatory framework for pollution control in place before emissions trading
can work. This will give sources the opportunity to choose how they intend to meet
environmental goals. Sources that prefer a tradable permit scheme can opt for it, while
sources that prefer standard setting can opt for that instead. This flexibility in choice can
also help address institutional feasibility concerns that come with tradable permit
schemes.
Public participation is very important if a tradable permit scheme is to achieve success.
Emissions trading is generally viewed with skepticism by the human rights community.
The Institute of Security Studies in South Africa specifically called for the abolition of
384

the CDM.

Allowing inputs from the human rights community will allay some of their

fears about carbon trading. Under the Acid Rain Program, the US EPA initiated a
stakeholder process to solicit input on the implementation and experience with the
emissions measurement requirements of the program.

385

The process involved regulated

power plants under the program, the state and local environmental agencies that carry out
audits for the EPA, and rights groups interested in the integrity of the program. The EPA
used the input from the stakeholder process to revise the emission measurement
requirements of the program.
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Emissions trading can help a country like South Africa transform the carbon intensive
nature of its energy production. The feature of the Acid Rain Program that encourages
energy conservation and renewable energy generation appears suitable for such a country.
A country like Nigeria can use it to combat acid rain, which has been prevalent in the
Niger Delta region of Nigeria due to gas flaring.

387

Acid rain also occurs regularly in the

Eastern Transvaal Highveld, the industrial hub of South Africa, where it can average a
pH of 4.2.

388

Industrial activity is the cause of acid rain in both Nigeria and South Africa.

This makes emissions trading a suitable policy option.
The opt-in provision in the Acid Rain Program can be used by African countries to
ensure that there are enough participating sources in the scheme. This will encourage
unregulated sources that want to cut their emissions to be involved in the program.
Another feature of the Acid Rain Program that can be copied by African countries is the
389

provision that specifies that allowances are not property rights.

This is important in

case a decision is made to alter the emissions cap, and will avoid a litigation backlash if
such a decision is made.

5.3 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
On 1 January 2005, the largest emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) came into existence.
390

Like the Acid Rain Program, it came about via legislation

proposed by the European

Commission and approved by the EU member states and European parliament. The EU
decided to implement a tradable permit system when its carbon tax proposal was rejected
by businesses in the EU, and it became apparent that it would be difficult to meet its
obligation to reduce its GHG emissions by 8 percent (below 1990 levels) by 2012 under
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Efe Sunday, “Spatial Variation of Acid Rain and its Ecological Effect in Nigeria” delivered at the
Environmental Management Conference, Federal University of Agriculture (2011).
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Acid Rain, online: <http://www.botany.uwc.ac.za/envfacts/facts/acidrain.htm>.
Clean Air Act, §402.
Emissions Trading and the Development Critique supra note 232 at 146.
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the Kyoto Protocol.

391

The program is a cap and trade program. Participation is

mandatory for companies in the sectors covered. The market is EU wide, but it also
accepts credits from emission reduction projects under the Clean Development
Mechanism and Joint Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The program covers some
11,500 facilities owned by 5,000 companies in 31 countries.

392

Companies have several options in meeting their obligations; they could invest in more
efficient technology, use a less carbon intensive source, or buy EU allowances and/or
CDM/JI credits.
Like the Acid Rain Program, the EU ETS is being implemented in phases. Phase 1 ran
from January 2005 to December 2007. This phase was meant to allow EU countries and
businesses to gain practical experience in emissions trading. EU countries, apart from the
United Kingdom and Denmark,

393

were inexperienced in emissions trading. Thus, it was

necessary to develop the institutional capacity that would make emissions trading thrive.
According to Ellerman et al., this phase was meant, “to establish the infrastructure and
institutions and to gain the experience to make the subsequent ‘real’ periods a success, as
394

opposed to achieving significant emissions reductions”.

The pilot phase was focused on CO2 and it covered all facilities with a thermal output of
25 megawatts. The iron and steel sector, energy production, mineral industries, and paper
and pulp production were the sectors covered in the pilot phase.

395

The overall cap was

made up of individual country caps set by each nation’s National Allocation Plan
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Directive/2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 13 October 2013 L/275/32.
“The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: A Prototype Global System?” supra note 336 at 3.
European Union, EU ETS Fact Sheet (European Union 2013) at 1.
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(NAP).

396

The NAP is meant to detail a member state emission target for ETS and non-

ETS sectors, and how a member state will allocate its allowances.

397

The decentralised

nature of the EU ETS meant that each member state had its own cap and trade while still
being linked with one another.

398

Ninety-five percent of allowances in the first phase were allocated for free or
grandfathered.

399

The allocation process in the first phase was not without some tension.

There was over-allocation of allowances during this phase, especially in the accession
countries of the EU.

400

The pilot phase successfully established a price for carbon and free trade in emission
401

allowances across the EU.

The verified emission reports for the first year of the

program became the benchmark by which the European Commission judged the
acceptability of proposed caps for the second phase. The verified annual emission report
filled the data gap that was present when the program came into existence.
The second phase of the program (2008-2012) was used by EU member states to meet
their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. Ninety percent of the allowances in the
second phase (first commitment period) were allocated for free.

402

Two EU countries—

Bulgaria and Romania—and three non-EU countries—Norway, Iceland, and
Liechtenstein—joined the scheme in the second phase. GHGs covered in the scheme
extended to nitrous oxide emissions from the production of nitric acid.

403

Phase III of the

program started in January 2013. The cap for 2013 has been set at 2,039,152,882 EUAs.
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The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) Insights and Opportunities (Pew Center on
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The aviation sector has been included in this phase; it represents the largest emitting
sector covered by the scheme. All airlines from all nationalities will need EUAs (EU
allowances) to cover the emissions from their flights to, from, or within the EU.

404

The

new phase includes installations undertaking the capture, transport, and geological
storage of greenhouse gases (CO2 emissions from the petrochemicals, ammonia and
aluminum sectors, nitrous oxide emissions from the production of adipic acid and
405

gloxylic acid, and perflourocarbon emissions from aluminum production).

Individuals and non-government organisations are free to buy and sell allowances in the
market.

406

Governments involved in the program are at liberty to exclude small

installations from the program, so long as they have measures in place that will achieve
an equivalent reduction in emissions. The revision to the program is expected to result in
an emissions reduction of 120-130 million tonnes of CO2 per year.
currently covers around 45 percent of EU emissions.

408

407

The program

It only focuses on sectors in

which emissions can be measured, reported, and verified with a high level of accuracy.
This is meant to minimise the MRV problems that can arise from adopting emissions
trading as a climate policy instrument.
The decentralised nature of the program will give way to a centralised approach. The 27
national caps under the NAPs will give way to a single, EU-wide cap. It is believed that
this centralised approach will enable the EU to achieve its emission reduction goals for
409

2020.

It is projected that the number of allowances that will be available in 2020 will
410

be 21 percent below the level of the verified emissions in 2005.

404

Siikamaki et al. supra note 375 at 2-3.

405

State and Trends of the Carbon Market supra note 2 at 18. See also Action Against Climate Change
supra note 71 at 13.
406
407
408
409

410

Ibid at 11.
Ibid at 9.
Ibid at 15.
EU ETS Fact Sheet supra note 373 at 1.
EU Action Against Climate Change supra note 71 at 12.

109

From 2013, 80 percent of the allowances in the manufacturing will be distributed for free
while the rest will be auctioned. The number of allowances distributed free will reduce
annually to 30 percent by 2020. In the aviation sector, 15 percent of the allowances
would be auctioned for the period 2013- 2020.

411

Installations of a given type will now

be treated equally across the EU. The method of distributing allowances to the
manufacturing sector is now based on harmonised rules. This is different from what was
obtainable in the second phase, when member states were at liberty to distribute
allowances the way they deemed fit.

412

All allowances in the power sector will be auctioned. The idea is that power companies
413

can easily pass the cost of the allowances to consumers, unlike other sectors.

However,

countries like Cyprus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland,
and Romania will continue to distribute a certain percentage of allowances for free until
2019. The power industries in these countries are meant to reciprocate the gesture by
investing in the modernisation of the sector.

414

Installations undertaking the capture,

transport, and geological storage of greenhouse gases will also have to buy their
allowances.

415

Auctions are held by companies appointed by national governments, but are open to
buyers from any country participating in the EU ETS. Most governments use a common
‘platform’ for their auctions, but Germany, Poland, and the UK have opted to use their
own platforms. It is estimated that auctioning will generate 20-30 billion euros per year
by 2020. Governments have agreed that the revenue generated from the auctions will be
used to combat climate change in Europe and in developing countries.
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As part of compliance, businesses must monitor and report their EU ETS emissions for
each calendar year and have their emission reports checked by an accredited verifier.

417

A calculation-based approach (using emission factors), as well as a CEM system, is
allowed for monitoring and reporting emissions. Each installation involved in the
418

program must have a permit

from its competent authority for its emissions of all

greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol. The operator of any installation must
satisfy the competent authority that it is capable of monitoring and reporting its
emissions.
Operators whose emission reports for the year are adjudged as unsatisfactory by the
independent verifier would not be allowed to sell allowances until a revised report is
approved.

419

Aircraft operators within the EU must have a monitoring plan. A new

monitoring and reporting guidelines is now in effect; this is meant to check the noticeable
420

divergence in member states’ monitoring, reporting, and verification practices.

Companies must surrender enough allowances to cover their total emissions by April 30th
of the following year. These allowances are then cancelled so they cannot be used again.
A company is penalised if it does not surrender enough allowances to cover its emissions.
They will have to obtain additional allowances in the following year to make up for the
shortfall.
The defaulting company’s name will also be published;

421

this is meant to embarrass the

company. In addition to the above, the defaulting company will pay a fine for each excess
tonne of CO2 emitted. The fine, initially set at 40 euros per tonne, is now 100 euros per
tonne. The fine will continue to rise in line with the annual rate of inflation in the

417
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Monitoring, reporting and verification of EU ETS emissions, (European Commission) online:
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/monitoring/index_en.htm>.
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Eurozone.

422

Some member states also have additional dissuasive sanctions for any

infringement of the program rules.

423

A single EU registry with strong security measures ensures the accurate accounting of
allowances. The registry keeps track of the ownership of allowances held in electronic
accounts. Trading can be done directly between buyers and sellers, through several
organised exchanges, or through the many intermediaries active in the carbon market. In
424

2011, some six billion allowances were traded, worth a total value of 77 billion euros.

Most accounts suggest the program is a success story. Ellerman and Buchner tentatively
estimate that, in both 2005 and 2006, the EU ETS abated 85 million metric tonnes, or 4
425

percent, of annual emissions.

According to Grubb et al., the program has achieved a

2.5 to 5 percent reduction in emissions below baseline levels.

426

In April 2012, the

European Commission published 2011 verified emissions data. Emissions fell from 1,938
Mt in 2010 to 1,896 Mt in 2011, representing a 2.2 percent decline.

427

Extraneous factors

such as the economic crisis contributed to this reduction. Following the 2008 financial
crisis, Europe entered into a recession and industrial activity fell strongly. European
emissions from the industrial sector decreased drastically, generating an oversupply of
allowances.

428

The surplus in allowances could undermine the ability of the scheme to

achieve more demanding emissions reductions in a cost effective manner.

429

The EU

would need an average annual 4.3 percent growth in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
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from 2013 to cancel out the excess.

The European Commission wants to postpone the

auctioning of allowances until late in the third trading period as a way of addressing the
glut.

431

The European Parliament is currently considering a proposal to withhold 900

million permits from the market between 2013 and 2015, known as “backloading”.

432

There has also been suggestion of setting a price ceiling and floor to address the
oversupply in the scheme.

433

In addition, a stringent cap has been proposed as a way of getting out of the problem,
because rendering the program more stringent will increase allowance prices.

434

Emissions reductions are still being met despite the current low price of allowances.

435

All in all, the evidence suggests that the EU ETS has succeeded in reducing emissions
below what would be expected from the recession alone.
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See Figure 5.3.
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See Brown, Hannafi & Petsnok, EU Emissions Trading System Results and Lessons Learned
(Environmental Defense Fund 2012) for more information.
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Figure 5.3 EU Emissions Data
Source: Brown, Hannafi & Petsnok, EU Emissions Trading System Results and Lessons Learned
(Environmental Defense Fund 2012).

Apart from price concerns, the EU ETS have had to contend with fraudsters. In 2010, the
European authorities uncovered several cases of “carousel fraud”, which amounted to an
estimated US$6.45 billion in lost revenues across at least 11 countries.

437

Carousel fraud is a

form of missing trader fraud, wherein the trader facilitating the carbon credit exchange keeps
the value-added tax (VAT), rather than paying it to the tax authorities and government
438

treasuries.

Emission credits were initially purchased without adding the VAT, but then

sold with the VAT added. This prompted changes in the tax law in EU countries that the
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UNEP, The Impact of Corruption on Climate Change: threatening emissions trading
mechanisms?(UNEP-GEAS March 2013)
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439

VAT fraud occurred.

In 2011, due to lax security, three million units were stolen from

national registries involved in the EU ETS. The fraudsters used classic cyber-criminality
techniques to access accounts in several national registries and to transfer allowances.

440

To prevent further attacks, the European Commission suspended all registries on 19
January 2011. The registries were reopened after each registry provided sufficient
evidence that it met minimum-security criteria. The EU also wants to fully decouple its
registry operations from the National Registries established under the Kyoto Protocol and
centralize technical management in a Union Registry (UR), built as a single infrastructure
and operated by single software as an additional measure to check this.

441

5.4 Lessons and Transferable Ideas from the European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme
The cap is very important in a cap and trade program. The environmental integrity of the
cap is dependent on the stringency of the cap. Usually, in a new program, the cap is
moderate, but becomes more stringent over time. The cap can also be used to address the
low price of allowance. If the price is too low, it will not act as an incentive to
participants.

442

The price must not be too low or too high, so that trading can occur. The

cap and trade model appears suitable for countries like Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, and
Nigeria, whose emissions are already significant and might likely resemble those of a
developed country under a “business as usual” scenario in a few years’ time.
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To build the necessary institutional capacity for emissions trading, African countries can
copy the pilot phase of the EU ETS. The transition phase can be used to set up registry
and the necessary enforcement regime of the policy.
African countries can also copy the feature of the program that requires installation to
have permits for its emissions. This will ensure that emitting installations or facilities
build the capacity to monitor and report their emissions. The permit requirement would
be part of the approval process for a new emitting installation or facility.
The EU ETS shows the importance of mainstreaming corruption into climate change
governance. The registry is very important in a tradable permit scheme; the integrity of
the registry must be maintained at all times. Linking the registry of the proposed scheme
to the International Transaction Log established under the Kyoto Protocol can help check
possible phishing attacks on the registry.

5.5 The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme
The New Zealand ETS came into existence via the Climate Change Response Act.

443

The

ETS is New Zealand’s primary way of meeting its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.
New Zealand’s per capita emissions are the twelfth highest in the world and its gross
emissions keep rising due to increasing emissions in transportation and electricity
generation.

444

After some initial discussion about carbon tax, the New Zealand
445

government decided to set up an ETS.

The choice was informed by the belief that

emissions trading is the lowest cost way of reducing emissions. It was also adopted as a
climate change mitigation instrument in order to maintain New Zealand’s eco-friendly
brand.
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Legislation was passed for the NZ ETS on 10 September 2008. See World Bank, State and Trends of
the Carbon Market 2010 (Washington, DC: 2012) 1 at 23. Tom Tietenberg et al, supra note 67 at 29.
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This is not the first time New Zealand will be using emission trading for environmental
purposes. Before now, New Zealand used a cap and trade program to move commercial
fishing towards sustainable levels. Under the program, the government sets total
allowable annual catch limits for each fish species in defined management areas, based
on sustainable harvest considerations.447 The program began in 1986. The government
created individual transferable quotas (ITQs) to approximately 2,500 commercial fishing
permit-holders based on their historic catch levels. ITQs are permanent rights to harvest
fish from a particular area. If the sum of the individual quotas exceeded the total
allowable commercial catch (TACC) for a fish stock, the Government will make a onetime purchase of the difference, and retire that portion of the quota.
The ITQ system has led to heavy trading, as it is estimated that 77 percent of the initially
allocated ITQs have changed hands. Under the program, the first receiver of the fish must
attest to the fact that the fish products received are covered by ITQs. The Government
investigates the paper records to detect inconsistencies. So, it is not surprising that New
Zealand opted for emissions trading to mitigate climate change.
New Zealand’s emissions profile resembles most of the countries in Africa because of its
high dependence on agriculture. On average, emissions in developed countries and
economies in transition are 83.2 percent CO2, 9.5 percent methane (CH4), and 5.9 percent
nitrous oxide (N2O), but New Zealand’s emissions are 46.5 percent CO2, 35.2 percent
CH4, and 17.2 percent N2O.

448

The program started in 2008 with only forest owners included. The inclusion of forestry
in the scheme is an attempt to address deforestation because, as part of its obligations
under the Kyoto Protocol, New Zealand must account for emissions that occurred from
deforestation.
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Under the scheme, all major owners of pre-1990 forests, or vested third parties, incur a
deforestation liability for harvesting and not replanting.

450

Owners of post-1989 forests

can voluntarily opt in to participate in the scheme. They would receive NZUs for any
increase in carbon stocks from 1 January 2008.

451

However, they would face liability if

carbon stock fell below a previously reported level.

452

The NZUs can be sold either at home or abroad. In 2009, public and private buyers
purchased up to 600,000 forestry NZUs on the spot market.
Norway purchased about 520,000 NZUs in 2009.

453

The Government of

454

In 2010, industrial processes, stationary energy sources, and liquid fossil fuel
installations were included in the scheme. Beginning 1 January 2015, the program will
cover nearly all emission sources of the New Zealand economy, and all greenhouse gases
455

covered by the Kyoto Protocol.

The program has no domestic cap; it operates within
456

the global cap on emissions set by the Kyoto Protocol.

The scheme has a price cap set

at $25 per unit of CO2.
For compliance, regulated entities have the choice of surrendering the free NZUs
allocated to them if they are eligible, purchasing NZUs in the market or purchasing
government-issued allowances at the fixed NZ$25 price. The government-issued NZUs
are available in unlimited supply. They can only be surrendered; they cannot be banked
457

or sold.
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emitted.

This is known as the one-for-two obligation. The one-for-two obligation and
459

price cap are intended to reduce some of the distributional effects of the program.

Certain international units can also be surrendered for compliance in unlimited quantities,
such as CERs or ERUs. In 2011, scheme participants secured enough secondary CERs to
achieve compliance for the next two to three years.

460

There are penalties for noncompliance. If a participant fails to surrender NZUs when it is
meant to, or surrenders fewer NZUs than required, the units will be cancelled and the
participant will pay a penalty of $30 for each NZU. A participant could be fined up to
461

$24,000 if it knowingly fails to file its emission return.

In addition, a participant that

deliberately lies about its obligations could be fined up to $50,000, or be imprisoned for 5
years.

462

Emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries (including agriculture) received free
allowances on an intensity basis during the transition period of the program (20102012).

463

The intensity-based free allocation is meant to encourage efficiency improvements
without penalizing increases in production or putting businesses at a competitive
disadvantage in the international market.

464

Free allowances were not granted to

industries that are not trade-exposed, such as electricity generation and liquid fossil
fuels.
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Some changes are being proposed to make the program more effective, including setting
an absolute cap on covered emissions, limiting the use of international offset credits,
maintaining the NZ$25 price ceiling beyond 2015, and allocating allowances through
auction from 2014 or 2015.

466

Agriculture participants (fertilizer suppliers and

processors) have started reporting their emissions from January 2012 in preparation for
the inclusion of agriculture in the scheme in 2015.

467

They are to collect and retain data,

and to use that data to calculate and annually report calendar year emissions. In the NZ
ETS, emissions must generally be calculated by multiplying the quantity of a product by
an “emissions factor”. The emissions factors used within the scheme represent the
average tonnage of CO2-equivalent emissions of methane or nitrous oxide associated with
one unit of the product, such as one tonne of meat produced.

468

Despite the NZU falling from NZ$13 per tonne of CO2 in late 2011 to NZ$0.19 in
January 2013, the program appears to be a success.

469

The New Zealand Greenhouse Gas

Inventory and “net position” show that New Zealand is on track to meet its Kyoto
obligations for the period 2008-2012.

470

The report shows that New Zealand will have a

471

surplus of 29.6 million emission units.

The report is only a tentative assessment of the

program, as it is still in its transitional phase.
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5.6 Lessons and Transferable Ideas from the New Zealand
Emissions Trading Scheme
African countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Zambia, Cameroon, Tanzania
and Zimbabwe who have considerable emissions from the forestry sector)

472

can use

emissions trading to combat deforestation and enhance forest cover. New Zealand, a
country that has commitment under the Kyoto Protocol to combat deforestation, has
deployed emissions trading to halt the loss of forest cover and has achieved success,
given the fact that the country is on course to meet its Kyoto commitment. African
countries can follow the example set by New Zealand in this regard.
Criminal sanctions for noncompliance, inherent in the New Zealand scheme, are a
laudable provision that can be copied by African countries to ensure that erring
participants do not sabotage the environmental goal of the program.

5.7 Santiago Tradable Permit Program
The Santiago Tradable Permit Program came into existence via the Supreme Decree 4
(passed in 1992) and the Supreme Decree 16 (passed in 1997). Though the program was
legislated as far back as 1992, it only became active in 1997.

473

The program is meant to

control total suspended particulate (TSP) emissions from the largest stationary sources
(industrial boilers, industrial ovens, and large residential and commercial heaters
discharging emissions from a duct or a stack at a flow rate higher than 1,000 m3/hour) in
Santiago.

474

The program was not designed on the basis of actual emissions, but on a

proxy variable equal to the maximum emissions that a source could emit in a given
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period of time; sources were too small to require a sophisticated monitoring procedure

475

The observable firm’s emission rate (mg/m3) is multiplied by its maximum possible
output (m3/year) to infer its maximum emissions (mg/year) for which the firm must buy
permits.

476

Sources operating by March 1992 were designated as existing sources and received
grandfathered permits equal to the product of an emissions rate of 56 mg/m3 and their
flow rate at the moment of registration. New sources receive no permits; they must cover
their emissions by buying permits from existing sources.

477

The total number of permits

distributed was 64 percent of aggregate (proxied) emissions from existing sources prior to
the program. After each annual inspection, the authority proceeds to reconcile the
estimated emissions with the number of permits held by each source.

478

The program is credit based, in that all trades require approval by the regulatory agency,
even trades among large boilers that share common ownership.

479

A participant that

wants to offset its emissions must request an offset and find a partner who is willing to
sign an offsetting agreement. The offsetting agreement must specify the emissions to be
compensated and the sources involved in the transaction. This is followed by certification
of the emissions of the sources involved in the transaction through formal monitoring
procedures. After all this procedure, the environmental agency accepts or rejects the
480

transaction. In some other instances, it requests additional information.

There is no banking provision in the scheme; permits are given in perpetuity and large
boilers are restricted to trading permits on a permanent basis. According to Montero et
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al., this has created an illiquid market where sources are uncertain about the availability
of permits in the future, and where buyers pay prices close to their top prices.

481

Like most ETS, the program relies on self-reporting by regulated entities. Existing and
482

new boilers report emissions once a year to the authorities.

As part of the reporting

requirements of the program, sources must contact an independent and certified
laboratory to monitor the flow and the concentration of emissions discharged through
their stacks.

483

Sources that fail to meet the reporting requirement face sanctions ranging

from $4.50 to $90,000.
According to Montero, the program proved to be more cost effective than traditional
regulation.

484

Coria and Sterner’s evaluation of the program showed that the program has

been met with aggregate over-compliance, but this was massively aided by the switch to
natural gas.

485

See Appendix E.

The authors’ review shows that the program’s development has been hampered by high
transaction costs due to the credit nature of the program and the lengthy time it takes to
reconcile permits.

486

The program suffers from design issues, one of its limiting factors

being the lack of public participation.

487

All in all, the Santiago program shows that emission trading can achieve some measure
of success in a developing country. The program has successfully achieved emissions
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reduction. Chile now has a complete inventory of pollution sources in Santiago. Trading
488

activity has also increased over time.

The program has been cost effective thus far.

5.8 Lessons and Transferable Ideas from the Santiago
Tradable Permit Program
Africa can use emissions trading (though not the credit based model adopted by Chile,
because of its high transaction costs) to combat air pollution. It is now clear that climate
489

change and air pollution are closely coupled. According to a report by the US EPA,

ozone is a significant contributor to climate warming. The climate impacts of ozone are
greatest when it is located in the upper part of the troposphere. Particle pollution can also
have significant effects on the climate because of its ability to absorb and scatter light.

490

In addition to greenhouse gases already in the scheme, including regular pollutants such
as Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), CFCs, and HFCs, will be good for the climate.
African countries can use emissions trading to achieve a complete inventory of
greenhouse gases, just like Chile used it to achieve a complete inventory. Having this
inventory will aid in the formulation of other climate change mitigation policies.
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Chapter 6

6

Conclusion

This thesis has demonstrated how African countries can contribute to UNFCCC’s goal to
stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Cooperation is
necessary between developed countries and developing countries if the goal of the
UNFCCC is to be realised. Two research questions were formulated for this study:
“What are the gaps in Africa’s climate change mitigation policy architecture?” and,
“Would adopting an emissions trading scheme as a policy instrument close the identified
gaps?”
In resolving the first question, reference was made to the proposed carbon tax in South
Africa, the REDD+ initiative, the CDM implementation in Africa, and the NAMA
initiative.
This thesis concludes that, going forward, the existing mitigation initiatives are
inadequate and will not allow African countries contribute effectively to the goal of the
Convention.
This thesis also highlights the ways in which a domestic emissions trading scheme can
assist. A cap on emissions can achieve more than the current piecemeal approach under
the CDM. A cap on the downstream sector, for instance, will not only reduce emissions
from the sector, but also reduce transport emissions, because low quality fuels produced
from the refineries are one of the causes of increased transport emissions. What is more,
the emissions of the continent are expected to grow in the future as countries undergo
development.
The drivers of deforestation in Africa threaten to undermine the new mitigation initiative
(REDD+) for developing countries. It has been shown that the drivers of deforestation are
economic, which makes the incentive-based system, inherent in a tradable permit scheme,
an appropriate remedy. A tradable permit scheme involving farmers and other forestdependent communities will put a value on forest cover and thus halt the loss of such.
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The success of REDD+ implementation will ensure that Africa contributes its fair quota
of diminishing the rising concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. It has
been argued that emissions trading could be a source of revenue for African countries,
which can be used to implement other mitigation measures. Revenues generated from
auctioning allowances can be used to finance renewable energy development.
For this to happen, auctioning has to be part of the design of the scheme. However,
auctioning has distributional implications. For instance, auctioning off allowances to
companies in the power sector could lead to increased electricity tariffs, as power
companies will want to shift the burden to the consumers. If the revenue generated from
auctioning is invested in generating electricity from renewable sources, this will address
the energy deficit in Africa. More people will have access to electricity. If the revenue
realised from auctioning is adequately invested in energy generation, consumers will
have the option of choosing between clean and unclean energy sources.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the policy is already under consideration in South Africa.
If the government of South Africa goes ahead with the introduction of the policy, the
program will mostly likely cover its energy generation sector, as it accounts for the bulk
of its emissions. The design of the program should have a price ceiling and floor.
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This

will address price crashes due to outside factors such as economic crises, which
determine the supply and demand for allowances. The price ceiling is normally set at a
rate considered to be harmful for economic productivity, while the floor is set at a rate
where it would become impossible for companies to stop reducing emissions effectively.
If the price gets too high, more allowances will be supplied to keep the price down. If the
price gets too low, some allowances will have to be withdrawn. This is why it is very
important that allowances are not made to be property rights. If they are property rights,
they inure to the benefits of the holders until disposed of. This will prevent a litigation
backlash due to the withdrawal of allowances.
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supra note 430, 431, and 434.
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Over-allocation of allowances should be avoided. Over-allocation can also lead to a price
crash. Allocating 50 percent of the allowances for free, and the remainder through
auctioning, from the inception of the program can help avoid an oversupply of
allowances as well.
South Africa can decide to implement the scheme alone, or partner with other high
emitting countries like Egypt, Algeria, and Nigeria to form a regional scheme. The larger
the sources, the more cost effective the scheme will be.
A lot of capacity building needs to be done before the policy can thrive in Africa. Any
country in Africa that wants to implement a tradable permit scheme could partner with
the European Union in setting up—and preventing cyber-attacks on—the registry. What
is more, the climate change secretariat will be more than willing to assist in capacity
building if the policy makers in Africa see its merit. Linking the registry of the scheme to
the international registry established under the Kyoto Protocol will ensure that
transactions under the scheme are transparent and that the scheme meets UNFCCC’s
overall objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere. In
conclusion, emissions trading is a viable policy option for fighting climate change in
Africa.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Sectors and Source Categories for CDM Project Activities.
Greenhouse gas emission reductions
Energy

Industrial processes

Agriculture

Waste

CO2 – CH4 – N2O

CO2– N2O – HFCs –
PFCs – SF6

CH4 – N2O

CH4

Enteric fermentation
• Rice cultivation
Agricultural soils
Prescribed burning of
savannas (cerrado)
Filed burning of
agricultural residues
• Others

Solid waste disposal
Wastewater handling
Waste incineration·
Others

Fuel combustion
Energy industries·
Manufacturing
industries
Construction
Transport
• Other sectors
Fugitive emissions
from fuels
Solid fuels
Oil and natural gas

Mineral products·
Chemical industry
Metal production
Production and
consumption of
halocarbons and
sulphur hexafluoride
Solvent use
Others

CO2 removals
Reforestation/afforestation
Source: Nederberger, Anne and Raymond Saner, “Exploring the relationship between FDI flows and CDM
potential” (2005) 14 Transnational Corporations 1.
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Appendix B: Types and Numbers of CDM Projects in Africa
Types of CDM projects in Africa

Number of
projects

Landfill gas

29

Wind

27

Biomass energy

27

Reforestation

17

Hydro

16

Fossil fuel switch

11

EE households

10

N2O

8

EE own generation

8

Fugitive

8

Methane avoidance

7

Solar

7

Afforestation

4

Cement

3

EE industry

3

EE supply side

2

Geothermal

2

Coal bed/mine methane

1

Source: Carbon Markets and Africa: a Quick Factsheet for Journalists, online:
<http://www.unep.org/climatechange/Portals/5/cop17/docs/Carbon_Markets_and_Afria_Resource_Guide_f
or_Journalists.pdf>.
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Appendix C: Most Populous Countries and Total Fertility Rates, 2012
2012

2050

Country

Population (Millions)

Country

Population (Millions)

China

1350

India

1691

India

1260

China

1211

United States

314

United States

423

Indonesia

241

Nigeria

402

Brazil

194

Pakistan

314

Pakistan

180

Indonesia

309

Nigeria

170

Bangladesh

226

Bangladesh

153

Brazil

213

Russia
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Dem. Rep. Congo

194

Japan

128

Ethiopia

166

Countries with the Highest Total Fertility Rates 2012
Country

TFR

Niger

7.1

Somalia

6.4

Burundi

6.4

Mali

6.3

Angola

6.3

145

Dem. Rep. Congo

6.3

Source: Population Reference Bureau, online: <http://www.prb.org/pdf12/2012-population-datasheet_eng.pdf>.
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Appendix D: Facilities Used for Mining/Drilling, Processing, and Refining of
Petroleum in Africa
Country

Location/Name

Owner/Operator

Angola

Lobito

Sociedade Nacional de PetrÃ³leos de Angola (Sonangol)

Angola

Luanda

Sociedade Nacional de PetrÃ³leos de Angola (Sonangol)

Benin

SÃ¨mÃ¨ Kpodji

Zetah Oil Company of CÃ´te d’Ivoire (private, 100 percent)

About 21 oilfields, which
included Bavo, Ekoundou
Cameroon

Horst, Eloundou,Eloundou

Total Exploration and Production Cameroun (Total S.A., 100

Nord Marine, Ekoundou

percent)

Sud, Itindi, and Kombo
Centre

Makoko Northeast,
Cameroon

Makoko-Anana and makoko
South Marine Fields;

Pecten Cameroon Co. (Pecten International, 80 percent)

Lipenja

Cameroon

Moudi and Kribi Fields

Pecten Cameroon Co.

Cameroon

Refinery at Limbe

Societa Nationale de Raffinage (Government, 66 percent)

Bolobo, Kome, and

Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc. (Exxon Mobil

Miandoum Fields

Corp.,40 percent)

Congo –

East Mibale and 5 other

Societe de Recherche et d’Exploitation des petroles au

Kinshasa

offshore wells

Congo, Perenco plc (France and Uunited Kingdom)

Chad

Congo –
Kinshasa

Muanda

Societe Congo-Italienne de Raffinage (SOCIR),
(Government, 50 percent, Agip SA, 50 percent)
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Congo –
Kinshasa

Congo –

Offshore Wells (y)

ChevronTexaco Oil Congo (DRC) Ltd. [Muanda International
Oil Co. (Perenco plc (Europe) 50 percent )]

Onshore wells

TotalFinaElf

Cote D’Ivoire

Abidjan

SociÃ©tÃ© Ivorienne de Raffinage

Egypt

Ain al-Sokhna to Sidi Kir

Arab Petroleum Pipeline Co. (Egypt, 50 percent)

Egypt

Alexandria

Alexandria Petroleum Co. (Government, 100 percent)

Egypt

Ameriya

Egypt

Asyut

Egypt

Belayim, Suez Gulf

Egypt

Gulf Of Suez, October

Gulf of Suez Oil Co. (EGPC , 50 percent; Amoco, 50 percent)

Egypt

Gulf of Suez, Ras Budran

Suez Oil Company (EGPC, 50 percent)

Egypt

Mostorod, Tanta

Cairo Petroleum Refining Co. (Government, 100 percent)

Egypt

Suez

El-Nasr Petroleum Refining Co. (Government, 100 percent)

Egypt

Suez

Suez Petroleum Processing Co. (Government, 100 percent)

Alba Field, Alba Block

Joint Venture of Marathon Oil Co.( 63 percent)

Ceiba Field, Block G

Triton Equatorial Guinea, Inc.(80.75 percent)

Kinshasa

Equatorial
Guinea

Equatorial
Guinea

Ameriya Petroleum Refining Co. (Government, 100
percent)

Asyut Petroleum Refining Co. (Government, 100 percent)

Belayim Petroleum Co. (EGPC, 50 percent; International
Egyptian Oil Co. 50 percent)
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Equatorial

Punta Europa

Marathon Oil Co.(52 percent)

Zafiro Field, Block B

Joint Venture of Mobil Equatorial Guinea Inc.(71.25 percent)

Eritrea

Assab

Petroleum Corp. of Eritrea

Gabon

15 km South of Mayumba

Perenco Plc.

Guinea

Equatorial
Guinea

Gabon

60 km Southwest of Port
Gentil

Perenco plc.

Gabon

Anguille field

Total Group, 100 percent

Gabon

Atora field

Total Group, 40 percent (Total is the operator.)

Gabon

Avocette field

Total Group, 57.5 percent (Total is the operator)

Gabon

Gabon

Gabon

Gabon

Gabon

Gabon

Gabon

Avocette, Coucal, and Hylia
fields

Baudroie Nord field

Gamba-Ivinga Field,
Onshore Gamba

Gonelle Field

Oguendjo Offshore Field, 85
km Southeast of Port Gentil

Port Gentil

Rabi-Kounga Field, 100 km
North of Gamba

Elf Gabon

Total Group, 50 percent (Total is the operator)

Shell Gabon

Total Group, 100 percent

Perenco Plc.

SociÃ©tÃ© Gabonaise de Raffinage

Total Group, 47.5 percent (Total is the operator.)
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Ghana

Saltpond and Tano Fields

Ghana National Petroleum Corp. (Government, 100 percent)

Ghana

Tema

Tema Oil Refinery (Government, 100 percent)

Kenya

Mombasa

Kenya Petroleum Refineries Ltd. [Government, 50 percent;

Libya

Az Zawiya

Az Zawiya Oil Refining Co.

Libya

Marsa el Brega

Libyan National Oil Co.

Libya

Ras Lanuf

Ras Lanuf Oil and gas Processing Co.

Libya

Sarir

Arabian Gulf Oil Co.

Libya

Tobruk

Arabian Gulf Oil Co.

Madagascar

Toamasina

Galana International, Groupe Trimeta, Gulf

Mauritania

Nouadhibou refinery

SociÃ©tÃ© Mauritanienne d'Industrie de Raffinage

Morocco

Bouhoua, Nador

Morocco

Mohammedia

Morocco

Sidi Kacem

SAMIR

Nigeria

Kaduna refinery

Kaduna Refinery and Petrochemicals Co. Ltd.

Nigeria

New Port Harcourt

-

Nigeria

Niger Delta

Nigeria

Old Port Harcourt

SociÃ©tÃ© d'Exploitation des Mines du Rif (SEFERIF)
(BRPM, 100 percent)

SociÃ©tÃ© Anonyme Marocaine de l'Industrie du Raffinage
(SAMIR) (Group Corral Petroleum, 64.7 percent)

Various joint ventures with Nigerian National Petroleum
Corp.

-
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Nigeria

Warri Refinery

Warri Refinery and Petrochemicals Co. Ltd.

Senegal

Dakar

SociÃ©tÃ© Africaine de Raffinage (private, 100 percent)

Sierra Leone

Freetown

Sierra Leone Petroleum Refining Co. Ltd.

Somalia

Mogadishu

Iraqsoma Refinery Co.

South Africa

Cape Town

Caltex Oil SA Pty. Ltd. (private, 100 percent)

South Africa

Gencor, Durban

Engen Ltd. (62 percent)

South Africa

Johannesburg area

Africa Pty. Ltd. (Sasol Ltd., Total SA)

South Africa

Mossel Bay

South Africa

Natref, Secunda

South Africa

Oribi field area, Mossel Bay

South Africa

Oryx field

South Africa

Sanref, Durban

Sudan

Abu Jabra

Mossgas (Pty) Ltd. (Government, 100 percent through
Central Energy Fund)

National Petroleum Refiners of South

Southern Oil Exploration Co. (Soeker)(Government, 100
percent)

Southern Oil Exploration Co. (Soeker)(Government, 100
percent)

Shell and BP Refineries Pty. Ltd. (Shell International B.V., 50
percent; BP Plc, 50 percent)

Government

Block 1, Unity, El Toor,
Tooma South Fields; Block
1a, Munga, Khairat Fields;
Sudan

Block 2, Grand Heglig Field
(Heglig, Barki, Hamra,
Kanga Laloba, Rihan, and
Toma Fields); Block 2a,

Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Co. [China National
Petroleum Corp. (CNPC), 40 percent]
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Bamboo, Garaad Fields

Petrodar Consortium (China National Petroleum Corp. 41

Sudan

Block 3 – Adar-Yale Field

Sudan

Block 6 – Abu Gabra

China National Petroleum Corp.

Sudan

El Obeid

Government

Sudan

Jali

Sudan

Port Sudan

Port Sudan Refining Ltd. (Government, 100 percent)

Sudan

Shajirah

Concorp Ltd.

Tanzania

Dar es Salaam

Tanzanian & Italian Petroleum Refining Co.

Tunisia

Bizerte

Societe Tunisienne des Industries du Raffinage

percent)

Khartoum Oil Refinery (China National Petroleum Corp., 50
percent; Sudan Petroleum Corp., 50 percent)

Source: Petroleum Facilities in Africa (6 June 2010), online: Afribiz
<http://www.afribiz.info/content/petroleum-facilities-in-africa>.

Cement Facilities in Africa
Country

Location/Name

Owner/Operator

Algeria

Aïn Touta

Algeria

Aïn-Kébira

Algeria

Bekkouche

Algeria

Beni-Saf

Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés de l’Ouest

Algeria

Chlef

Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés d’Ech

Société des Ciments d’Aïn-Touta (Enterprise des Ciments et Derives
de l’Est, 100 percent)

Société des Ciments d’Aïn-Kébira (Enterprise des Ciments et Derives
de l’Est, 100 percent)

Société des Ciments de Tébessa (Enterprise des Ciments et Derives de
l’Est, 100 percent)
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Société des Ciments de Hamma-Bouziane (Enterprise des Ciments et

Algeria

Hamma-Bouziane

Algeria

Meftah

Algeria

M’Sila

Algeria

Raïs-Hamidou

Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés du Centre

Algeria

Saïda

Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés de l’Ouest

Algeria

Sour-El-Ghoziane

Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés du Centre

Algeria

Tébessa

Algeria

Zahana

Angola

Luanda

Benin

Cotonou Plant

Benin

Do.

Benin

Onigbolo plant

Société des Ciments d’Onigbolo (Amida Group, 100 percent)

Burkina Faso

Ouagadougou plant

Ciment du Burkina (Holcim Ltd. of Switzerland, 100 percent)

Burundi

Bujumbura

Burundi Cement Plant

Derives de l’Est, 100 percent)

Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés du Centre

Algerian Cement Co. (Orascom ConstructionIndustries S.A., 100
percent)1

Société des Ciments de Tébessa (Enterprise des Ciments et Derives de
l’Est, 100 percent)

Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés de l’Ouest

Nova Cimangola S.A.R.L.(Scanang Holding Co., 49 percent,
Government, 39.8 percent, and Bank BAI, 9.5 percent)

Ciments du Benin S.A. (Lafarge Group significant minority holder)

Société des Ciments du Benin (Government, 50 percent, and private,
50 percent)

Bonaberi near
Cameroon

Douala and Figuil at
Garoua

Cimentaries du Cameroun (Lafarge Group, 57 percent)
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Congo –
Brazzaville

Congo –
Kinshasa

Congo –
Kinshasa

Congo –
Kinshasa

Congo –
Kinshasa

Congo –
Kinshasa

Loutété

Nouvelle Société de Ciments du Congo

Kabimba in
theLubumbashi area,

Interlacs (The Forrest Group)

Katanga Province

Kimpese

Cimenterie Nationale SARL

Lubudi , in the Likasi
and Kolwezi area,

Cemenkat, (The Forrest Group, and Gecamines)

Katanga Province

Luena

La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines).

Lukala in the
Kinshasa area in Bas-

Lukala Cements Company, (The Forrest Group)

Congo Province

Cote D’Ivoire

Abidjan Plant

Société des Ciments d’Abidjan (Government, 40 percent)

Cote D’Ivoire

Abidjan Plant

Cote D’Ivoire

San Pedro

Egypt

Ain Sukhna

Suez Cement Co.

Egypt

Ameriyah

Ameriyah Cement Co.

Egypt

Assiut

Asiut Cement Co.

Egypt

Beni Suef

National Cement Co.

Société Ivorienne de Ciment et Materiaux (Holcim and Origny, 80
percent)

Société des Ciments du Sud-Ouest (Government and Omnium
Tropical)
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Egypt

El Mex

Alexandria Portland Cement Co.

Egypt

El Minya

Helwan Portland Cement Co.

Egypt

El Tabbin

National Cement Co.

Egypt

Helwan

Helwan Portland Cement Co.

Egypt

NA

Egyptian Cement Co. (Orascom Group, 40 percent; private

Eritrea

Massawa

Eritrea Cement Works

Ethiopia

Addis Ababa

Mugher Cement Enterprise (Government-

Ethiopia

Dire Dawa

Mugher Cement Enterprise (Government-

Ethiopia

Mekele

Messebo Building Materials Production

Ethiopia

Mugher

Mugher Cement Enterprise (Government-

Gabon

Franceville

Ciments du Gabon

Gabon

Owendo

Ciments du Gabon

Ghana

Takoradi

Ghana Cement Works Ltd. (Heidelberg Zement AG of Germany)

Ghana

Tema

Ghana Cement Works Ltd. (Heidelberg Zement AG of Germany)

Guinea

Conakry

Ciments de Guinee

Kenya

Athi River

East African Portland Cement Co. Ltd.

Kenya

Kaloleni

Athi River Mining Ltd.

Kenya

Mombasa

Bamburi Cement Ltd.
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Kenya

Nairobi

Bamburi Cement Ltd.

Liberia

Monrovia

Liberia Cement Corp

Libya

Al Margab (Homs 1)

Arab Cement Co.

Libya

El Hawari, Benghazi
Province

Libyan Cement Co.

Libya

Fataih, Derna

Libyan Cement Co.

Libya

Libda (Homs 2)

Arab Cement Co.

Libya

Souk el Khamis,
Tripoli

Arab Cement Co.

Libya

Zliten

Arab Cement Co.

Madagascar

Ibity

Holcim Madagascar S.A.

Madagascar

Mahajanga

SA Nouvelle Cimenterie Amboanio

Malawi

Blantyre

Portland Cement Co. Ltd.

Malawi

Changalume

Portland Cement Co. Ltd.

Malawi

Livwezi

Shayona Cement Corp.

Mali

Bamako

Société Lou Kouma (private, 100 percent)

Mali

Bamako area

Diamou Cement (private, 100 percent)

Mauritania

Morocco

Nouakchott grinding
plant

Agadir

Ciment de Mauritanie (private, 100 percent)

Société les Ciments du Maroc S.A. (CIMAR)
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Morocco

Morocco

Cadem, at Meknes

Douar Laaouameur,
south of Casablanca

Asment de Temara

Société Lafarge Ciments S.A. (Lafarge Maroc, 69.2 percent)

Morocco

Fès, at Doukkarat

Société Holcim (Maroc) S.A

Morocco

Fès, at Ras El Ma

Société Holcim (Maroc) S.A

Morocco

Kiln and mill at
Oujda

Société Holcim (Maroc) S.A. (Holcim Ltd. of Switzerland, 51 percent)

Morocco

Layoune

Société les Ciments du Maroc S.A. (CIMAR)

Morocco

Marrakech

Société les Ciments du Maroc S.A. (CIMAR)

Morocco

Nador

Société Holcim (Maroc) S.A

Morocco

Safi

Société les Ciments du Maroc S.A. (CIMAR)

Morocco

Tamuda, at Tétouan

Asment de Temara

Morocco

Tangier

Asment de Temara

Morocco

Temara

Asment de Temara (Cimentos de Portugal, 57.4 percent)

Morocco

Tétouan II

Asment de Temara

Mozambique

Dondo

Cimentos de Mocambique, SARL

Mozambique

Matola

Cimentos de Mocambique, SARL

Mozambique

Nacala

Cimentos de Mocambique, SARL

Niger

Malbaza plant

Société Nigeriénne de Cimenterie (Holderbank, 77 percent)
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Nigeria

Ashanka

Ashanka Cement Co. plc

Nigeria

Benue State

Benue Cement Co. p.l.c.

Nigeria

Calbar

United Cement Co of Nigieria

Nigeria

Ewekoro

West Africa Portland Cement Co.

Nigeria

Ibese

Dangote Cement Works

Nigeria

Nkalagu

Nigeria Cement Co.

Nigeria

Okepella

Bendel Cement Co. Ltd.

Nigeria

Shagamu

West Africa Portland Cement Co.

Nigeria

Sokoto

Cement Co. of Northern Nigeria

Reunion

Bourbon

Ciments de Bourbon SA

Rwanda

Plant at Cyangugu

Cimenterie du Rwanda

Senegal

Kirène

Les Ciments du Sahek S.A. of Senegal (private, 100 percent)

Senegal

Rufisque

Société Ouest Africaine des Ciments (private, 100 percent)

Sierra Leone

Freetown

Sierra Leone Cement Corp. Ltd. (HeidlebergCement, 50 percent)

Somalia

Berbera

Berbera Cement Agency

De Hoek,
Dwaalboom,
South Africa

Herculese, Jupiter,
Slurru, Riebeeck
West, Port Elizabeth

Pretoria Portland Cement Co. Ltd. (Barlworld Trust Co. Ltd., 60.3
percent)
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Dudfield,
South Africa

Lichtenburg area,

Alpha Ltd. [Holcim Ltd. (Switzerland)]

Roodepoort

South Africa

South Africa

Durban area

Lichtenburg, North
West Province

Lafarge South Africa Ltd. [Lafarge (France)]

Lafarge South Africa Ltd. [Lafarge (France)]

Simumu plant, 125
kilometers southwest
South Africa

of Durban; also

Natal Portland Cement Co. (Pty.) Ltd. [Cimentos de Portugal SGPS,

grinding mills at

S.A. (CIMPOR)]

Durban and
Newcastle

South Africa

Ulco

Alpha Ltd. [Holcim Ltd. (Switzerland)]

Sudan

Atbara

Sudan

Rabak

Nile Cement Company (Government, 100 percent)

Tanzania

Mbeya

Mbeya Cement Co. Ltd. (LaFarge Group)

Tanzania

Tanga

Tanga Cement Co. Ltd. (Holcim Ltd., 60 percent)

Tanzania

Wazo Hill

Tanzania Portland Cement Co. Ltd.

Togo

Lomé

Ciments du Togo S.A.

Togo

Tabligbo

West African Cement S.A.

Tunisia

Ben Arous

Société de Ciments Artificiels Tunisiens

Tunisia

Bizerte

Société de Ciment de Bizerte

Atbara Cement Company Ltd. (LaFarge Group of France and Dal
Group of Sudan)
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Tunisia

Enfida

Société de Ciment d’Enfida

Tunisia

Feriana

Société Tuniso-Algérienne de Ciment Blanc S.A.

Tunisia

Gabès

Société de Ciment de Gabès

Tunisia

Jbel Oust

Société de Ciment de Jbel Oust

Tunisia

Le Kef

Société de Ciment d’Oum el Kélil

Uganda

Kasese

Hima Cement Industries Ltd. (Bamburi Cement Ltd., 70 percent)

Uganda

Tororo

Tororo Cement Industries Ltd.

Zambia

Lusaka

Chilanga Cement plc (Lafarge, 51 percent)

Zambia

Ndola

Chilanga Cement plc (Lafarge, 51 percent)

Zimbabwe

Bulawayo

Portland Holdings Ltd. (Pretoria Portland Cement Co. Ltd.)

Zimbabwe

Gwanda

Portland Holdings Ltd. (Pretoria Portland Cement Co. Ltd.)

Zimbabwe

Harare

Circle Cement (Pvt. ) Ltd.

Zimbabwe

Indiva

Sino-Zimbabwe Cement

Source: Cement Operations in Africa (1 June 2010), online: Afribiz
<http://www.afribiz.info/content/cement-operations-in-africa>.
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Appendix E: Compliance in the Santiago Tradable Permit Program

Source: Coria and Sterner, Tradable Permits in Developing Countries Evidence From Air Pollution in
Santiago, Chile, (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper December 2008), 1 at 27, online:
<http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-08-51.pdf>.
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